The Teesta gamble: Bangladesh’s China bet risks repeating Pakistan’s strategic mistakes

For nearly five decades, Bangladesh has been regarded as one of India's biggest diplomatic successes in South Asia. Despite periodic disagreements over illegal migration, border management, trade imbalances and the unresolved sharing of Teesta waters, the overall trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations remained positive. Security cooperation deepened significantly after Sheikh Hasina came to power; cross-border insurgent groups operating from Bangladeshi territory were curbed, connectivity projects expanded and bilateral trade reached unprecedented levels. India also emerged as one of Bangladesh's most important development partners through investments in railways, roads, power transmission and digital connectivity. The relationship demonstrated that two neighbours with difficult historical and geographical realities could still cooperate through mutual trust and shared economic interests.

That strategic understanding, however, is beginning to undergo a profound transformation. The announcement by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman that the China-backed Teesta Barrage Master Plan would be implemented "at any cost" marks much more than the approval of another infrastructure project. Coming immediately after Rahman's visit to Beijing, where he received assurances from the Chinese leadership that Beijing would continue supporting Bangladesh "no matter how the world changes", the project has acquired unmistakable geopolitical significance. It signals that Bangladesh is increasingly looking towards China not merely as an economic investor but as a long-term strategic partner in critical national infrastructure.

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From Bangladesh's perspective, the project addresses genuine developmental concerns. The Teesta River is central to the livelihoods of millions of people living in northern Bangladesh. Every year the country experiences devastating floods during the monsoon, followed by acute water shortages during the dry season. Farmers often witness the irony of abundant water flowing through rivers while agricultural land located only a few kilometres away suffers from drought because of inadequate storage and irrigation infrastructure. The proposed master plan aims to modernise river management, improve irrigation, increase water storage through the Padma Barrage, reduce flood damage and ensure year-round water availability. These are entirely legitimate developmental objectives for a country whose economy remains heavily dependent upon agriculture and whose vulnerability to climate change continues to increase.

However, the strategic implications of the project extend far beyond water management. The concern for India is not whether Bangladesh should improve its irrigation systems or seek international assistance for river management. Every sovereign nation has the right to pursue development according to its national priorities. The issue instead revolves around the identity of the external partner, the location of the project and the broader geopolitical context in which it is unfolding. Chinese involvement in a strategically sensitive area located close to India's Siliguri Corridor inevitably transforms what appears to be an engineering project into a matter of regional security.

The Siliguri Corridor, popularly known as the Chicken's Neck, is one of India's most vulnerable geographical features. This narrow strip of land, barely twenty to twenty-five kilometres wide at certain points, connects the entire northeastern region of India with the rest of the country. Nearly fifty million Indian citizens depend upon this corridor for transportation, logistics, military movement and economic connectivity. Any significant foreign presence near this strategic artery naturally attracts close scrutiny from Indian security planners. Modern infrastructure projects no longer consist merely of dams, canals and embankments. They increasingly incorporate digital communication systems, satellite monitoring, sensor networks, surveillance technologies and extensive data collection mechanisms. These technologies often possess dual-use capabilities, serving civilian purposes during peacetime while simultaneously providing valuable strategic information during periods of geopolitical tension. Consequently, China's growing role in the Teesta basin cannot be viewed by India solely through the lens of development cooperation.

China has attempted to reassure India by stating that its cooperation with Bangladesh "does not target any third party". Such assurances have become a recurring feature of Beijing's diplomatic messaging whenever concerns arise regarding its expanding presence in South Asia. Similar statements accompanied Chinese investments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar and the Maldives. Yet the evolution of these projects demonstrates that infrastructure investments frequently generate strategic consequences irrespective of their original stated intentions. The issue therefore is not China's public assurances but the long-term geopolitical realities created by sustained Chinese involvement in strategically sensitive locations across India's immediate neighbourhood.

The Teesta project also cannot be viewed in isolation because it forms part of a much larger pattern of Chinese engagement with Bangladesh. Over the past decade Beijing has steadily expanded its economic footprint by financing ports, bridges, highways, industrial parks, power generation projects and telecommunications infrastructure. China has simultaneously become Bangladesh's largest supplier of military equipment while increasing cooperation in defence technology and strategic planning. Individually, each of these projects may appear commercially justified and economically beneficial. However, collectively they reveal the gradual emergence of a long-term Chinese strategy aimed at establishing enduring political, economic and strategic influence within Bangladesh. This pattern mirrors China's approach across much of Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean region, where economic engagement has frequently preceded deeper geopolitical influence.

Pakistan offers perhaps the clearest example of how such strategic partnerships evolve over time. Islamabad's relationship with Beijing began as a security partnership during the Cold War but gradually expanded into one of the closest bilateral relationships in the world. Pakistani leaders consistently described China as their "all-weather friend" and believed that Beijing's economic and military support would permanently offset India's conventional superiority.

The results have been far more mixed than originally promised. Although Pakistan benefited from improvements in electricity generation and transportation infrastructure, many of the anticipated economic gains have failed to materialise. A substantial proportion of the projects were financed through loans rather than grants, significantly increasing Pakistan's external debt obligations. Chinese companies received the overwhelming majority of construction contracts, imported their own equipment and often relied heavily upon Chinese labour and technical personnel. Local industries remained only marginally integrated into the projects, limiting technology transfer and domestic industrial development. As Pakistan's debt servicing obligations increased, the country found itself repeatedly seeking financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund while struggling with severe foreign exchange shortages and recurring balance-of-payments crises.

Bangladesh's economic position differs substantially from Pakistan's, and there is no suggestion that Dhaka currently faces a similar debt crisis. Nevertheless, the broader strategic lesson remains relevant as dependence rarely emerges suddenly. It develops gradually through successive projects, expanding financial commitments, increasing technological reliance and deeper political coordination. What begins as development cooperation can eventually evolve into strategic dependence if diversification is gradually replaced by excessive reliance upon a single external partner.

The Teesta project therefore raises important questions about Bangladesh's long-term strategic direction. Bangladesh has every sovereign right to seek investments that contribute to national development, but the nature of those investments deserves careful consideration. The critical question is whether Chinese participation will genuinely strengthen Bangladesh's independent technological capabilities and institutional capacity or whether it will create long-term dependence upon Chinese financing, expertise, equipment and operational support. Sustainable development should enhance national autonomy rather than constrain it. Infrastructure should expand strategic options instead of narrowing them.

India's concerns regarding the project extend beyond the unresolved dispute over Teesta water sharing. For more than fifteen years, negotiations over a comprehensive water-sharing agreement remained stalled largely because of political opposition within West Bengal. With the recent political changes in the state, many observers believed that the possibility of finally resolving this long-standing dispute had significantly improved. Ironically, just as the political environment became more conducive to bilateral negotiations, Chinese involvement in the Teesta basin accelerated. This development complicates an issue that could potentially have been resolved through sustained India-Bangladesh dialogue.

From New Delhi's perspective, the project also raises broader questions about the future trajectory of bilateral relations. India has invested considerable diplomatic capital and financial resources in strengthening Bangladesh's economy and connectivity over the past decade. Electricity exports, railway modernisation, integrated check posts, inland waterway connectivity, border infrastructure and digital cooperation have all contributed to an unprecedented level of bilateral engagement. Counter-terrorism cooperation also transformed regional security by ensuring that insurgent organisations operating against India no longer enjoyed safe havens inside Bangladesh. These achievements were built upon mutual confidence and recognition of each other's core security interests. Any development that introduces strategic distrust into this relationship therefore carries consequences extending well beyond a single infrastructure project.

India, on the other hand, must also draw important lessons from the evolving situation. It cannot expect historical goodwill alone to sustain its influence in neighbouring countries. Infrastructure financing, project implementation and economic partnerships increasingly shape regional diplomacy. Delays in resolving the Teesta water-sharing agreement, coupled with slower execution of several connectivity projects, created opportunities that China has effectively utilised. If New Delhi intends to remain the preferred development partner in South Asia, it must demonstrate that cooperation with India can deliver projects efficiently, respond to the developmental aspirations of neighbouring countries and provide long-term economic value without creating strategic dependence.

Bangladesh requires the infrastructure necessary to secure its agricultural future and strengthen climate resilience. Yet the experience of Pakistan demonstrates that development partnerships should always be evaluated not merely by the scale of investment but by their long-term implications for economic sovereignty, strategic autonomy and foreign policy independence.

History repeatedly demonstrates that great powers pursue their own strategic interests, often irrespective of the long-term consequences for smaller partners. The Teesta project may well improve irrigation, strengthen flood control and support agricultural productivity, but the decisions surrounding its financing, implementation and strategic partnerships will also change the geopolitical landscape in South Asia. Bangladesh therefore faces a choice that extends well beyond river management. It must decide whether development will reinforce its strategic independence or gradually create the kind of dependence that Pakistan today finds increasingly difficult to escape.

(Raja Muneeb is an independent journalist and columnist. He tweets @rajamuneeb. The views expressed in this article are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.)