Cruise missiles, drones and more... The deadly arsenal of the Houthis

Stretching between northeast Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea serves as one of international commerce's most vital sea routes.

Every year, thousands of merchant vessels carrying crude oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods and consumer products transit its waters before passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and onward toward the Suez Canal.

The Bab el-Mandeb itself is a relatively narrow passage linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, ultimately, the Indian Ocean. Although only a fraction of the width of many major oceans, it functions as an indispensable corridor connecting Europe with Asia.

The Houthis control much of Yemen's western coastline overlooking this strategic waterway.

More from Explainers

Escalation trap to an exit strategy: How can the Iran war end?

The new geography of war: Why the Houthis can no longer be ignored

What is the latest in the Red Sea?

Earlier this week, the movement declared what it described as a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia. That declaration quickly translated into military action. According to the Houthis, their forces launched both missiles and drones against two Saudi oil tankers identified as the Encelia and the Layla on July 22.

Saudi Arabia acknowledged that the Encelia had been struck, with the state news agency SPA citing an official source who said the vessel sustained damage that resulted in a fire near its bow. The reported attack on the Layla had not been independently confirmed yet.

Separate maritime security reporting indicated that the Encelia transmitted a distress message after informing authorities that it had been hit by a missile near the Saudi port of Jizan late on Wednesday.

Tracking data showed that five oil tankers altered their planned routes in the Red Sea to avoid sailing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Three other tankers carrying Saudi crude destined for China and India reportedly reversed course earlier in the week rather than continue toward the increasingly contested waterway.

Despite the growing risks, shipping activity has not entirely ceased. Data also indicated that two Chinese very large crude carriers transporting a combined four million barrels of Saudi oil continued toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Since Iranian restrictions have already complicated navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has increasingly redirected significant volumes of crude exports toward its Red Sea terminal at Yanbu.

However, if the southern entrance to the Red Sea also becomes unsafe, exporters face sharply reduced options. Cargoes would largely need to travel north before transiting the Suez Canal, adding considerable distance, additional operating costs and longer delivery times.

What weapons do the Houthis have in their arsenal?

Anti-ship ballistic missiles

Military analysts now assess that the Houthis have become the first non-state armed organisation to operationally employ anti-ship ballistic missiles during active combat operations.

Their inventory includes several systems that appear to have been developed using Iranian technology while incorporating modifications suited for operations in the Red Sea.

One of the longest-range systems believed to be available to the Houthis is the Asef, also referred to as Asif. The missile is estimated to have an operational reach of approximately 450 to 500 kilometres and is widely assessed to be derived from Iran's Khalij Fars and Fateh-313 missile families.

Another important member of the Houthi arsenal is the Tankil, sometimes linked to the Iranian Zohayr or Raad-500 programme. Its reported range also falls at roughly 500 kilometres, placing much of the Red Sea within reach when launched from Houthi-controlled territory.

For engagements at shorter distances, analysts believe the Houthis also field the Faleq ballistic missile. Although its estimated range of approximately 140 kilometres is considerably less than that of the Asef or Tankil, it remains well suited for operations inside confined maritime environments where shipping traffic passes relatively close to Yemen's coastline.

Complementing these systems are the Mayun and Bahr al-Ahmar missiles. Both are regarded as compact coastal-defence ballistic missiles with estimated ranges between 100 and 150 kilometres.

What makes anti-ship ballistic missiles particularly difficult to defend against is not merely their range but the manner in which they attack. Instead of flying close to the sea surface like cruise missiles, ballistic missiles climb high into the atmosphere before descending toward their targets at tremendous speed.

By the time they begin their terminal dive, defending warships have only a narrow window in which to detect, classify and intercept the incoming threat.

As a result, escorting naval vessels may be forced to employ advanced anti-ballistic missile interceptors — including systems such as the SM-2, SM-6 and Aster 30 — against each incoming weapon.

Because these interceptors are expensive and carried in limited numbers aboard warships, even unsuccessful attacks can gradually deplete defensive missile inventories.

Cruise missiles

Unlike ballistic missiles that descend from high altitude, cruise missiles follow a very different flight profile. They travel just above the ocean surface, often remaining below a ship's radar horizon for much of their journey.

This "sea-skimming" approach significantly reduces the time available for crews to detect and engage an incoming threat, making them particularly dangerous against both commercial vessels and naval escorts.

Over the years, the Houthis have assembled a mixed inventory of modern Iranian-derived cruise missiles alongside older weapons inherited from Yemen's pre-war military stockpiles.

Among the most capable systems believed to be in Houthi service is the Quds family of cruise missiles. This includes the Quds Z-0 and the Sayyad variant, both of which are assessed to originate from the Iranian Paveh/Project 351 missile family.

Powered by turbojet engines, these missiles are estimated to possess ranges of more than 800 kilometres, enabling strikes far beyond Yemen's immediate coastline.

The two variants differ primarily in the guidance systems used during the terminal phase of flight. The Quds Z-0 employs an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) seeker, allowing it to identify and track targets visually during its final approach.

The Sayyad version instead incorporates an active radar homing seeker, which continuously searches for and locks onto vessels using radar reflections.

The Houthis are also believed to operate the Al-Mandab 2, another intermediate-range anti-ship cruise missile.

Military analysts assess that this weapon is based on Iran's Ghadir missile, itself an upgraded derivative of China's C-802 (YJ-82) anti-ship missile. It has an estimated operational range of around 300 kilometres and uses an X-band active radar seeker to locate maritime targets.

Alongside these more advanced systems remain several legacy missiles originating from Yemen's former armed forces. The Al-Mandab 1 is based on the Chinese C-801 (YJ-81) anti-ship missile and offers a much shorter engagement range of roughly 40 kilometres.

The Houthis are also believed to retain Rubezh coastal-defence missile systems, equipped with P-21/P-22 Styx missiles inherited from Soviet-era Yemeni military stockpiles.

Although these weapons belong to an earlier generation of missile technology, analysts note that they continue to carry substantial 513-kilogram high-explosive warheads, capable of inflicting severe structural damage if employed against unarmoured commercial vessels.

Drones

Over the past decade, attack drones have evolved from relatively simple reconnaissance platforms into versatile weapons capable of conducting surveillance, direct strikes and coordinated attacks alongside missiles.

The Houthis now field several categories of unmanned aerial vehicles with varying ranges and operational purposes. One of the most significant is the Wa'id family, comprising the Wa'id-1 and Wa'id-2.

These aircraft are regarded as Yemeni designations for the Iranian Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 loitering munitions.

Powered by piston engines, the drones are estimated to possess operational ranges between 1,500 and 2,500 kilometres while carrying 30 to 50-kilogramme blast-fragmentation warheads.

The Houthis also employ the Sammad family, including the Sammad-2, Sammad-3 and Sammad-4 variants. These aircraft use a distinctive V-tail configuration and are likewise capable of operating over distances ranging from 1,500 to 2,500 kilometres.

Another important component of the Houthi drone inventory is the Qasef series. The Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K are derived from Iran's Ababil-2 platform and provide shorter-range strike capabilities, with an estimated range of around 150 kilometres.

The Qasef-2K differs from conventional impact drones because it is designed to detonate approximately 20 metres above a ship's superstructure rather than striking directly.

Explosive drone boats & naval mines

The movement also possesses unmanned surface vessels designed to attack ships at water level, creating an entirely different challenge for commercial operators and naval escorts.

Among these systems is the Tofan series, which includes the Tofan-1, Tofan-2 and Tofan-3. These vessels resemble high-speed boats but function as floating explosive charges.

Packed with between 150 kilogrammes and more than 500 kilogrammes of explosives, they can be remotely controlled or operate in semi-autonomous mode.

According to analysts, the vessels are equipped with bow-mounted contact detonators and camera systems capable of transmitting live video via satellite or high-frequency communication links.

Travelling at speeds estimated between 35 and 45 knots, they are intended to strike the waterline or engine-room sections of target vessels, where explosions may lead to flooding and severe structural damage.

The Houthis are also believed to convert conventional maritime craft into unmanned explosive vessels. These include rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) as well as traditional dhows, whose familiar appearance allows them to blend into ordinary commercial or fishing traffic before rapidly accelerating towards their intended targets.

Beneath the water's surface, the Houthis possess yet another means of threatening maritime traffic through the deployment of naval mines. Their inventory reportedly includes moored contact mines such as the Mas'ur-1, Mas'ur-2 and Sadaf, based on the Iranian Sadaf-02 design.

These weapons are anchored below the sea surface and detonate when vessels make physical contact with them.

In addition, analysts assess that the Houthis possess Merkat acoustic and magnetic influence mines, which rest on the seabed and are triggered by changes in a ship's acoustic signature or magnetic field rather than by direct impact.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Warships and commercial tankers constantly alter course and speed, meaning accurate targeting requires a continuous flow of updated information.

To address this challenge, the Houthis have developed a multi-layered Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) network designed to identify, monitor and track maritime traffic across the Red Sea and surrounding waters.

One important source of information comes from Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions. Commercial vessels routinely broadcast AIS signals containing their identity, location, speed and destination.

These publicly available transmissions can be monitored using commercial tracking platforms, allowing shipping movements to be observed in near real time.

The Houthis are also believed to maintain shore-based surveillance positions equipped with optical observation systems and coastal radar installations overlooking important maritime approaches.

Such facilities have reportedly been established along elevated coastal areas around Hodeidah, Salif and Mokha, providing continuous monitoring of vessels transiting nearby waters.

Long-endurance reconnaissance drones provide another layer of surveillance. By conducting aerial overflights, these aircraft can monitor vessel positions over extended periods and transmit updated targeting information before missiles or drones are launched.

How do the Houthis acquire such advanced weapons?

Military analysts say the answer lies in an increasingly resilient procurement and production ecosystem that has developed over more than a decade.

According to assessments of the group's procurement architecture, the Houthis now sustain their long-range capabilities through two complementary channels.

The first consists of specialised military assistance originating from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF).

Rather than transporting complete long-range missiles — which are difficult to conceal and vulnerable to interception — the emphasis is believed to be on delivering modular components, guidance packages, propulsion elements and specialised equipment that can later be assembled inside Yemen.

Running alongside this military pipeline is a far broader commercial procurement network. Investigations have found that numerous electronic components used in Houthi missiles and drones are commercially available products with legitimate civilian applications.

These parts can therefore be sourced internationally before being incorporated into military systems after reaching Yemen.

Do the Houthis have their own military production?

Although external support remains an important factor, analysts no longer describe the Houthis merely as recipients of imported weapons. Instead, the movement has gradually established an indigenous military-industrial capability centred on assembly, modification and adaptation.

Years of coalition air strikes prompted the construction of an extensive network of underground workshops, concealed industrial facilities and tunnel complexes spread across Sa'ada, Sana'a and Hodeidah.

Operating beneath the surface reduces vulnerability to aerial bombardment while allowing production activities to continue even during periods of intense military pressure.

Within these facilities, imported components are assembled into complete missiles and drones.

Analysts also assess that technical specialists associated with the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah provide expertise in missile assembly, telemetry calibration, reverse engineering and weapons modification.

Rather than simply reproducing foreign systems unchanged, engineers are believed to adapt designs to local production capabilities while incorporating commercially sourced electronics wherever possible.

An important feature of this approach is modular standardisation. Instead of manufacturing missiles as single, fixed structures, components are designed as separate sections capable of being welded or bolted together.

This configuration simplifies transportation because individual sections fit more easily inside shipping containers, truck cargo beds or the holds of traditional dhows before final assembly occurs inside Yemen.

From a logistical perspective, modular construction also increases resilience. If one shipment is intercepted, replacement sections may still arrive through different routes, allowing production to continue with minimal interruption.

Also Watch:

With inputs from agencies