Trump approves nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia. Here’s what is in 30-year agreement

United States President Donald Trump has approved a landmark 30-year civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, paving the way for American companies to play a big role in building the kingdom’s nuclear energy infrastructure.

The multibillion-dollar pact, negotiated under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is expected to be worth tens of billions of dollars and is widely viewed as one of the most consequential US-Saudi agreements in recent years, reported the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on Tuesday.

The agreement, which is expected to be signed by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, is designed to deepen strategic ties between Washington and Riyadh while preventing Russia and China from securing a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme.

However, the accord has divided Washington because it opens the possibility of uranium enrichment inside Saudi Arabia under specific conditions — an issue that many fear could reshape nuclear norms in West Asia.

More from Explainers

Trump is just the messenger: Delhi must prepare for long winter in Washington

America’s credibility gap: Why middle powers are seeking strategic hedging

The agreement will now be submitted to the US Congress for review, where lawmakers are expected to scrutinise both its commercial benefits and its long-term security implications.

What does the Saudi nuclear deal comprise?

The agreement establishes the legal framework for American companies to construct Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy infrastructure, including reactors and other related technologies.

It gives US firms the leading role in developing the kingdom’s planned reactor fleet and fuel supply chain while effectively sidelining competing offers from Russia and China.

One of the biggest commercial beneficiaries is expected to be Westinghouse Electric, whose AP1000 nuclear reactor is among the leading technologies likely to be deployed under the agreement.

The AP1000 reactor can generate around 1,100 megawatts of electricity — enough to supply power to a medium-sized city or a large artificial intelligence data centre.

Saudi Arabia has long argued that developing civilian nuclear energy is essential for meeting rising domestic electricity demand. Riyadh also hopes that nuclear power will allow it to consume less oil for domestic electricity generation, enabling the kingdom to export more crude and increase revenues.

Trump administration officials have also presented the agreement as part of a broader effort to revive the American nuclear industry while strengthening Washington's strategic relationship with one of its closest partners in the region.

“The agreement could help revitalise the US nuclear industry, strengthen US-Saudi ties and deny Russia and China a strategically important role in the Saudi nuclear programme,” Robert Einhorn, a former longtime senior State Department official who advised both Republican and Democratic administrations on nonproliferation issues, told WSJ.

“But unless it contains adequate constraints, including on enrichment, it could increase nuclear proliferation risks in the Middle East and beyond,” Einhorn added.

What about the possibility of uranium enrichment?

Unlike previous US nuclear agreements that generally prohibited domestic enrichment by partner countries, the new accord allows for the possibility of constructing a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia if a joint US-Saudi study concludes that such a facility is commercially justified.

Under the agreement, Washington and Riyadh will conduct a two-year review examining whether enriching uranium within Saudi Arabia would be economically viable compared with importing nuclear fuel.

If the study determines that domestic enrichment is warranted, the enrichment plant would be built by American companies under a highly secretive "black box" arrangement.

Under this model, sensitive enrichment technology would remain inaccessible to Saudi Arabia, preventing the transfer of critical nuclear know-how.

Trump administration officials argue that keeping American companies directly involved would ensure enriched uranium is not diverted for military purposes. They also say spent nuclear fuel generated by Saudi reactors would not be capable of being reprocessed into material suitable for nuclear weapons.

The agreement also contains an important safeguard: if the United States objects to proceeding with enrichment after the joint study, Saudi Arabia would be barred from pursuing uranium enrichment independently or with another foreign country for the following 10 years.

Administration officials maintain that such provisions would ensure any enrichment activity remains exclusively peaceful while preventing Riyadh from turning to less restrictive suppliers.

How does the deal differ from previous US nuclear agreements?

The agreement represents a significant departure from what has traditionally been known as the US nuclear "gold standard."

Under previous agreements — most notably the 2009 US-United Arab Emirates nuclear accord — partner countries permanently agreed not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

Saudi Arabia has consistently refused to make such a commitment.

As a result, the new agreement does not legally require Riyadh to permanently abandon either uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing. Instead, these issues remain subject to future bilateral arrangements and the safeguards built into the current accord.

Another major difference concerns international inspections.

Rather than requiring Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol — which permits more intrusive inspections, including at undeclared nuclear facilities — the agreement instead relies on a customised oversight system combining baseline IAEA safeguards with bilateral US-Saudi monitoring.

Saudi Arabia rejected the Additional Protocol during negotiations. Trump administration officials argue that the bilateral monitoring framework will provide adequate oversight of US-built facilities.

However, many contend that it would be less effective in investigating suspected nuclear activities outside facilities directly linked to the United States.

The agreement also prioritises American companies over rival foreign suppliers, reinforcing Washington’s strategic objective of limiting Russian and Chinese influence in the kingdom’s nuclear sector.

How was the deal finalised?

The agreement forms part of a broader expansion in US-Saudi strategic cooperation. Negotiations gathered momentum following Trump's visit to Riyadh in May 2025, where discussions included economic partnerships, defence cooperation and major investment initiatives.

The process advanced further during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit in November 2025, when both governments signed multiple agreements, including a Strategic Defence Agreement, artificial intelligence chip export arrangements and the Joint Declaration on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

Final negotiations were completed by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman before receiving final approval from President Trump.

Unlike the previous Biden administration, which had linked civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi recognition of Israel, the Trump administration has removed that condition.

Although Trump continues encouraging Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords and establish diplomatic ties with Israel, the new nuclear agreement proceeds independently of any normalisation requirement.

The timing is also notable because Washington continues pressing Iran to scale back its nuclear programme and surrender its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

Experts argue that the administration risks appearing inconsistent by demanding strict limitations on Iran while simultaneously supporting a Saudi civilian nuclear programme that could eventually include domestic uranium enrichment.

Administration officials reject that comparison, arguing that Saudi Arabia's programme would remain under effective safeguards and continuous American oversight.

Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that its nuclear ambitions are entirely peaceful. Nevertheless, concerns persist because Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated in 2018 that if Iran were ever to develop a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would seek one as well.

How has the deal divided Washington?

The agreement has prompted strong reactions from non-proliferation experts and members of Congress. Many analysts argue that uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing represent the two principal technological pathways towards producing weapons-grade nuclear material.

They warn that even a civilian enrichment capability could provide Saudi Arabia with what is known as a latent nuclear weapons capability.

Experts also caution that moving away from the IAEA Additional Protocol could weaken established global non-proliferation standards and encourage other countries to seek similar exceptions.

“Whither goes Saudi Arabia, so goes the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Egypt. The idea that this will have a happy ending is delusional,” Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told WSJ.

“Rest assured, these agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation, while relying on the world’s best nuclear technology and scientists, designed right here in the United States,” Wright said in a statement.

“Thanks to President Trump, the American nuclear renaissance is underway and will deliver long-term benefits to the American and Saudi people.”

What happens next?

The agreement must now undergo congressional review under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act. Congress will have a mandatory 90-day continuous session to examine the accord after it is formally submitted.

Unless lawmakers pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval, the agreement will automatically enter into force after the review period.

Even if both chambers approve a resolution blocking the deal, Trump would be able to veto it.

Opponents would then need a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to override the presidential veto — a threshold widely considered difficult to achieve.

Although Democratic and Republican administrations have historically resisted allowing West Asian countries to enrich uranium, lawmakers seeking to stop the agreement face significant procedural hurdles.

The debate is not new. In 2018, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced legislation that would have required Congress to affirmatively approve any nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia before it could take effect.

One of the senators supporting that proposal was then-Florida Republican Marco Rubio, who now serves as Trump's secretary of state. The legislation, however, was never brought to a vote.

Also Watch:

With inputs from agencies