China’s discomfort is Quad’s best validation

In a time of severe flux in the global system, the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the United States should have been reassuring. But the summit of the ‘Quad’, once a star of India-US relations, has been delayed by months.

Doubts have surfaced, not on the value of the partnership itself, but on the interest of Washington in powering up the grouping. The recent visit of the US President to China with a phalanx of top business leaders has led most to view the Quad as dead in the water. But analysts always saw the loose grouping as a non-starter. The truth is that it has done far more than is immediately apparent. And it could do a lot better, notwithstanding Trump’s apparent deference to China.

A Quad of fits and starts

It is true that when taking the long view, the Quad has had its stops and starts, beginning with disaster relief following the 2004 tsunami, evolving under the visionary Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, as primarily a loose coalition of democracies for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ with the unstated underlying intention of balancing against Chinese domination. That vision came to a halt as Abe demitted office, Australia backed off under Chinese pressure, and everyone’s priorities shifted due to the global financial crisis.

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But it was precisely Chinese island militarisation and aggressiveness in the South China Sea that prompted Japan and India to restart the Quad in 2017. The first Trump presidency backed it, but it really started going places under the Biden Administration with six summits, including four physical meetings and two virtual. In other words, the Quad grew as a sum of political intentions and leadership, with all members equally committed.

Diffused not diluted

As the Quad evolved, however, its original intentions seemed diluted. Post-pandemic it had a useful common vaccine initiative, fighting climate change, cancer research, and a commitment to quality infrastructure that later evolved into green port infrastructure, and financial instruments to back it.

Slipped in almost quietly were strong efforts for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and a push for critical and emerging technologies. A working group on space evolved into a Quad Satellite Data Portal and integration of commercial space activity. By 2022, as the US focussed on MDA, the Quad Maritime Legal Dialogue aimed at solidifying a rules-based maritime order, while the Ship Observer Mission set up cooperation between coast guards. Practical cooperation was also seen in the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network (IPLN), with an exercise held in December 2025 in Guam, pitched carefully as a disaster management exercise.

The first air exercise, “Cope India”, took place, with Australia joining for the first time, but as an observer, together with Japan and India leading the exercise. This was held at the same time as the Malabar naval exercise 2025. In fact, in 2025, the Quad seemed to be on steroids, with two Foreign Ministers’ meetings, a Quad Critical Minerals Initiative allied with a meeting of more than 35 companies, and a Counter Terrorism Working Group in India in December 2025. That last was in expectation of a summit in India. Nothing happened on climate change, and nothing much seemed to have happened in areas like infrastructure. But the sum of it was that the four cooperated fully in areas of urgency.

Quad as a force multiplier

One interesting aspect of the Quad is its multiplier effect. It knits seamlessly with bodies like the US-led Minerals Security Partnership, which adds another ten members. Then there is the G7 Action Plan initiative on the subject supported by Japan and India. At another level, the Quad IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) works with multiple regional partners in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in support of maritime law enforcement by providing valuable data on subjects including the highly problematic illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing primarily by massive Chinese fishing fleets.

The effort is in turn supported by the India-US satellite NISAR, which is capable of tracking ships that have switched off their AIS (automatic identification systems). Fusion centres near Delhi frame this data. Australia in turn has the lead on cable connectivity and resilience, which also caters to its neighbours like Micronesia and other Indo-Pacific countries.

Then there is engagement with IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) and the Pacific Islands Forum. All this is knit together with a series of bilateral frameworks, like India’s “2+2” format of Defence and Foreign Ministers with all Quad members. In sum, Quad activity goes through multiple forums and platforms, even while having no specific alliance framework.

In short, the Quad progressed surprisingly well as long as a clear political commitment was evident. President Trump’s commitment to a body that obliquely defends against Chinese domination may be in doubt, but the grouping is still capable of going ahead on strong common interests like critical minerals and alternative supply chains. In practical terms, the lack of a Quad Secretariat creates problems in navigating legal and regulatory frameworks for pushing ahead with planned initiatives. Then there is the fact that strong industrial intermeshing between treaty allies like Australia and the US makes outsiders’ entry into such markets difficult.

There is also the reality that Quad inaction against Chinese interests, for instance when massive Chinese fishing fleets were aggressively deployed in a 290-mile-long wall in the East China Sea, betrays the fact that all governments involved — not just the US — are heavily dependent on Chinese trade and unwilling to ruffle feathers. And now US tariff wars make such action against civilian assets seem even more unlikely, as Quad partners are hit equally by capricious policies. In fact, an India-Japan rare earths deal was probably an immediate casualty.

However, the worst problem is none of these. The most serious is that the foundation of the Quad is a defence of the ‘rules-based order’. With the Venezuela government change and the Iran war, no ‘rules’ are evident that can be legitimately defended. In simple terms, it is difficult to preach international law in the Indo-Pacific, when it is being ignored in the Atlantic and the Arabian Sea. Such confusion erodes the glue in an already loose organisation. Yet, the other three could persist, in what is after all the one endeavour that actually knits diverse countries in this part of the world into a common if oblique objective.

China hates the Quad, and that is reason enough to keep it going. Clearly, the four are doing something right.

(Dr Tara Kartha is a former Director, National Security Council. The views expressed in this piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)