Escalation trap to an exit strategy: How can the Iran war end?

The war in Iran is escalating with every passing day. Since July 8, when the ceasefire collapsed, the US has carried out daily strikes into Iran and, each time, Iran has responded in equal measure, if not more. The 14-Point MoU is practically dead and Iran has officially withdrawn from it. The death of three American soldiers, along with the destruction of a number of air and military assets based in Jordan and elsewhere in the region, is forcing the US to strike harder and deeper into Iran in the hope that, at some point, Iran will not be able to continue the war and seek a compromise. Unfortunately, it has not happened so far. The US has reportedly offered a temporary ceasefire of 10 days through intermediaries in Qatar, Egypt and Pakistan, but Iran is not willing to consider it.

The war has therefore entered a very dangerous phase, not because either Iran or the US is looking at an all-out war, but because neither is able to break free from the rapidly climbing ladder of escalation. What are the options, therefore, to end this war? Is there another MoU or a ceasefire on the horizon soon? Can there be a solution where neither side looks vanquished and beaten, even if there is no outright victory? And, most importantly, how long can this conflict continue, or is there a possibility of this, too, like Iraq and Afghanistan, being doomed to end up as another ‘Forever War’ for America?

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Trump’s Dilemma

The war in Iran has come a long way since its start on February 28. It is also a classic example of entering a war without a clearly defined strategy, with vague military objectives, a lack of coordination with allies and, most importantly, changing goalposts. The war started with three stated objectives — complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme, complete destruction of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and creating conditions for regime change in Iran.

Somewhere along the way, all three objectives either got superseded by new emerging battle priorities or were found to be militarily unachievable. As a result, the 14-Point MoU did not mention the ballistic missile programme at all, the nuclear issue was mentioned but without much clarity, and Iran’s support for regional proxies did not find any mention either. Of course, the regime, which not only has survived but seems to have greater control over the nation, is yet another US-Israeli goal left unachieved. Along the way, the changing goalposts — from securing American bases to protecting regional allies, protecting commercial shipping, enforcing a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and now the question of who controls the Strait of Hormuz — have not made the task for the US military any easier.

There are reports that the US may be considering a ground troop insertion as a final throw of the dice. However, most analysts have concluded that the geography favours Iran and that any ground insertion, although feasible, will be extremely hard to sustain and may result in heavy casualties without any assurance of a decisive victory. Continued escalation in any form is therefore not an option that is likely to deliver dividends for the US.

What about an exit then? President Trump is a master at building narratives and is absolutely capable of weaving a story for an exit, where the US does not look defeated but, in fact, disinterested in continuing. He has already dropped hints, stating that there is very little that the US gets out of the Strait of Hormuz and, therefore, it may be best for the regional players to sort it out with Iran. For the US, therefore, an agreement to cease hostilities, even if it is unilateral, and a return to the 14-Point MoU, leaving the crucial Clause 5 (on the administration and control of the Strait of Hormuz) to Iran, Oman and the regional players to sort out, could be a possible face-saving exit. The bottom line is clear — the military campaign is going nowhere, American casualties and damage to military assets may only rise, and continued escalation is a trap best avoided. A well-timed and even better orchestrated exit may therefore be a better option.

Another Ceasefire or an MoU

The ceasefires, commencing with the first one on April 7, to the 14-Point MoU signed on June 16, and the repeated violations have not presented a picture of confidence or assurance, at least for Iran. At every stage, Iran has claimed that the US has violated the ceasefire or the peace talks. In fact, the pre-emptive strikes by the US and Israel on 28th February are also considered a betrayal by Iran. Even the 14-Point MoU, though it brought a brief period of peace, left many critical issues unaddressed or deferred to the future because an immediate ceasefire was perhaps the primary priority. Going forward, will a similar MoU or a ceasefire work? The answer is clearly ‘No’ because, until such time as the core issues of mistrust and animosity are addressed and clearly agreed upon, violations will continue to take place.

Any ceasefire or peace agreement therefore has to answer critical questions such as: What happens to Iran’s nuclear programme? What about the disposal of already enriched uranium? What happens to Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities? What about economic sanctions on Iran? Who will have a say in the administration and control of the Strait of Hormuz? What happens to American military deployment and its security umbrella in the region?

A shallow ceasefire without a concrete political solution is only postponing the conflict, not terminating it. Also, the ceasefire must provide both sides with an honourable exit — therefore, the language and diplomacy would matter more than the content itself. The US could exit today, claiming that Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities have been severely degraded and that freedom of navigation has been restored. On the other hand, Iran could claim that it fought America on equal terms, preserved its sovereignty, retained the right to a peaceful nuclear programme and, most importantly, has administrative control (along with Oman) over the Strait of Hormuz.

A Regional Mechanism

The war has had disastrous consequences for the region. By hosting US military bases, most countries have found themselves caught in the middle. They have neither been able to prevent the US from using its bases in the region to target Iran nor have they been able to protect themselves from Iranian missiles. The American security assurances, which they have bought and outsourced for decades, have been laid bare, and there are no other security alternatives, at least in the current scenario. As the war is escalating, critical infrastructure is coming under threat from Iran. In response to US strikes targeting Iran’s crucial infrastructure, countries in the region have had to bear the brunt of the retaliation — the critical causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia has been bombed, water desalination plants in Kuwait have suffered damage, oil fields in Qatar have been hit, the US resupply and logistics node at Duqm Port in Oman has been badly damaged, and some unconfirmed reports suggest that an Amazon data centre in Bahrain was also hit on July 21.

While Qatar, Oman and Egypt have been actively involved in negotiating peace, some reports suggest that Saudi Arabia has also been conducting back-channel talks with Iran. And, of course, there is Pakistan, which has been involved in facilitating peace talks. If the US and Iran are not able to agree on an acceptable formula, perhaps the regional players, as a bloc, could come up with a face-saving solution.

The advantage of regional diplomacy is that it has the potential to create a broader framework which goes beyond the narrow bandwidth of American-Iranian negotiations. Also, the regional mechanism could address larger issues like the future of American military bases, the control and administration of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as a mechanism to monitor Iran’s nuclear programme in close collaboration with the IAEA.

With the region deeply split over the war and confused over how it can individually or collectively ensure future security beyond American assurances, this is going to be anything but easy. Plus, the Israel factor, the future of Gaza, the future of the Abraham Accords and the tilt of some nations towards Israel, especially the UAE, will be impediments. However, the prospects of prolonged instability and economic downturn could motivate the region to come together. If that happens, it may not only ensure an early end to the war but also provide a perfect off-ramp for both the US and Iran.

Conclusion

The war is at a critical inflection point, where any continued escalation could result in an irretrievable security situation. With every successful strike, the scope of military options is multiplying while diplomatic options are rapidly shrinking. The US can keep escalating, but it only gets sucked deeper into the escalation trap. Iran has no option but to continue resisting and striking back, but that too carries the risk of further destruction. Both sides are tired and hurting and are looking for an exit. The question is whether they can find an exit before the current escalation crosses a threshold beyond which an exit becomes a remote possibility and the region gets trapped in another ‘Forever War’. This war is no longer about outright victory; it is about finding an exit without appearing to lose.

(Col Rajeev Agarwal is a West Asia expert and a Senior Research Consultant at Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi. His X handle is @rajeev1421. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)