Bangladesh’s Teesta pivot to China threatens Dhaka more than Delhi

The Teesta River, originating in Sikkim and flowing through West Bengal before entering Bangladesh, has long symbolised both shared heritage and enduring friction. For years, Bangladesh has grappled with dry-season water shortages that devastate agriculture and livelihoods in its northern regions. The proposed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP), estimated at around $1 billion, envisions a large reservoir, extensive dredging, embankments, and new infrastructure to store monsoon waters and ensure steady flows.

Negotiations between India and Bangladesh date back decades. An ad hoc 1983 arrangement allocated shares roughly favouring India slightly, while a promising 2011 draft treaty—offering Bangladesh 37.5 per cent in the dry season—collapsed due to opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee over local concerns. India has invested in upstream projects for its own needs, but Delhi has repeatedly signalled willingness to collaborate. Post-2024 political shifts in Dhaka, successive governments under figures like Tarique Rahman have turned decisively to China. High-level visits in 2025-2026 with Xi Jinping and Chinese officials accelerated feasibility studies with POWERCHINA, bypassing deeper talks with India.

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This move reflects Bangladesh's frustration with delays but carries heavy risks. India, for its part, has demonstrated goodwill through high-level diplomatic appointments aimed at resetting ties. Yet Dhaka's choice highlights a troubling impatience that invites greater external influence.

Dhaka's Desperation: Why Bypass a Neighbour?

Bangladesh's urgency is understandable. Northern districts face recurrent water crises affecting millions of farmers and ecosystems. Leaders argue they cannot afford indefinite waits amid domestic pressures. However, this desperation reveals a shortsighted tilt. India has offered substantial support, including funding packages and technical collaboration for Teesta management. A senior Indian envoy was specifically chosen to strengthen bilateral bonds, reflecting New Delhi's commitment to constructive engagement despite its own federal challenges with states like West Bengal.

Dhaka could have pursued patient diplomacy, building on shared interests in connectivity, trade, and security. Instead, by fast-tracking with Beijing, it signals where its priorities lie. This is not a neutral development choice but one that sidelines a key neighbour directly affected by the river. India's approach has been balanced—acknowledging Bangladesh's needs while protecting its legitimate upstream interests. Rushing to China undermines the potential for mutually beneficial outcomes and exposes Bangladesh to dependencies it may later regret.

Beijing's Strategic Ambitions: Surrounding India

China sees clear gains in the Teesta pact. The project places its state-linked firms near India's vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, the narrow lifeline to the Northeast. This is no mere infrastructure venture; it advances Beijing's broader strategy of encircling India through economic footholds in neighbouring countries. From ports in Bangladesh to projects in Nepal and Myanmar, China systematically builds leverage that could constrain Indian manoeuvrability in crises.

Bangladesh holds special value for Beijing as a populous, strategically located partner in the Belt and Road Initiative.

Deeper involvement allows influence over key waterways, potential dual-use assets, and alignment on regional issues. While professing "win-win" cooperation free of third-party concerns, China's pattern reveals a drive for dominance rather than equitable partnership. This move strengthens Beijing's position in the Bay of Bengal while testing India's resolve. Bangladesh's desperation provides the opening China eagerly exploits.

The Trap of Financial Dependence

Infrastructure promises from China often mask long-term costs. For Bangladesh, the Teesta project risks locking it into heavy debt through loans that prioritise Chinese contractors and standards. History shows how such arrangements can lead to fiscal strain, renegotiations, and concessions that erode sovereignty.

What begins as river restoration may expand into Chinese-controlled economic zones or facilities serving Beijing's interests first.

This financial imperialism could burden future generations, divert resources from genuine domestic priorities, and heighten vulnerability to external pressure. Bangladesh deserves sustainable development, but tying its critical river management so closely to one powerful lender is a high-stakes gamble that may deliver short-term relief at the expense of long-term autonomy. India, by contrast, has a track record of grants and concessional support without such extractive strings.

Why India Must Take Note

India should respond with calm vigilance rather than overreaction. Dhaka's decision casts doubt on bilateral trust at a time when Delhi has extended olive branches. Chinese presence so close to sensitive borders raises legitimate security questions—potential for intelligence advantages or infrastructure that could serve non-civilian purposes. This is not good news for regional harmony.

Yet India's strength lies in its measured approach. It can continue offering alternatives, deepen economic ties where possible, and bolster its own Northeast infrastructure. The situation underscores the need for proactive diplomacy that addresses Dhaka's genuine concerns while safeguarding core interests. Bangladesh's choices ultimately harm its own strategic balance more than they constrain a resilient India.

Broader Risks for South Asian Geopolitics

This pact tilts South Asia toward greater Chinese sway, weakening the prospects for cooperative regionalism. Beijing's playbook—exploiting bilateral disputes for strategic entry—fosters dependency across smaller states and complicates India's efforts to foster stability through mutual respect. South Asia thrives when neighbours prioritise shared prosperity over external rivalries; China's involvement risks turning rivers into arenas of competition rather than collaboration.

Dhaka's desperation plays into this dynamic, potentially isolating it from balanced partnerships. For the region, this is a concerning precedent that empowers one external actor at the cost of collective autonomy. India, with its democratic credentials and developmental focus, remains a more reliable anchor for South Asian progress. True stability demands restraint from over-ambitious external powers and wiser choices by regional states.

(Sayantan Ghosh is the author of two books, 'Battleground Bengal' and 'The Aam Aadmi Party'. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)