The US-Iran war may be over, but the real battle has just begun
As Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv navigate an uneasy truce, the geopolitical map of West Asia is being quietly rewritten

The Iran, US and Israel war has taken so many twists and turns, and the public display of Trumpian outbursts, Iranian calculations and Israeli defiance of any diktat or deal have the potential to derail the 14-point or clause Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was signed while Donald Trump was having dinner hosted by President Emmanuel Macron at Versailles and the Iranian President was signing it away from Tehran. It was unusual, but then this war and its exchanges have been unusual all through.
The very first clause on stopping the war in Lebanon was agreed by the US and Iran without the actual combatants, Hezbollah and Israel, with whom Trump also had direct conversations, urging them to abide by the ceasefire. It is likely that Tehran, the Ayatollah and the IRGC might have sufficient leverage over Hezbollah to hold fire, but perhaps Trump, despite his public display of frustration and threats against Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli leadership, that too somewhat unprecedented, seemed to have limited levers to control the Israeli regime of the day. In fact, Israel activated the powerful Jewish lobby to try and slow down Trump and stunt his threats in Congress and elsewhere.
Reportedly, Trump’s team, which believes that Israel can only survive with US support, has begun to reach out to his political opponents and, obviously, in view of the upcoming Knesset elections, this can derail Bibi’s political capital and chances of staying in power and out of jail for other criminal charges. But Bibi is not the one to give in easily, and in full effrontery he intensified attacks on southern Lebanon, including Beirut and Hezbollah hideouts, to secure the territory south of the Litani River as a buffer. According to some reports, more people have been killed in the Lebanon war than in the US-Iran war.
Trump was also under great pressure from European allies at the Evian G7 Summit, where they expressed their deep resentment against Netanyahu continuing to attack Gaza and Lebanon and pressured the US President to intervene, while themselves individually taking several measures to isolate and punish Israel for continued violations. This does not mean that strategically Trump is ready to dump Israel or its security at all. Trump may throw his tantrums because he may not have much to lose individually, except some lame threats of exposure in the Epstein case. Not that Trump would be moved by that, because his realisation that he has been played into the invasion of Iran by Netanyahu is real. So is his desire to walk out of this infructuous war, as it has cumulatively cost him more than he would admit.
The MoU has all the ingredients for failure, as the verbal duels and implied threats and internal contradictions in Iran and the USA provide a charge for ignition, and so do the loaded clauses open to interpretation by both sides, which of course do provide an off-ramp from domestic pressures. One of these is the full opening of the Strait of Hormuz — the choke point that has given a unique weapon to Iranians in the short to medium term to press the adversaries with the threat and practice of global financial and economic meltdown.
The US has also realised its limitation in this domain, even as Trump threatened, when talks between Vance and Ghalibaf were on in Lucerne, that he would occupy the Strait and even keep 20 per cent of the oil as toll for himself. It of course does not take into account the dangerous threat of the combination of the Bab el-Mandab choke point with Hormuz, which could be weaponised by the Houthis — another powerful proxy of Iran — with whom Trump had to seek an accommodation last year after bombing and threatening them.
No doubt that despite the continued uncertainty and contradictory perceptions of the remit of the MoU, both sides were able to agree to ceasefire terms and also worked out certain mechanisms and established technical groups to pursue negotiations on several tracks. Iran Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei commented on the Ghalibaf and Aragchi talks with Vice President JD Vance as follows:
“We have established a Conflict Control Unit to stabilise the front lines in West Asia, including Lebanon. Second, a hotline of communication has been formed through which Iran can be contacted if problems arise in the Strait of Hormuz. Third, a working group on the nuclear file has been formed, which will begin its work as soon as the United States has fully implemented Clause 13 of the agreement. Fourth, we have signed agreements with Qatar about the release of Iran’s frozen assets. (Not mentioning that the USA will supply Iranian food and other requirements against these funds.) Fifth, we have received documents from the United States that allow us to sell oil, gas and petrochemical products without sanctions for a period of 60 days.”
The New York Times summed it up: “The U.S. Treasury Department’s new 60-day general licence is a major economic boost for Iran. The waiver authorises the sale, delivery and import of Iranian oil and related petroleum products through Aug. 21, while also permitting associated banking, insurance and transportation services, including transactions in U.S. dollars. The move could allow Iran to sell oil more freely on global markets after years of sanctions-related restrictions.”
President Trump and his administration worked overtime with Israeli leaders to ensure that the ceasefire in Lebanon holds and does not derail the larger US-Iran ceasefire. This all-weather partnership has come under stress, with public spats on both sides in an unprecedented manner, as Trump decided to pick up the strewn cards in a definite manner while being mindful of Israeli security concerns, especially the nuclear issue.
The details of the discussions were published mainly by a Qatari press release, as Qatar has played an important role in achieving this understanding. Meanwhile, Iranians are in a fast drive with regional visits to Oman on Hormuz and in concert with regional leaders, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as the visit of President Pezeshkian to Pakistan, with which several trade corridors have been opened. The regional permutations and combinations have begun to emerge as Riyadh and others have begun to look at alternative options. While Pakistani PM and Field Marshal Munir were managing the tense discussions at Lake Lucerne, Burgenstock, the R4 Foreign Ministers were meeting in Cairo for their 4th ministerial, which includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye and Pakistan, on regional security and collaboration after the Saudi-Pak Mutual Security and Defence Agreement.
For Indian diplomacy, these developments are indeed both a challenge and an opportunity, as the Pakistan factor in West Asia has become accentuated after a big dip. But proactive diplomacy with the regional strategic partners, and particularly Iran, through the 4Ds policy of dialogue, diplomacy, de-escalation and de-hyphenation, is needed to not only restart importing Iranian crude and prepare for the release of funds, but also re-engage and reactivate Chabahar port management and development through continued discussions also with the US as part of ongoing negotiations.
For India, both the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) are equally important and will have to be pursued with purpose and firm conviction. While a bilateral engagement is desirable, and some action and discussions have happened at the recent NSA BRICS meet, the BRICS Summit in September will provide an important opportunity to engage and work on peace and regional security at the highest level.
(Anil Trigunayat is a former Indian ambassador to Jordan, Libya and Malta and a distinguished fellow and head of the West Asia Experts Group at the prestigious Vivekananda International Foundation. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the oldest Indian think tank, the United Services Institution of India. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)

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