Fight and negotiate: The new normal in West Asia

Given the deep mistrust between the US and Iran, it was no surprise that the technical-level talks at the Bürgenstock resort, Switzerland, lasted only three days. These sessions commenced soon after the summit meeting attended by US Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf, with the Prime Ministers of Qatar and Pakistan participating as mediators.

Under US pressure and in coordination with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Oman initiated an evacuation plan on 23 June to rescue over 11,000 sailors and 500 merchant ships stranded in the Persian Gulf last week. To bypass Iranian oversight in the Strait of Hormuz, the designated route for this evacuation hugged the coast of Oman and was drawn up without consulting Tehran. This unilateral action angered Iran, particularly because the US had previously agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that Iran would oversee safe passage for commercial vessels for 60 days.

More from Opinion

Furthermore, most shipowners overwhelmingly favoured the Omani route, bypassing the Iranian-specified passage near its coast. This imbalance left Tehran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) completely sidelined. Retaliating against this development, Tehran warned that any unauthorised commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf would face immediate military action. Soon thereafter, on 25 June, a cargo ship off the Omani coast was hit by a drone. This forced the IMO — which had already successfully evacuated 115 vessels and 2,500 sailors — to temporarily suspend the operation.

This triggered a chain reaction: the US struck Iranian military assets in southern Iran, and Iran retaliated against US assets in Kuwait and later Bahrain. When the US pushed back by insisting that ships follow a safe route near Oman, Iran doubled down by hitting an oil tanker, sparking another round of reciprocal air strikes. Sensing that further escalation would destroy the delicate interim peace deal, the Trump administration announced a preliminary stand-down agreement to take place in Doha yesterday to end the tit-for-tat strikes and resume diplomatic negotiations. While Iran initially maintained calculated silence, it has now sent its delegation to Doha, though at a low level.

Over the past week, both the US and Iran have actively pursued diplomacy in the Persian Gulf region. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain and also had a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The joint statement of the meeting, which included Oman, emphasised that lasting stability depends on reopening the Strait of Hormuz for free, unconditional and unrestricted navigation. As for Iran, Foreign Minister Aragchi visited Baghdad and persuaded his Iraqi counterpart to propose an eight-country security and economic summit. Through this initiative — bringing together Iraq, Iran and the six GCC states — Iran hopes to counter mounting regional pressures.

In parallel, Iran has been negotiating with Oman to draft a permanent agreement on the administration of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz beyond the initial 60-day window. While Muscat firmly opposes mandatory fees or transit tolls, it does not rule out cost-recovery mechanisms for essential maritime services, such as enhancing navigational safety and combating pollution. This position aligns with Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides a legal framework for sharing the financial burden of keeping an international strait safe and clean through consensus-driven, voluntary partnerships with international users. The US and Iran could utilise this specific clause to structure a voluntary regional funding mechanism to be supported by the Gulf countries, which have strategic stakes in keeping the Strait of Hormuz permanently open for secure navigation.

Controlling transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains Iran’s primary leverage. It was this control that forced the US to declare the ceasefire in April and grant major concessions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Consequently, Tehran’s delegation will demand full responsibility for managing Hormuz maritime traffic as a non-negotiable condition for resuming technical talks in Doha.

The US had previously announced that the Doha talks would resume at both the political and technical levels, with the American team led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Iran — which was originally supposed to send Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi for the Doha meeting — decided against doing so because of deep mistrust of Witkoff and Kushner, whom Tehran considers responsible for the collapse of the two rounds of negotiations preceding the June 2025 war; instead, its delegation is now at a technical level.

Iran maintains that only after its control over the Strait of Hormuz is agreed will it move to discussions within the four distinct working groups focusing on nuclear issues, sanctions, reconstruction, and monitoring and dispute resolution. Additionally, Iran is demanding US agreement to the immediate release of the first tranche of its frozen funds — amounting to $6 billion — currently held in Qatari banks. Iran has not yet begun demining the Strait, an obligation it is required to fulfil within the first 30 days. Iran reacted sharply to the French President’s proposal to cooperate with Oman and other partners on clearing mines from the Strait of Hormuz, asking France not to complicate the issue.

What is the prognosis for the Doha talks?

Both the US and Iran wish to avoid a return to war. As far as the United States is concerned, President Trump is keen to secure a final deal guaranteeing that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon. For him, this agreement would serve as a major achievement ahead of the November midterm elections, while also stabilising global oil prices and cooling domestic inflation. As for Iran, although its leadership is not subject to democratic electoral pressures, it is critical for Tehran to ensure the continuation of the US sanctions exemptions on its oil exports beyond 21 August this year, when they are set to expire. Consequently, there is cautious optimism that the current ceasefire — despite violations — will continue to hold as both sides progress towards a permanent agreement with the “New Normal”, which is to fight while continuing to negotiate.

(The author is a former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, as well as a former Ambassador to Egypt and former Permanent Representative to the Arab League. The views expressed in this piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)