Is Taiwan collateral in a new Trump–Xi bromance?

As Air Force One lands in China, the mood in Taiwan seems quieter, tighter, and more alert.

The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping isn’t just another summit for Taiwan. It’s being read as a possible reset in US–China ties, one where Taiwan could end up less as America's priority and more as a bargaining chip.

Trump, true to his style, has moved away from the usual diplomatic language of “ironclad commitments” and replaced it with something looser and more transactional, talking instead about deals, leverage, and even a “big, fat hug” from Xi. For Taipei, that shift in tone matters because it raises a basic question. Is US policy actually changing, or just the way it is being spoken about?

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And it is precisely in that space between language and intent that Taiwan sees risk.

'Silicon shield': Still strong, but under pressure

Taiwan’s real security anchor has always been its chips. The island produces nearly 90 per cent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, making it central to everything from artificial intelligence (AI) to defence systems.

That “silicon shield” is still standing, but Washington’s approach to it is starting to look less fixed.

The concern in Taipei is simple. What if chip controls stop being a hard security line and start becoming a bargaining tool in US–China talks?

There are already, as Sana Hashmi, Fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation puts it, “visible fissures” in the system. She warns that if semiconductor restrictions are used as negotiation tools, it could strengthen China’s position while weakening both US security interests and Taiwan’s safety.

Similarly, the concern is that if semiconductor controls start getting folded into wider US–China negotiations, Taiwan may begin to see a shift in Washington’s approach. "Taipei will worry that technological containment is no longer an absolute red line for Washington," says Assistant Professor at Delhi University and international relations expert, Rityusha Mani Tiwary.

Still, Hashmi adds, a full policy reversal is unlikely because advanced chips remain a core national security issue for Washington.

Corroborating the same view, Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow and Coordinator at the East Asia Centre of Delhi's Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, says the US would not use Taiwan as a bargaining chip for any short-term gain. In his words, “It is too precious a bargaining chip or pressure point to be squandered for short-term tactical gains.”

Even so, the tension does not go away. The US remains deeply dependent on Taiwan’s chip ecosystem, but it is also increasingly open to deal-making with China on technology-related issues.

And that contradiction sits at the centre of Taipei’s concern.

Follow our live coverage of Trump's China visit here. 

Reading the tea leaves

Beyond formal decisions, what is now being watched in Taipei is tone and language.

Even if nothing major is announced, the way Taiwan is referenced after the summit will matter just as much.

There is concern that Taiwan could be mentioned less, or described in softer terms—less about deterrence, more about “stability” and “restraint.” That kind of shift may look small, but in Taipei it signals priority slipping.

There’s also worry about Beijing pushing language changes—framing Taiwan as the problem, or nudging Washington away from its usual careful phrasing.

Hashmi notes that even small shifts carry weight. "Trump emphasising no Taiwan independence or blaming Taiwan for provocation in Taiwan Strait would put pressure on the leadership on the Island. If Taiwan appears only briefly, that suggests deprioritising its significance for Trump."

Building on this, Tiwary adds that in any joint statement what matters is not only what is said about Taiwan, but also what is left unsaid.

"In the post-summit communique, If strong deterrence language gives way to vague calls for ‘stability’ and ‘restraint,’ Taipei will read that very carefully. Taiwan becomes vulnerable when it shifts from being treated as a strategic principle to becoming one variable in a broader US-China bargain," she says.

Taiwan’s response: Build, diversify, prepare

Taiwan is not standing still. It’s trying to reduce dependence and build resilience from within.

One part of this shift is “drone diplomacy,” a push to scale up domestic drone and defence production. Alongside this is a broader “whole-of-society resilience” strategy aimed at strengthening civil defence, infrastructure readiness, and supply chain stability.

But there are limits to how far Taiwan can diversify.

As Hashmi points out, no country can truly replace America’s role in Taiwan’s defence ecosystem, given that the US remains the only major power willing to sell arms to the island and is formally committed to its security.

That support extends far beyond weapons sales. It includes intelligence-sharing, surveillance capabilities, and the logistics backbone that underpins Taiwan’s broader defence preparedness. This is precisely why Taipei is not moving away from its asymmetric defence strategy.

That, ultimately, is the strategic reality Taiwan cannot escape. As Singh puts it, the Lai administration —or any future government in Taipei—“has no option but to continue working to keep the US on its side and proceed on the assumption that the US would not abandon Taiwan and would come forward for its defence.”

The worry in Taiwan, after all, is not an overnight shift in policy, but a slow weakening of how solid that support really is in a more transactional phase of US–China ties.