The Iran-US MoU: Tehran’s diplomatic triumph, Tel Aviv’s strategic setback

The Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to continue the current ceasefire between the countries, open the Strait of Hormuz, lift the US naval blockade of Iran and provide a period of 60 days to convert the MoU into an agreement has been digitally signed between the two countries. US President Donald Trump did so at the Palace of Versailles in Paris on June 17. On the Iranian side it was digitally signed by President Masoud Pezeshkian. The text of the MoU, which is in both English and Persian, has been officially released by both countries. Before analysing the MoU, a word on Pakistan’s role and its current disappointment.

With great aplomb Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had announced to the country’s National Assembly that Pakistan will host the signing ceremony in Geneva on June 19. That would have given an opportunity to Pakistani leaders to strut before the global stage gathering felicitations from the international community. No one would have anticipated this more than the Chief of Defence Staff and Army Chief Asim Munir. His role was especially praised by Shehbaz Sharif. Now the Pakistani leadership has only got an acknowledgement of its role from Trump. He said on June 17, “I want to thank our partners in both Pakistan and Qatar; these people worked so hard… they knew them (Iran) a little bit, in the case of Pakistan, quite well; in the case of Qatar, they were sort of at odds.”

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Here too Pakistan has been clubbed with Qatar. This would have only added salt to its wounds.

Pakistan has now said that a meeting will still be held in Geneva to begin the “technical talks” between Iran and the US. With the MoU’s signing, the two countries are unlikely to need Pakistan’s role as they did in the past. Thus, Trump’s ‘praise’ of Pakistan and, if the technical-level meeting does take place — and now it is to be co-hosted by Pakistan and Qatar — means that it has been given the proverbial handkerchief to wipe its tears. All this only shows, once again, that great powers use countries for their purposes and once that is achieved they ignore these ‘used’ countries. But then, throughout its history Pakistan has liked being ‘used’ for temporary gain and thereafter complained bitterly about being ignored. Such is the fate of those who voluntarily accept a serf’s status!

The MoU consists of 14 points. Taken together it can be said to be heavily weighted in Iran’s favour even though it contains the key US objective regarding Iran not making nuclear weapons. The MoU’s paragraph 8 emphatically states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” Doubtless it is this sentence that the Trump administration will play up. It will assert that President Donald Trump has been able to achieve what President Barack Obama could not do in the JCPOA which he had signed with the Iranians to deny them nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding what the Trump people may claim, the fact is that formally Iran has always denied any intention of making nuclear weapons. Naturally, it was difficult to take its intentions at face value then, as it is so now as well.

A principal reason why this writer believes that the MoU leans heavily in Iran’s favour is because the US has formally committed itself not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. This means that Trump has abandoned the cardinal US objective of wanting to overthrow the Iranian system of governance contained in the Vilayat-e-Faqih. Paragraph 2 of the MoU states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.” This does not mean that the US will not criticise or even condemn what it considers Iran’s violations of internationally accepted human rights, but it does mean that it cannot — if it upholds the MoU and the agreement that may follow — seek to overthrow the Iranian government.

For Iran this would obviously be a key requirement because it not only experienced the decapitation strike which killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the top Iranian leadership as well, but it has bad memories of US interference in its domestic politics going back to 1953 when the CIA organised the overthrow of popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. This US commitment will cause great disappointment to the opponents of the Iranian clerical system both within and outside Iran. This will be especially so in Israel.

The MoU’s important part for the international community is contained in the following words: “Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles in de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be instated within 30 days.”

This means that the global community can now look forward to the restoration of the status quo ante of Gulf hydrocarbons moving through the Strait of Hormuz. On its part the US has committed to: “The United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.”

What will give the Iranians great satisfaction is the US agreement to the release of funds to them and the ending of sanctions. All this is contingent on the final deal being signed. The relevant MoU paragraphs are so important that they need to be fully quoted. This is because they mean that with a final agreement Iran will enter the mainstream of regional and global affairs with the clerical system intact.

The paragraphs state: “The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalised as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licences, waivers and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America. The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned, and expressed their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.”

It is also clear that in the period of the MoU’s 60 days the flow of Iranian oil will not be impeded by the US or its partners. This is most important for those countries like China that depend on Iranian hydrocarbons. India too could now look to enhance its purchase of Iranian oil.

In its opening paragraph the MoU commits the two countries and their allies to “terminate military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon”. This will be a very bitter pill for Israel to swallow. Indeed, taken as a whole, the MoU marks a great reverse for Israel. None of the objectives with which it began this war, and in which it persuaded Trump to join it, have been achieved. It can now be expected to mount a rear-guard action to try to ensure that the MoU does not get translated into an agreement.

Naturally, the key to that conversion lies in both countries achieving mutual satisfaction on nuclear issues. As a non-weapon-state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is obliged not to make nuclear weapons. At the same time the NPT gives it rights to enrich nuclear material for peaceful purposes. Under the NPT it is also obliged to allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The case against Iran on nuclear enrichment has rested on its dubious record in the past on enrichment. There have been valid fears that it has enriched uranium beyond permissible limits. Indeed, it was, under international law, not permitted to do so even after Trump had junked the JCPOA. But international law is seldom adhered to by states when their security is threatened. The problem of the already enriched uranium stocks in Iran will pose difficulties between the parties.

That has been the case made by the Iranian hardliners and their case has been strengthened by the decapitation strike by Israel at the start of the war. They will put obstacles in the way of converting the MoU into an agreement. For now, the Iranian pragmatists have prevailed. But will they continue to do so? This is because the hardliners will emphasise that Trump, or the US generally, cannot be trusted even if they have given an assurance that they will not try regime change. Ultimately, it will have to be the current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei who will have to decide.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)