Pakistan opens land routes to Iran: How this move exposes Islamabad's double-game with the US
Pakistan’s decision to open six overland trade routes to Iran amid a US naval blockade has raised questions about where Islamabad's priorities lie. The move offers Tehran a critical economic lifeline while exposing Islamabad’s strategic balancing between Washington, Beijing, and regional interests

Pakistan’s decision to operationalise six overland transit routes into Iran comes as the US-led naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz continues.
On one hand, the United States is attempting to exert maximum economic pressure on Tehran by restricting its maritime access and on another hand, Pakistan’s creation of alternative land-based corridors has provided Iran with a crucial logistical outlet.
The move is going to aid in altering trade flows into Iran but is also raising long-standing questions about Islamabad’s strategic positioning and allegiance.
What Pakistan’s transit order comprises
Last week, Pakistan formalised its decision through the Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026, establishing a legal framework for the movement of goods destined for Iran.
The order allows cargo originating in third countries to pass through Pakistan en route to Iran, under a system that includes an encashable customs guarantee to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
The announcement identified six specific corridors that would facilitate this movement. These routes connect key maritime hubs in Pakistan with land border crossings into Iran, creating an integrated network that combines coastal and inland transport infrastructure.
The six routes include:
- Gwadar to Gabd, considered a primary corridor due to its proximity to the Pakistan-Iran border
- Karachi and Port Qasim to Gabd via the coastal highway passing through Lyari, Ormara, and Pasni
- Karachi to Taftan, following a traditional inland route through Khuzdar and Dalbandin
- Gwadar to Taftan via an inland alignment that connects Turbat and Quetta
- A hybrid route linking Gwadar to Taftan through both coastal and inland segments, including Lyari and Khuzdar
- A direct Karachi to Gabd commercial transit route designed for streamlined movement
Together, these corridors link major Pakistani ports — including Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim — with border entry points such as Taftan and Gabd.
The connectivity is significant given that Pakistan shares a border of more than 900 kilometres with Iran, making overland trade a viable alternative to maritime routes.
The framework also permits logistical flexibility. Cargo can be transferred between containers or different modes of transportation during transit, provided such operations take place under strict customs supervision.
Financial safeguards are embedded in the system through guarantees that can be encashed in case of violations, ensuring regulatory control while enabling movement.
The order builds upon an earlier bilateral agreement signed between Pakistan and Iran in 2008 on international road transport.
One of the immediate drivers behind the decision has been the growing backlog of shipments intended for Iran.
Reports indicate that more than 3,000 cargo containers destined for Iranian markets have been stuck at Pakistani ports, particularly Karachi, as tensions in the Gulf have escalated.
The maritime disruption has made it difficult for these consignments to proceed via traditional sea routes. The newly announced land corridors provide a pathway for redirecting these shipments, allowing them to continue their journey overland into Iran.
Why the move comes as a relief to Iran
The backdrop to Pakistan’s move is the ongoing US naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, which came into force on April 13. The blockade involves attacks on and seizures of vessels associated with Iranian ports, with the objective of restricting Tehran’s access to global markets.
The strategy is designed to exert economic pressure by limiting both exports and imports. By targeting a critical maritime chokepoint through which a substantial portion of global energy supplies and regional trade flows, the United States has sought to isolate Iran economically.
According to statements from US President Donald Trump, the pressure campaign is having a significant impact. He has said that “Iran is collapsing financially” and asserted that Tehran is “starving for cash” and seeking the reopening of the Strait.
The blockade has not only affected Iran’s ability to export oil and other goods but has also constrained its capacity to import essential supplies.
While Tehran has attempted to sustain trade through alternative arrangements, maritime access has become increasingly restricted, particularly for vessels linked to the United States and its allies.
Analysts are also warning that Iran could soon run out of space to store oil — forcing deeper production cuts and potentially triggering long-term damage to its energy system.
How analysts highlighted Pakistan's double-game
The introduction of land corridors has been widely interpreted as a development that weakens the effectiveness of the US blockade.
US-based national security expert Derek J Grossman highlighted the implications in a post on X.
“Trump administration, you have a problem. Your good friend Pakistan appears to have just opened six overland links to Iran, helping the regime bypass your counter-blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. This will help Iran continue to resist US pressure. Islamabad double deals America again!” he wrote.
Islamabad has been hosting indirect talks between the two sides, serving as a neutral venue for engagement at a time of heightened tensions. This dual role — facilitating trade routes for Iran while also acting as a mediator — has been described as a “mediator paradox.”
On one hand, Pakistan is contributing to efforts aimed at de-escalation by providing a platform for dialogue. On the other, its actions on the trade front are seen as undermining the economic pressure that forms a key component of US strategy.
Geopolitical analyst Himanshu Jain described the move in similar terms, suggesting that it represents a major shift in the strategic landscape. "Pakistan just punched a formal hole in the blockade," he wrote on X.
Adding in the thread, Jain wrote, "Three capitals. One day. Washington sanctions. Palm Beach cancels. Islamabad opens corridors. Pakistan took $8B+ Saudi cash, hosted back-channels, then legally enabled transit to Iran. Field Marshal Asim Munir running the show."
Riccha Dwivedi, another analyst, pointed to the two-faced side of Pakistan’s positioning, writing on X, "So Pakistan is simultaneously: mediating US-Iran talks, taking Saudi money to enforce Iran-isolation, leaning on Chinese-backed corridors and opening routes that legally punch a hole in the US naval blockade."
She pointed out that this was "in the same week the [US] Treasury announced new sanctions, while Field Marshal Asim Munir runs both the back-channel and the corridor that bypasses it."
The inclusion of Gwadar in multiple routes highlights the role of infrastructure developed under broader regional initiatives, including projects backed by China.
The land corridors also provide an alternative to routes that pass through Afghanistan, where instability has periodically disrupted transit.
What Pakistan's dubious history tells us
The current theme behind this developments is not something new. Analysts often interpret this in light of a long history of complex interactions between the United States and Pakistan.
One frequently cited example is the AQ Khan network, which operated from the 1980s until its exposure in 2004.
While Pakistan was receiving billions in US military and economic aid to support the Mujahideen against the Soviets, Dr. AQ Khan, Pakistani nuclear physicist, was operating a global black market for nuclear technology.
During this time, Pakistan traded nuclear secrets and centrifuge technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Despite intelligence reports, the US often looked the other way during the 1980s to ensure Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan, only to face a massive proliferation crisis in 2004 when the network was finally officially dismantled.
Another area of tension emerged during the War on Terror from 2001 to 2021. While Pakistan was designated a major non-Nato ally and received substantial assistance, US officials accused elements within its security establishment of maintaining ties with groups such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network.
US Admiral Mike Mullen at the time described the latter as a "veritable arm" of Pakistan's ISI in 2011.
The most significant blow to US-Pakistan trust occurred when Osama bin Laden was discovered living in a high-security compound in Abbottabad — just miles from Pakistan’s premier military academy (PMA Kakul).
The US had to conduct the raid without notifying Pakistan, fearing that elements within the Pakistani security apparatus would tip off Bin Laden.
It was seen as impossible by US intelligence that the world's most wanted man could live in a military town for years without some level of state complicity or gross negligence.
In more recent years, as US aid dwindled during the 2010s, Pakistan pivoted sharply toward Beijing. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed by Washington as a move to help China gain a naval foothold in the Indian Ocean (Gwadar), directly challenging US Indo-Pacific strategy.
Why the US continues to engage Pakistan
Despite recurring tensions, the United States maintains a multifaceted relationship with Pakistan, driven by practical considerations.
While the Islamabad channel is currently providing Washington with a means of communication even as formal relations with Tehran remain strained, in the economic sector, the US has pursued initiatives aimed at counterbalancing China’s influence in Pakistan.
These include agreements involving critical minerals, as well as the use of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to shape Pakistan’s economic policies.
In September 2025, the US Strategic Metals (USSM) company signed a $500 million deal to mine minerals in Pakistan. This "uses" Pakistan to secure supply chains for the US tech sector, directly competing with Chinese mining interests in Balochistan.
The US uses its dominant influence within the IMF (which currently oversees a $7 billion programme for Pakistan) to ensure that Chinese debt repayments do not cannibalise Pakistan’s economy.
By keeping Pakistan on an "IMF leash," the US maintains a veto over Pakistan’s most significant financial decisions.
Security cooperation remains another pillar. The United States relies on Pakistan for intelligence sharing and operational coordination in addressing threats such as ISIS-K and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.
Additionally, Pakistan’s geographic position offers a vantage point for monitoring regional developments, including Chinese activities at strategic locations such as Gwadar.
The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) continues to engage with Pakistan to prevent the "leakage" of sensitive US military tech (like F-16 components) to Chinese engineers — essentially using the Pakistani military as a buffer zone.
These factors contribute to a relationship that is often described as transactional. To Islamabad, this is "strategic autonomy" while to Washington, it remains a "magnificent delusion."
The US is giving just enough to Pakistan so that it remains tethered to Western markets rather than becoming a total satellite of Beijing.
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With inputs from agencies
Inhaling global affairs on a daily basis, Anmol likes to cover stories that intrigue him, especially around history, climate change and polo. He has far too many disparate interests with a constant itch for travel. You can follow him on X (_anmol_singla), and please feel free to reach out to him at anmol.singla@nw18.com for tips, feedback or travel recommendations

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