Will Bangladesh PM Tarique Rahman pick China over India for his first foreign visit?

Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman may soon make China his first official overseas destination since assuming office in February 2026.

While the Bangladeshi government has yet to formally announce the visit, reports have strongly suggested that a state visit could take place in late June.

New Delhi had swiftly invited Rahman for an official visit immediately after he was sworn in as prime minister following the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s sweeping electoral victory earlier this year.

However, if Rahman ultimately travels to Beijing before New Delhi, many analysts are likely to see it as evidence of Bangladesh’s steadily deepening relationship with China at a time when India and China remain locked in broader regional competition.

In the last two years Bangladesh has seen a dramatic political transformation following the fall of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024, which led to the rise of the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus, and the eventual return of Tarique Rahman after 17 years in self-imposed exile in London.

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Why the first foreign visit matters

The first foreign destination chosen by a newly elected leader is rarely viewed as routine scheduling. Bangladesh’s political history reflects this pattern clearly.

When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman assumed leadership of newly independent Bangladesh in 1972, India became his first major foreign destination as Dhaka sought to consolidate ties with New Delhi after the Liberation War.

Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia travelled first to the United States after assuming office in 1991 before later visiting India for the SAARC summit.

Sheikh Hasina herself followed different diplomatic trajectories during separate periods of her political career.

After returning to office in 2024, she chose India for her first official foreign visit, a move widely interpreted as a reaffirmation of close India-Bangladesh ties. However, during her first tenure in 1996, China was among her earliest foreign destinations.

These precedents show that Dhaka’s early diplomatic outreach has historically reflected prevailing political and strategic calculations rather than any fixed protocol.

That is why observers in both Dhaka and New Delhi are closely watching Rahman’s next move.

According to reports circulating in Bangladeshi media, Beijing has proposed hosting Rahman for a high-profile state visit in late June 2026.

Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen has publicly confirmed that an invitation was extended, while Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman held discussions with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi earlier this month during a visit to Beijing.

Reports indicate that Rahman may hold meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

How the political climate in Bangladesh pivoted towards China

The political rupture began in August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina’s government collapsed following the student-led July Uprising.

Hasina eventually fled to New Delhi after being removed from office, a development that generated strong anti-India sentiment among sections of the Bangladeshi public. Many opposition supporters and protesters accused India of backing Hasina’s administration for years despite allegations of authoritarian governance and democratic decline.

The political fallout had direct diplomatic consequences. Bilateral engagement slowed considerably, public distrust toward India increased and visa operations reportedly faced disruptions for months.

Boycotts of Indian goods also gained traction on Bangladeshi social media during the politically volatile period that followed.

The interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus subsequently adopted a noticeably more assertive approach toward Beijing.

In March 2025, Yunus travelled to China for a four-day visit during which he attended the Boao Forum and secured a reported $2.1 billion package consisting of loans, grants and investments from Beijing.

The Yunus administration also shifted the proposed Teesta River restoration project away from possible Indian implementation and toward Chinese financing and technical support.

That decision immediately drew attention in New Delhi because the Teesta issue has long remained one of the most sensitive unresolved subjects in India-Bangladesh relations.

The strategic drift toward Beijing became even more visible early this year. In January, Bangladesh’s defence establishment deepened engagement with China after the Bangladesh Air Force signed a deal with China’s CETC to establish a drone-manufacturing facility inside Bangladesh.

Around the same time, direct flights between Dhaka and Pakistan resumed after a 14-year gap, while reports also emerged regarding discussions on the possible procurement of JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed by Pakistan and China.

Soon after taking office in February, Rahman spotlighted economic recovery, governance reforms and employment generation as central priorities for his administration. During one of his early post-election remarks, he also described China as a “development friend.”

Why China’s importance to Bangladesh is growing

During Khalilur Rahman’s recent visit to Beijing, both countries agreed to deepen cooperation in multiple sectors, including trade, industrial investment, healthcare, digital economy initiatives, water resource management and connectivity projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.

Khalilur Rahman described China as a “trustworthy” and “indispensable friend and partner” during the visit while reiterating Dhaka’s support for the One-China Policy.

Economic considerations are playing a major role in Bangladesh’s outreach toward Beijing.

The Rahman government is currently facing substantial economic pressure as Bangladesh approaches graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in late 2026. The transition is expected to reduce important trade privileges and tariff benefits that have historically supported Bangladesh’s export-driven garment industry.

At the same time, the government has unveiled ambitious economic targets, including plans to expand the country’s economy from approximately $450 billion to $1 trillion by 2034.

Achieving those goals will require large-scale foreign investment and infrastructure financing, areas where China has already become a crucial partner.

Reports indicate that Chinese investment into Bangladesh has accelerated since the BNP assumed office. Beijing has reportedly invested nearly $100 million in Bangladesh following the February elections, while direct economic connectivity between the two countries has also increased.

China currently operates dozens of direct weekly flights to Dhaka and has issued tens of thousands of visas to Bangladeshi traders this year.

Chinese leaders also moved quickly to establish close engagement with the new administration. Chinese Premier Li Qiang congratulated Rahman immediately after his inauguration and reaffirmed Beijing’s support for Bangladesh’s new government.

Even before the elections, Rahman had publicly hinted China’s importance as a development partner for Bangladesh.

Why India is keeping an eye on Bangladesh’s strategic direction

Bangladesh plays a central role in India’s regional security architecture, particularly because of its geographic position next to India’s northeastern states. Stability in Bangladesh directly affects border security, connectivity projects and maritime dynamics in the Bay of Bengal.

As a result, India has traditionally sought to maintain strong political and economic influence in Dhaka.

China’s expanding presence in Bangladesh — particularly in infrastructure, defence and strategic river projects — has therefore become a growing concern for Indian policymakers.

The Teesta River issue remains one of the most sensitive aspects of this equation.

Bangladesh has repeatedly pressed India to finalise a long-pending Teesta water-sharing agreement. However, the agreement has remained stalled for years because of political opposition from the Indian state of West Bengal.

Recent reports indicate that the Rahman government is now actively seeking Chinese involvement in the Teesta restoration project.

The project carries implications because parts of the Teesta region lie close to India’s strategically vital Siliguri Corridor, commonly known as the “Chicken’s Neck,” which connects mainland India to the northeastern states.

If China becomes deeply involved in the Teesta project, Indian strategists are likely to view it as a major expansion of Beijing’s influence near one of India’s most sensitive geographic chokepoints.

Water-sharing disputes are also becoming increasingly prominent in Bangladesh’s public messaging toward India. Recently, leaders within the ruling BNP indicated that future Dhaka-New Delhi relations would depend heavily on long-term arrangements regarding Ganges water-sharing cooperation.

Still, despite strategic anxieties, India and Bangladesh have continued diplomatic engagement.

In April, Khalilur Rahman travelled to India and met Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar as well as National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. The discussions reportedly focused on trade, border management, energy cooperation and the Rahman government’s “Bangladesh First” foreign policy doctrine.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi had also extended an invitation to Rahman shortly after his swearing-in ceremony. India’s outreach reflected an effort to stabilise bilateral ties after the turbulence that followed Sheikh Hasina’s removal from power.

What this says about Dhaka’s balancing strategy

Rahman’s administration has attempted to frame its foreign policy as pragmatic rather than ideologically aligned with any single power bloc.

The “Bangladesh First” doctrine promoted by the BNP government seeks to present Dhaka as pursuing national interests through diversified international partnerships.

Historically, the BNP was often viewed in India as more sceptical of New Delhi and comparatively closer to China and Pakistan. However, Rahman’s government has attempted to project a more balanced approach publicly.

By sending his foreign minister to New Delhi early in the administration while potentially choosing Beijing for his own inaugural foreign trip, Rahman appears to be signalling that Bangladesh intends to maintain relations with both powers while avoiding dependence on either side.

Given the public backlash against India following Sheikh Hasina’s removal and her continued presence in New Delhi, a first visit to India could be politically sensitive for the BNP leadership domestically.

Choosing China first allows Rahman to distance his administration from perceptions of excessive dependence on India while appealing to nationalist sentiment inside Bangladesh.

Yet Dhaka has not abandoned engagement with India entirely.

The BNP recently congratulated India’s ruling BJP after its electoral victory in West Bengal, indicating that communication channels remain open despite tensions. India and Bangladesh also continue to cooperate on trade, energy and border management.

Meanwhile, Beijing has deepened engagement not only with Bangladesh but also with countries including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives.

With inputs from agencies