Why South Korean President Lee’s India visit is a strategic game-changer | An Expert Take

The summer heat has begun to settle over the national capital and amid the high temperatures, Code One of the Republic of Korea touched down at Palam Air Force Station on Sunday, marking the commencement of President Lee Jae-myung’s three-day State Visit to India.

The visit is not merely a routine diplomatic exchange, it is a high-octane "reboot" of a relationship that many analysts felt had entered a period of strategic stasis.

Accompanied by a massive business delegation of nearly 200 executives — including the heads of Samsung, Hyundai, SK Group, and LG — the South Korean president's itinerary reflects a world where economic security and national security are now indistinguishable.

To unpack the layers of this visit, Firstpost spoke with Dr. Jagannath Panda, Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) and a leading voice on Indo-Pacific power dynamics.

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In a comprehensive interaction, Panda explains why the "8-year gap" between presidential visits has ended and what the "new era" of India-South Korea ties looks like in a fractured global order.

The end of the "eight-year itch": Why now?

For nearly a decade, the "Special Strategic Partnership" between New Delhi and Seoul seemed to exist more on paper than in practice. While trade continued, the high-level political momentum seen during the 2018 visit of former South Korean President Moon Jae-in had dissipated.

When asked why it took nearly a decade for a South Korean leader to return to India, Panda points to factors like domestic preoccupations and shifting regional priorities.

"It has taken so long because India-South Korea ties were never broken, but they were often overshadowed by each side’s more immediate strategic compulsions," Panda explains.

"South Korea remained heavily consumed by North Korea, alliance management with the United States, and its deep economic exposure to China. India, meanwhile, was preoccupied with managing China on the Himalayan frontier, Pakistan-related security concerns, and a crowded major-power agenda."

Panda also notes that the internal mechanics of South Korean democracy played a role. "On top of that, South Korea’s domestic political churn and single-term presidential system made long-horizon strategic continuity harder. So, the relationship stayed important, but not urgent."

However, the 2026 landscape is vastly different from that of 2018. The post-pandemic world, coupled with the "de-risking" strategies of major economies, has forced a rethink in Seoul.

"What has changed now is the regional setting. Asia is no longer driven only by growth optimism; it is shaped by supply-chain insecurity, maritime contestation, technology rivalry, and pressure to diversify away from China-centric production networks," Panda observes.

"India has become far more central to these calculations because of its market size, manufacturing push, digital scale, and diplomatic weight across the Global South. Seoul’s current leadership is also looking beyond traditional dependence on the US alliance and the China market. That is why President Lee’s visit now looks less symbolic and more strategic."

The $50 billion dream: Upgrading CEPA

One of the most persistent hurdles in the bilateral relationship has been the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Signed in 2009 and implemented in 2010, the agreement is widely seen as outdated, with India frequently raising concerns over its burgeoning trade deficit with South Korea.

The two nations have set an ambitious target of $50 billion in bilateral trade by 2030. Can this visit provide the necessary oxygen to reach that summit? Panda believes the political "push" is necessary but must be followed by granular execution.

"This visit can provide the political push, but not by itself. High-level visits matter because they reduce uncertainty for investors, signal bureaucratic seriousness, and encourage industry to move from discussion to execution," he says.

"If both leaders use this visit to unblock CEPA issues, set timelines, and identify a few flagship sectors, then the $50 billion target by 2030 becomes more credible. But the real test is not the headline target; it is whether both sides can make the trade relationship more balanced, broader, and less dependent on a narrow set of manufactured goods."

According to Panda, the roadmap for this growth is already etched in the technological requirements of the coming decade.

"The sectors that can drive the jump are clear: electronics and semiconductors, auto components and EV ecosystems, ship-building and maritime equipment, defence manufacturing, clean energy technologies, batteries, and high-end industrial machinery. India offers scale, policy incentives, and a growing consumer and export base; South Korea offers technology depth, manufacturing discipline, and world-class industrial ecosystems."

However, he warns that the "implementation gap" must be closed.

"The problem with CEPA so far has been pace, regulatory friction, and a gap between political rhetoric and commercial follow-through. So, this visit matters if it produces a more practical roadmap: faster customs procedures, better market access, investment protection, deeper value-chain integration, and a CEO-led implementation mechanism. In that case, the visit could become the inflection point that turns CEPA from a negotiation file into a growth platform."

Semiconductors: The OSAT and ATMP strategy

As India pushes its Semiconductor Mission, many have wondered if a South Korean giant like Samsung or SK Hynix would announce a "frontier fab" (a front-end fabrication plant) during this visit.

While the hope for a multi-billion dollar fab remains, Panda suggests a more pragmatic, phased approach is currently "on the table."

"At this stage, the most realistic India-South Korea semiconductor opportunity is not an immediate cutting-edge fab, but packaging, testing, assembly, memory-linked ecosystems, specialty materials, equipment partnerships, and design collaboration," Panda notes.

"India’s semiconductor incentives have increasingly focused on building a complete electronics-component ecosystem, not just a prestige fab. That creates room for South Korean firms to enter where they are strongest: memory, advanced packaging, substrate materials, display-linked electronics, equipment supply, and manufacturing know-how."

This "component-first" strategy aligns with India's Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, which seek to build depth rather than just surface-level assembly.

"So, when it is asked, what is 'on the table,' the likely answer is a mix of OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test)/ATMP (Assembly, Testing, Marking and Packaging)-style investments, supplier park participation, joint R&D and workforce training, and deeper sourcing commitments from Korean majors already embedded in India’s electronics base," Panda elaborates.

He points out that the presence of the business delegation is key. "Samsung already has a large manufacturing footprint in India, and Korean conglomerates are part of the business delegation accompanying President Lee. That gives the visit commercial weight. But a course correction is needed here: both sides must avoid treating semiconductors as a slogan."

"India needs faster land, utilities, logistics, and talent pipelines; Korean firms need to view India not only as a consumer-electronics market but as a scalable node in a trusted supply chain. In the short term, packaging and component eco-systems are more plausible than a frontier fab; in the medium term, those steps can prepare the ground for deeper fabrication partnerships."

India as the bridge to the "Global South"

Under Lee, South Korea has aggressively pursued a "Global Focal State" strategy. A critical part of this involves engaging with the "Global South" — a term that has become synonymous with India’s leadership following its 2023 G20 Presidency.

South Korean National Security Adviser Wi Sung-rak recently stated that the India visit is a pillar of this outreach. Panda explains how India provides the "political legitimacy" that Seoul currently lacks in the developing world.

"India helps South Korea in Global South diplomacy because India has something Seoul does not yet possess at the same scale: political legitimacy across much of the developing world," Panda argues.

"India is seen not simply as an Asian power, but as a country that can speak to Africa, the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and parts of Latin America in a language of development, capacity building, and strategic autonomy. That makes India an especially valuable partner for a South Korea that wants to widen its diplomatic footprint beyond traditional alliance networks and high-income markets."

Panda identifies three specific ways India acts as this bridge:

Converging security theatres: Peninsula vs South China Sea

For decades, Seoul and New Delhi viewed their security challenges through localised lenses. Seoul looked at the 38th Parallel; New Delhi looked at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

However, the deepening "no-limits" partnership between China and Russia, and North Korea's involvement in global conflicts, has blurred these lines.

"India and South Korea do not see these issues identically, but their concerns are converging," Panda observes.

"For Seoul, the Korean Peninsula remains the core security theatre, and any tightening of China-North Korea-Russia alignment is deeply worrying because it can weaken deterrence stability and create strategic ambiguity. For India, North Korea is not the primary day-to-day challenge, but Pyongyang’s past proliferation linkages, missile record, and its alignment with authoritarian powers matter because they affect the broader Asian security balance or Indo-Pacific power balance. Both countries are therefore increasingly reading security as interconnected rather than geographically separate."

This interconnectedness is most visible in the maritime domain. As both nations rely on the Indo-Pacific sea lanes for energy and trade, the stability of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean has become a shared priority.

"South Korea is a trade-dependent, energy-importing economy; India is also increasingly energy hungry and deeply invested in secure sea lanes. Both have a stake in freedom of navigation, stable shipping routes, and a rules-based maritime order," Panda states.

"They may use different diplomatic language on the South China Sea, but the logic is shared: coercion at sea, grey-zone tactics, and unilateral pressure hurt all major trading democracies. This is why India-Korea cooperation should now expand through maritime domain awareness, coast guard exchanges, defence dialogues, naval industry cooperation, and coordination in regional forums. The bigger picture is simple: democracies in Asia can no longer afford to treat peninsula security and maritime security as separate theatres. They are becoming parts of the same strategic map."

Defence: Beyond the K9 Vajra

The K9 Vajra self-propelled howitzer — a localised version of the South Korean Hanwha K9 — stands as the gold standard for India-ROK defence cooperation. Produced by L&T in India, it proved that Korean technology could thrive under the "Make in India" initiative.

But what comes next? While there has been buzz around Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), Panda suggests the immediate future lies in "new-age" autonomous platforms.

"On defence manufacturing, the K9 Vajra has already shown why India should take South Korea seriously: it proved that Korean systems can be adapted, localised, and produced with the Indian industry," he says.

"The next phase should logically move toward advanced drones, autonomous systems, loitering munitions, sensors, counter-drone technologies, naval electronics, and possibly air-defence components. These are areas where India needs diversification and rapid capacity building, while the Korean industry brings strong manufacturing quality, speed, and systems integration."

Regarding SMRs, Panda advises a more cautious timeline.

"Small modular reactors are a more complex case. They are strategically important, and India has moved to open more space for SMR development through recent policy change, but SMR cooperation with South Korea is still more likely in the medium term and probably in civilian energy, marine applications, or technology dialogue before it becomes a concrete bilateral defence project. So, the immediate 'new-age' space is more plausibly drones and dual-use systems than SMRs."

His conclusion on defence is rooted in the necessity of diversification. "Why should India look to South Korea for such equipment? Because diversification matters. Overdependence on any one defence supplier creates strategic vulnerability. South Korea offers a technologically capable, politically reliable, and increasingly competitive alternative that fits India’s push for domestic production rather than simple off-the-shelf buying."

The critical mineral mission

In the race for EV dominance, the control of critical minerals like lithium and cobalt has become the new "Great Game." Both India and South Korea are currently heavily reliant on Chinese processing of these minerals.

Panda sees this as a prime area for a bilateral breakthrough.

"The prospects are real, and they are improving, because both countries now see critical minerals as a strategic-security issue, not just a commercial one," he explains.

"India has made critical mineral security a formal priority and is pushing the National Critical Mineral Mission and broader bilateral and multilateral cooperation to build resilient supply chains. South Korea, for its part, has strong downstream industrial demand in batteries, electronics, and EVs but remains highly sensitive to external supply shocks."

He envisions a deal that focuses on the mid-stream and down-stream sections of the value chain.

"A bilateral deal, if it emerges, is likely to focus less on raw mining inside either country and more on joint sourcing, refining partnerships, long-term offtake arrangements, battery materials processing, and perhaps third-country collaboration in resource-rich regions. That would make strategic sense. India offers scale, growing EV demand, and a policy push to build value chains; South Korea offers industrial technology and corporate depth in batteries and advanced materials."

However, he notes that "mineral diplomacy works only when finance, processing capacity, and trusted logistics are aligned. Still, the logic is stronger now than it was even two years ago. As countries try to reduce exposure to Chinese dominance in critical mineral processing, an India-South Korea minerals framework would be increasingly necessary."

Shipbuilding: A masterclass in process transfer

Perhaps the most "tangible" sector for this visit is shipbuilding. As India aims to become a global maritime hub, South Korea’s status as a world leader offers a shortcut to modernisation.

"Shipbuilding may become one of the most practical deliverables of this visit because the complementarity is obvious," Panda states.

"South Korea is one of the world’s top shipbuilding powers, with deep strengths in yard management, design efficiency, modular construction, marine engines, specialised vessels, and export-oriented production systems. India, meanwhile, wants to expand commercial shipbuilding, modernise naval-industrial capabilities, and reduce dependence on foreign yards."

Panda points to a specific model of cooperation that is already yielding results.

"A concrete example of this model is the 2025 arrangement under which HD Hyundai Heavy Industries was to provide technical support to Cochin Shipyard for LNG-powered container vessels ordered by CMA CGM. That matters because it shows exactly how India can climb the ladder: start with technical partnership, learn higher-value yard practices, build commercial credibility, and then expand domestic capability."

This isn't just about building hulls; it's about the "software" of manufacturing.

"The same logic can apply to repair ecosystems, green shipping, coastal vessels, offshore support ships, and eventually more sophisticated naval platforms. For 'Make in India' to succeed in shipbuilding, India does not just need orders; it needs ecosystem upgrading. Korean expertise can accelerate that transition far more effectively than a simple buyer-seller relationship."

India as a "primary manufacturing hub"

Is India finally graduating from being just a "market" for Korea to being a "factory" for the world? The signals from the chaebols (large Korean conglomerates) suggest a resounding yes.

"India is no longer just a sales destination for major Korean firms; it is becoming a manufacturing and export platform," Panda observes.

"That shift is driven by several factors: India’s large domestic demand, policy incentives, competitive labour pool, infrastructure upgrades, and the wider geopolitical push to diversify supply chains away from excessive concentration in East Asia, especially China. The fact that roughly 200 executives are accompanying President Lee... underlines that this visit has a strong business and manufacturing logic behind it."

Specific company strategies highlight this trend:

The ultimate goal, according to Panda, is for India to replicate and exceed the "Vietnam model."

"So, the strategic shift is visible: India is being viewed as a place where Korean firms can manufacture at scale, serve the domestic market, and export outward. The remaining question is whether India can move from assembly-led attraction to higher-value integration. If that happens, India could become for Korean firms what Vietnam has been in some sectors, but on a much larger scale: a long-term manufacturing anchor with domestic-market depth."

The "Trump factor" and middle power hedging

Finally, the visit must be viewed through the prism of the 2024 US election results and the return of Donald Trump. His transactional "America First" approach has sent ripples through Seoul, where the US-ROK alliance is the bedrock of national security.

When asked if Trump's agenda has accelerated this India-ROK rapprochement, Panda is emphatic.

"I would say that Trump’s return has sharpened the need for South Korea to diversify its partnerships. The issue is not simply whether Washington still talks about the Indo-Pacific; it is whether US policy has become more transactional, less predictable, and more tariff-driven. Recent pressure on South Korea over tariffs has reinforced a lesson that many US partners are drawing: even close allies cannot rely exclusively on Washington for economic stability. That does not weaken the US-ROK alliance in military terms, but it does encourage Seoul to widen its strategic options with capable middle powers."

In this "fractured" regional order, India offers a unique stability.

"That is where India becomes especially attractive," Panda concludes.

"India offers scale, diplomatic autonomy, manufacturing potential, maritime relevance, and a degree of strategic flexibility that Korea increasingly values in a fractured regional order. In other words, India fits Seoul’s recalibration because it is neither an ally-dependent relationship nor a China-dependent one. It is a partnership with room to grow in trade, technology, supply chains, defence, energy, and Global South engagement. So, Trump’s agenda has had an indirect but meaningful effect: it has reminded South Korea that hedging today means building stronger ties not only with the United States, but also with pivotal regional actors that can help absorb shocks and expand strategic space. India is one of the most important of those actors."

About the Expert:

Prof. Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden, and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) in the Netherlands.

He is the co-editor/co-author of the books, “India-Korea Connections in the Indo-Pacific: Minilateralism to Multilateralism” (Routledge: 2025), and “The Future of the Korean Peninsula: Korea 2032 and Beyond” (Routledge: 2022).