Balochistan has become Pakistan’s biggest security challenge

The significance of the three attacks that rocked Balochistan between July 5 and 8 can be gauged by the fact that the provincial government of the province, no doubt with the approval of Islamabad and the Pakistan army, finally agreed to the appointment of a judicial commission to investigate the Ziarat and Hanna Urak incidents that claimed the lives of 32 policemen and civilians. This was one of the demands of the families of the deceased policemen who had died in the attack at the two places.

Pakistan’s leading newspaper Dawn reported on July 18, "Families of the martyred personnel had been holding the sit-in at Quetta’s Koila Phatak since July 9, along with the martyrs’ bodies." The Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) claimed to have undertaken both the attacks. Significantly, in Ziarat's Mangi Dam checkpost attack, which the TTP undertook on July 6, eighteen policemen were taken hostage. They were later killed by the group. The checkpost is located around 90 km from Quetta, while Hanna Urak is on its outskirts.

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The families of the police personnel who sat in dharna had the support of Balochistan’s political parties as well as its trading community. Indeed, on July 16 Balochistan's main markets remained closed in a show of solidarity with the families of the killed policemen. The Balochistan government also agreed to other demands of the families. These related to financial assistance to them and state assistance for the education of the children of those killed by the TTP.

These would have posed no problems for the Pakistani army. What it would have found very difficult to accept was the appointment of a judicial commission to examine the security conditions and lapses that led to the attack. While the TTP killed provincial policemen, the security of the province continues to be in the hands of the army. Hence, it is the army that would inevitably have to provide answers to the commission. No wonder the army would have obviously resisted the appointment of the judicial commission. It was the obvious pressure of families who refused to bury their dead and the anger of the people at the security lapses that made the army bend.

Islamic tradition mandates the earliest burial of the dead. Hence, the refusal of the families not to bury their dead for twelve days clearly shows their outrage and anguish against the government and the institution which projects itself as the guardian of the Pakistani people. All this would have severely hurt the pride of Chief of Defence Forces and army chief Asim Munir, who has been for weeks basking in the acclaim he has received from a large section of the international community for his role in ‘mediating’ the now ‘torn to shreds’ US-Iran June cease-fire.

The third attack was carried out by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) on a military convoy on Pakistan’s National Highway 25 in the area of Bela Bandar, which is located in the Las Bela district. The district is 500 km from Quetta and about 180 km from Karachi. The BLA killed 11 military personnel in this operation. The Las Bela district is populated by the Baloch people who have great sympathy for the BLA and look upon the Pakistani army as an occupying force.

These three attacks caused great consternation in the Pakistani army and the federal government. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by Munir, visited Quetta to chair a high-level security meeting. Following the meeting, the army launched a much-publicised province-wide operation against the TTP and the BLA. Over the past 10 days the military’s media wing has been regularly reporting the number of militants the army has neutralised in these operations.

Reflexively, both the army and the elected government have blamed India. Interestingly, in a media briefing on July 8, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, Director General of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), alleged that India, along with hostile foreign forces, was behind these attacks because they could not accept Pakistan’s honour, prosperity and stability. He went on to claim that these attacks were taking place from Afghan territory under the control of the Afghan Taliban. He warned, "We will hurt you and hunt you everywhere." No wonder, after such threats it would have been galling for the Pakistan army to accept the appointment of the judicial commission.

It is noteworthy that the three attacks came within 10 days of the Pakistan air force bombing areas in Afghanistan's Paktia, Khost and Kunar provinces in June. The Afghan authorities reported that 53 civilians, including women and children, had died in these bombings. The Afghan Taliban was furious at Pakistan’s action. The timing of the three attacks in Balochistan would suggest that they were in response to the Pakistani bombings. Besides, the Pakistani army should be well aware of the Pashtun tradition of Badal (Revenge). Hence, instead of dragging in India, it should introspect on its continuing mistakes in Afghanistan and Balochistan. It is using strong-arm tactics, but they are not working either against the Pashtuns in Baluchistan or the native Balochis of the province. It is significant that the TTP acted in the northern part of the province, which is largely by now inhabited by the Pashtun people, while the BLA attacked the convoy in an ethnic-majority Baloch area. This shows that the Pakistani army has succeeded in alienating both ethnic groups of the province. This is despite the great resentment that the Baloch have at the changes in the province’s ethnic balance made by the Pakistani authorities at the cost of Baloch interests.

In the wake of these three attacks and the earlier one at Chaman Phatak on May 24, which led to 47 deaths and was claimed by the BLA, the Pakistani army’s instinct would be to hit back not only against Afghanistan but also against India. Its desire to ‘hit back’ after an incident has mostly led it to undertake tactical actions to show both the army jawans and the people that it takes revenge. Thus, strategic patience, which may require cool-headed consideration of its national situation and the international context, is not in its DNA. Hence, India should be naturally on its guard against any Pakistani misadventure. However, at this time the Iran war and the role that Pakistan and especially Munir played in mediating the MOU may compel them to take a longer view.

An indication of this comes from the lack of any Pakistani action against India for the Chaman Phatak attack, which they attributed to India. Almost two months have gone by since then. Some Pakistani reports indicate that the political and army leadership deliberately decided to hold their hand. Will they now do the same? Neither the US nor China would want an India-Pakistan crisis to occur as long as the Iran war is on. They would have cautioned Pakistan against any misadventure at this stage. Munir, having become Trump’s favourite Field Marshal, would not like to go out of favour. Hence, he may be compelled to go against his instinct to order a major action against India so long as the Iran war is on. This would be the rational thing to do, but the Pakistan army has so often acted irrationally that India’s guard must be up.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)