As Hungary rejects Orban, Europe’s far-Right faces a moment of reckoning — but stays in the fight

Trumpian leader Viktor Orban’s defeat in Hungary has boosted moderates in Europe, giving them belief that the far-Right is not invincible. But, the challenges for European moderates have not mitigated even their times of celebration.

Despite Peter Magyar’s landslide victory and emerging cracks in the alliance between the American Maga movement and Europe’s far‑Right parties, moderates in the continent face a sobering reality that far‑Right powerhouses AfD in Germany and National Rally (RN) in France remain entrenched in the European heartland.

Orban’s loss in the Hungary election after 16 years in power represents a domestic turning point with wider implications for Europe, but the election result should not be over‑read as a continent‑wide defeat for the far-Right, according to Prof Ankita Dutta of the Centre for European Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

More from World

ALSO READ — Orban voted out: Hungary result could redraw Europe’s political map

As per the latest polls, the neo‑Nazi AfD is leading in Germany, RN is ahead in France, and Reform UK is the most popular party in the United Kingdom.

Dutta noted that the underlying reasons for the far-right’s popularity have not disappeared.

“Even as Orban has been defeated, far‑right parties elsewhere, such as the AfD in Germany and RN in France, continue to be strong. Persistent structural factors, such as migration anxieties, identity politics, and economic insecurity, continue to sustain the appeal of far‑Right narratives,” said Dutta, whose research focuses on European politics and the far‑Right movement across the continent.

Once political insurgents, far-Right faces reality of electoral politics

If far‑Right parties remain powerful elsewhere, does the Hungarian election matter at all? Dutta said the reality is nuanced.

Essentially, the far-Right is now on notice.

As alternative movements, far‑Right parties may gain popularity as political insurgents by capitalising on socioeconomic anxieties and promising radical transformation. But once in government, they face the same challenge of delivering what they promised while seeking votes or risk being ousted like Orban.

“Once in power, far‑Right leaders must navigate a complex political environment, including economic trade‑offs, EU regulations and public expectations, which frequently moderate their appeal. Across Europe, the far-Right is encountering the limits of its transition from protest movements to governments. While in Opposition, they benefit from mobilising public discontent. Once in power, the same public evaluates them on deliverables. This shift creates tension between radical rhetoric and policy pragmatism, which can result in voter disillusionment,” Dutta told Firstpost.

As pressure groups, far‑Right parties have often excelled at channelling public anxieties. But electoral politics is a different game.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron in 2024 assembled a tactical alliance to prevent RN from forming a government. In Germany, the ‘firewall’ maintained by mainstream parties ensured that the neo‑Nazi AfD could not form a government last year despite leading the polls.

Recently, in France, RN performed poorly in local elections. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s image of invincibility has been shattered by a defeat in a referendum that critics saw as a verdict on her leadership.

But Dutta cautioned against reading too much into these results. She said that local elections are primarily fought on governance issues, and bigger themes of migration and identity that fuel the far‑Right movement may not feature prominently.

‘Hungary model’ might not work everywhere

The ‘Hungary model’ that ousted Orban is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. While Orban was part of the pan‑European far‑Right movement, his defeat stemmed from Hungary’s specific conditions.

Dutta said the Hungarian election is best understood as an outcome of anti‑incumbency that all parties are vulnerable to.

Orban failed to deliver on the core promise that almost every regime makes from China to West Asia: providing economic well‑being in exchange for taking away sociopolitical rights.

Hungarians were battling persistently high inflation, stagnating living standards, and poor governance alongside a crackdown on civil liberties, Christian nationalism eroding the nation’s secular foundations, the centralisation of power, restrictions on media, and pressures on the judiciary. This meant the election became an outlet not only against democratic backsliding but also against failed economic promises.

“The Opposition effectively framed the election as a choice between ongoing institutional erosion and the restoration of democratic checks and balances. Magyar campaigned on a platform of ‘systemic change’ and emphasised systemic corruption, underfunded public services, and Orban’s dismantling of democratic institutions. Therefore, Orban’s defeat is primarily rooted in anti‑incumbency and represents meaningful but limited rejection of illiberalism,” Dutta said.

Even though the anti‑Orban movement had a foreign‑policy dimension, as Magyar mobilised voters around a renewed pro‑EU orientation against Orban’s closer ties to Russia and China, Dutta stressed that this does not signal a uniform reversal of far‑Right influence across Europe. Hungary‑like conditions simply do not exist in other European countries, such as France and Germany, to produce similar outcomes.