Pahalgam, Pakistan and India’s security challenge: The first step to escalation is terror, not response

There is little doubt that the dastardly Pahalgam terrorist attack was instigated and, in all likelihood, organised by the Pakistan Army. Such a decision could not but have been taken without the approval of the army chief, then General and now Field Marshal Asim Munir. Twenty-six men were killed by terrorists in front of the women and children of their families. The memory of this heinous and cowardly crime will not fade from the national consciousness.

The memory of this crime should always reinforce awareness of the Pakistani Army’s permanent animosity towards India. It has always chosen to channel this enmity into confrontational paths. One manifestation of this approach is the sponsorship of terrorism. Pakistan has actively pursued this for over thirty-five years, and there is no evidence that it is willing to abandon terrorism against India. Indeed, Pakistan has now made terrorism an essential element of its security doctrine against India. The other elements are seeking parity in conventional warfare and in the nuclear domain, including delivery systems.

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One consideration for Pakistan, while it continues with terrorism, is the financial toll it extracts from India. This arises from the deployment of security personnel in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and, as required, elsewhere in India. It is also due to the reluctance of investors to engage in projects in areas with security concerns. Finally, there are social costs involved as well, stemming from the sentiments generated by terrorism. The fact is that Pakistan has paid a heavier price for its sponsorship of terrorism, but it has been willing to bear it because it assesses that restraining India is to its advantage.

Pakistan’s terrorism against India also stems from the deeply flawed two-nation theory, which is the foundational principle of the country. This pernicious theory held that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct and hostile nations. Once Pakistan came into being, its leaders maintained that India was not secular but Hindu, and that Pakistan was a homeland for Muslims. From this view has flowed the desire to harm India and keep it off balance. The latter objective will never be realised, but it remains a basis for Pakistan’s pursuit of terrorism against India.

India’s response to Pakistani terror has evolved over the decades. In 2016, after the Uri terrorist attack, India undertook kinetic action. The same approach was witnessed in the Balakot strike in 2019, which followed the Pulwama terrorist attack. Again, India took the kinetic route after the Pahalgam attack when it launched Operation Sindoor. While a cessation of hostilities was announced by the government, Operation Sindoor has not been officially called off.

The Balakot experience, and even more so Operation Sindoor, showed that the international community immediately began engaging both India and Pakistan following the terrorist attack. Its initial attempt was to prevent India from taking military action against Pakistan. Once it failed in this endeavour, it sought an early end to military action. Pakistan, ever playing the innocent victim, demonstrated a willingness to accept mediation by the great powers, especially the US. This pattern is likely to be repeated in the future.

The obvious concern of the international community is that a military conflict between India and Pakistan should not escalate to the nuclear level. Pakistan has consistently fanned this fear. In 2019 and in 2025, India agreed to end the conflict early. It can thus be concluded that Indian kinetic action following a terrorist strike would have a window of about a week. Within this period, India has to establish clear military superiority over Pakistan. For this purpose, the Indian military must prepare thoroughly and take full account of the likelihood that Pakistan will be supported by China in both conventional and asymmetric warfare across all three domains.

India cannot afford to be taken by surprise by Pakistan. This is because, while it is not difficult to overcome surprise through a change in tactics, the element of surprise itself helps shape a narrative that may not be favourable to India. This does not mean that India can afford to neglect preparations for a prolonged conflict, even one involving two fronts. Kinetic action against Pakistani terror must be undertaken, but it must be fully prepared.

It is also necessary to work on narratives regarding Pakistani terror and India’s responses to it. This must take into account that global attention is not currently focused on terrorism. For this purpose, Pakistan must be consistently exposed, but in a calibrated manner. Its current profile as an intermediary may earn it some goodwill. Indian narrative setters must ensure that this does not obscure its involvement in terrorism. The focus should be on the infrastructure of terror, especially the tanzeems that propagate it in the region and maintain links with international terrorist groups. This narrative-building must be conducted with finesse.

India has announced a doctrine of pre-emption. It needs to be communicated within the global strategic community. There should be no apprehension that doing so will draw attention to Jammu and Kashmir. No country seeks involvement in the issue, and Pakistani attempts to internationalise it are unlikely to succeed.

Finally, the message must be that the first step on the escalatory ladder between two nuclear neighbours is a terrorist attack, not a kinetic response to it. The narrative should aim for the international community to accept this proposition. This objective should remain paramount.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)