Trump’s shock and bore doctrine won’t ‘Make America Great Again’

For much of the past decade, India viewed the United States with renewed strategic optimism. Whether under Republican or Democratic administrations, Washington had gradually arrived at the same geopolitical conclusion: the Indo-Pacific would define the twenty-first century, China represented the principal long-term strategic challenge, and India was indispensable to maintaining a favourable balance of power. Donald Trump's first administration appeared to accelerate that trajectory. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was revived with renewed purpose, defence cooperation deepened, and his Cabinet contained some of the most openly pro-India figures in modern American politics. I was among those who believed a second Trump administration would build upon those foundations. The expectation has not matched the reality.

Donald Trump remains one of the most remarkable political communicators of the modern era. He possesses an instinctive understanding of the media, an unrivalled ability to dominate political debate, and an extraordinary talent for forcing opponents onto the ground of his choosing. Those qualities helped transform American politics and twice carried him to the White House. Governing the world's leading power, however, requires more than controlling the headlines. It requires strategic discipline, consistency, and an appreciation that America's greatest strength has never been its military alone, but the confidence its allies place in its judgement.

More from Opinion

The defining characteristic of Trump's second presidency has increasingly become disruption for its own sake. During his first term, unpredictability often seemed to serve a broader strategic objective, particularly with respect to China and the Indo-Pacific. Today, unpredictability increasingly appears to be the strategy itself. There is an important distinction between calculated ambiguity and strategic incoherence. Richard Nixon deliberately cultivated uncertainty during the Cold War, but always within a coherent framework designed to strengthen America's negotiating position. Ronald Reagan combined uncompromising rhetoric with disciplined diplomacy that ultimately reinforced Western unity. Even Henry Kissinger understood that tactical ambiguity only succeeds when it advances clearly defined political objectives. Uncertainty is a tool of statecraft. It is not statecraft itself.

The recent conflict with Iran exposed this weakness with uncomfortable clarity. Washington demonstrated overwhelming military capability, celebrated operational success, and projected confidence, yet the political end-state remained remarkably ill-defined. Iran's leadership survived, the wider regional balance remained unsettled, diplomatic uncertainty continued, and America's partners were left asking precisely what strategic objective had been achieved beyond the immediate military operation. Tactical victories should always serve political strategy rather than substitute for it. For India, this matters enormously. Stability across West Asia underpins India's energy security, affects millions of Indian citizens living and working throughout the Gulf, and remains central to ambitious connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. New Delhi, therefore, has every reason to favour predictability over improvisation.

The same instinct for disruption has increasingly shaped Washington's relationships with its allies. Trump's repeated public criticism of NATO, his confrontational rhetoric towards Canada, his recurring fascination with Greenland, and his willingness to personalise disagreements with friendly governments have generated considerable media attention. They have also raised uncomfortable questions about America's reliability. There is nothing inherently wrong with demanding greater burden-sharing amongst allies or insisting that partners contribute more to collective security. Previous American presidents have done precisely that. The difference lies in how those disagreements are conducted. Diplomacy is intended to strengthen alliances, not transform them into public spectacles.

For India, this trend deserves scrutiny because New Delhi's foreign policy increasingly rests upon an interconnected network of strategic partnerships rather than exclusive alliances. India works closely with the United States through the Quad, deepens defence cooperation with France, expands economic and industrial ties with Italy, strengthens maritime security alongside Australia and Japan, and builds wider connectivity with partners throughout the Gulf. The resilience of this architecture depends not merely on bilateral relationships but on confidence among all its principal participants. When unnecessary friction develops between its leading members, the consequences extend far beyond the immediate dispute.

This is particularly evident in Europe's evolving relationship with Washington. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and President Emmanuel Macron occupy opposite ends of Europe's political spectrum, yet both have become exceptionally important partners for India. Meloni has overseen a remarkable transformation in relations between Rome and New Delhi. Cooperation now extends across defence, advanced manufacturing, technology, migration, maritime security, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Meanwhile, Macron has elevated the Indo-French strategic partnership to unprecedented levels, embracing cooperation on defence, civil nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, space, the Indian Ocean, and the wider Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Modi has developed warm and productive relationships with both leaders, albeit for very different reasons. Together, France and Italy have become two of India's most significant strategic partners in Europe.

It is therefore striking that Donald Trump has managed to create unnecessary friction with both.

The dispute with Giorgia Meloni is perhaps the more surprising because she entered office as Trump's closest natural ideological ally in Europe. Their shared positions on immigration, national sovereignty, and conservative politics appeared to offer the basis for one of Washington's strongest European partnerships. Meloni attended Trump's inauguration, and many commentators predicted that Rome would become the White House's principal ally within the European Union. Instead, disagreements over Iran, defence policy, and wider transatlantic issues gradually gave way to something far more personal.

Following the G7 Summit, Trump claimed in a televised interview that Meloni had "begged" him for a photograph because she believed it would increase her popularity in Italy. Meloni responded that the allegation was "totally invented", adding pointedly that "Neither I nor Italy ever beg." Rather than allowing the matter to fade, Trump escalated the row by posting a photograph of the Italian Prime Minister on Truth Social, accompanied by the caption, "RESTRAINING ORDER NEEDED", implying that she was somehow pursuing him. The episode attracted widespread criticism across Italy's political spectrum and forced senior ministers to remind observers that relations between nations should always transcend disagreements between individual leaders. What might have been dismissed as playground humour amongst political commentators assumed a very different significance when it emanated from the President of the United States.

For many observers, the episode symbolised a broader problem. Successful diplomacy is built upon discretion, mutual respect, and an understanding that even profound disagreements should be managed in ways that preserve long-term strategic relationships. Publicly mocking one of America's closest ideological partners may generate applause from domestic supporters, but it contributes little to advancing American interests. Meloni had done precisely what successive American administrations had encouraged European leaders to do: strengthen defence, embrace greater responsibility, and remain firmly committed to the Atlantic alliance. Alienating such a partner represented an unnecessary self-inflicted wound.

From an Indian perspective, the significance extends well beyond Italy. Giorgia Meloni has become one of Prime Minister Modi's closest European partners, and the warmth between New Delhi and Rome reflects a much wider strategic convergence. India has invested considerable diplomatic capital in strengthening ties with Italy as part of its broader engagement with Europe. When Washington publicly belittles one of New Delhi's most important partners, it inevitably introduces avoidable tension into a wider network of democratic cooperation that India has patiently spent years constructing.

If the Meloni dispute demonstrated Trump's willingness to personalise diplomacy, his increasingly difficult relationship with Emmanuel Macron illustrates a different problem altogether. Macron has long argued that Europe should develop greater strategic autonomy whilst remaining committed to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. Washington has not always welcomed that vision, fearing that a more independent Europe might weaken American influence. Ironically, Trump's conduct has often strengthened Macron's argument. Public disagreements over tariffs, NATO, Greenland, and, most recently, differing interpretations of diplomatic efforts surrounding the Iran conflict have reinforced concerns in European capitals that American foreign policy has become increasingly volatile. Trump publicly rebuked Macron after the French president commented on his abrupt departure from the G7, insisting that Macron "always gets it wrong" and had no understanding of his intentions regarding Iran. Such exchanges may appear trivial, yet they reinforce the perception that personal grievance increasingly shapes presidential diplomacy.

For India, Macron's importance cannot be overstated. France is India's leading defence partner in Europe, a regional power in the Indian Ocean, and one of the few countries to have consistently supported India's strategic ambitions over several decades. Modi and Macron have built a relationship founded upon mutual trust, strategic autonomy, and a shared commitment to a multipolar international order. If Washington repeatedly finds itself in unnecessary conflict with one of New Delhi's closest European partners, India cannot simply dismiss those disagreements as domestic American politics. They inevitably affect the wider strategic environment within which Indian diplomacy operates.

The implications become even more significant when viewed through the prism of the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is often described simply as a mechanism for balancing China's growing influence across the Indo-Pacific. In reality, its greatest strength lies elsewhere. The Quad functions because each participant believes the others possess a broadly consistent understanding of the long-term strategic destination. Confidence is its most valuable currency. Alliances and partnerships cannot thrive if their leading member increasingly appears driven by impulse rather than strategy. Trust, once diminished, is difficult to restore.

Washington's evolving approach towards Pakistan has compounded this uncertainty. Many in India's strategic community anticipated that Trump's second administration would continue recognising New Delhi as America's principal long-term partner in the Indo-Pacific, whilst maintaining a realistic appreciation of Pakistan's complex record on terrorism, regional instability, and its deepening relationship with China. Instead, warmer rhetoric towards Islamabad has generated understandable unease. India has never expected unquestioning American support; strategic autonomy remains central to its foreign policy. What India does expect, however, is consistency. Years of patient investment in the bilateral relationship should not be overshadowed by diplomatic gestures that create ambiguity about America's regional priorities.

The blurring of statecraft and spectacle has occasionally extended beyond geopolitics. Reports that Trump personally intervened with FIFA following the controversial red card shown to American striker Folarin Balogun before the United States' World Cup match against Belgium reinforced the perception that almost every international institution had become another arena for presidential performance. Whether dealing with NATO, the World Trade Organisation, or international sport, institutions derive their legitimacy from impartiality and consistency. Great powers strengthen themselves by reinforcing those principles rather than appearing to bend them towards immediate political advantage.

None of this diminishes the profound importance of the United States to India's future. America remains India's most significant strategic partner outside its immediate neighbourhood. Cooperation in defence, intelligence, advanced technology, semiconductors, critical minerals, maritime security, and the wider Indo-Pacific will continue to deepen because the underlying strategic logic remains compelling. China continues to represent the principal long-term geopolitical challenge confronting both democracies, and that reality transcends any individual presidency.

The concern is, therefore, not America's enduring importance but the direction of its leadership. The United States built the post-war international order not merely because it possessed unmatched military and economic power but because allies believed Washington combined strength with strategic judgement. Donald Trump has never lacked confidence or determination. What increasingly appears absent is the patient strategic discipline required to convert disruption into lasting geopolitical advantage.

History rarely judges great powers by the controversies they generated or the headlines they dominated. It judges whether they strengthened alliances, advanced enduring national interests, and left behind a more stable international order than the one they inherited. For many in India who once viewed a second Trump presidency with considerable optimism, that is becoming the defining question. Shock can be an effective political tactic. As a governing doctrine, however, it risks becoming an end in itself. When spectacle begins to eclipse strategy, even America's closest friends are entitled to ask whether the world's leading power still knows precisely where it intends to lead. Many are publicly calling for a divorce. Shock and Bore won’t Make America Great Again, it will speed up its demise.

(The author is a strategist in international relations and economic development. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)