Trump’s Iran deal is yet fragile: Peace in West Asia remains a distant dream

The Sunday agreement between the US and Iran established a 14-point interim framework to ensure the 'immediate cessation of hostilities' in the Iran war, reopened the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, and initiated the phased release of up to $25 billion in frozen Iranian assets. While presented as a ceasefire arrangement, the reality on the ground suggests a more decisive strategic outcome: Washington appears to have tacitly accepted what may become its most consequential geopolitical setback since Vietnam. Rather than a negotiated equilibrium, the settlement reflects shifting power dynamics that forced an early and pragmatic pause in active hostilities.

Why the Deal May Still Fail

The core aim of diplomatic negotiations is to identify previously invisible overlap between two parties’ positions — if not in stated demands, then in underlying interests. Concessions on one dimension by one side are intended to unlock reciprocal movement by the other, creating a pathway towards durable settlement.

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In this case, however, the positions of the United States and Iran remain fundamentally misaligned. What exists is not convergence but structured incompatibility managed through temporary de-escalation.

The US and Iran have instead agreed to a 60-day interim ceasefire extension memorandum of understanding (MoU). Iran’s demands remain extensive: lifting of the blockade, recognition of permanent sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, reparations, sanctions relief, unfreezing of assets, third-party guarantees against future aggression, and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Less publicly emphasised is Tehran’s insistence on cessation of hostilities in Gaza.

Crucially, Iran seeks irreversible concessions early in the process — including partial lifting of the blockade and the release of 50 per cent of frozen assets before any substantive compliance on its side. This reflects a negotiating logic shaped by distrust, particularly after the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA (or the Iran nuclear deal) and previous targeted strikes on Iranian leadership during earlier diplomatic phases.

Of these demands, Washington has only tentatively signalled willingness on lifting the blockade — and even that is conditional on Iran opening the Strait of Hormuz to Western shipping without fees.

Fragmentation of the Battlefield

Although early drafts of the ceasefire included Lebanon, the United States has sought to compartmentalise the conflict. Iran is unlikely to accept this separation, as it would effectively isolate Hezbollah and weaken its regional deterrence architecture.

For Israel, and particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, maintaining pressure on Hezbollah remains central to domestic political survival and regional military credibility. With internal political competition intensifying, sustaining an assertive posture also serves electoral calculations.

At the same time, Israel remains unwilling to significantly constrain operations in Gaza, which it considers a core security imperative. This creates a structural contradiction within the ceasefire framework — one that makes a complete cessation of hostilities politically difficult to sustain.

The US Position and Its Limits

US demands include opening Hormuz without fees, mine clearance, a pledge from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, and a commitment to curb proxy financing.

Of these, Iran is only likely to reaffirm its existing position on nuclear non-proliferation — largely symbolic, as it has previously made similar commitments. The remaining demands either require strategic concessions Iran views as existential or lack enforcement credibility in their current form.

Before discussions on a permanent settlement, Washington has demanded dismantling and removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, particularly material enriched to 60 per cent. Tehran has categorically rejected this, insisting on retaining enrichment capability as a sovereign right.

Why Permanent Peace Negotiations Are Structurally Weak

Iran’s negotiating framework remains anchored in a broader 10-point plan that includes cessation of hostilities against regional allies, binding United Nations Security Council guarantees, and regional non-aggression pacts.

While some elements — such as broad non-aggression commitments — may be superficially acceptable, they remain inherently weak due to enforcement challenges and the historical reversibility of such agreements.

One demand, however, is strategically transformative: the complete withdrawal of US military forces from West Asia. This would include dismantling operational infrastructure such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (US Central Command’s regional hub), the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and all forward-deployed US military assets across Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria.

This demand is non-negotiable from the US perspective, as it would represent a structural rollback of American military architecture in the region.

How It Will Likely End

In asymmetric negotiations, the party with lower tolerance for deadlock tends to concede more. While the United States retains greater aggregate power, it also faces higher domestic and alliance costs from prolonged conflict.

Washington may attempt to sustain low-intensity pressure in the short term. However, structural constraints — including depletion of stockpiles, oil market sensitivity, and alliance fatigue — limit escalation options.

Escalation drivers include domestic political pressure from pro-Israel constituencies, military-industrial incentives, and reputational concerns over perceived US retreat. However, countervailing pressures are significant: rising oil prices, risk of broader regional destabilisation, limited war reserves, and political exposure ahead of elections.

Iran’s leverage rests on its ability to disrupt energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, sustain asymmetric resistance, and benefit from external strategic balancing by powers such as China and Russia.

Over time, structural constraints are likely to outweigh escalation incentives. The most probable trajectory is a gradual drawdown of direct confrontation, coupled with continued Iranian control over Hormuz leverage, partial sanctions erosion, and a recalibrated US military posture in the region.

Israel’s regional position is likely to become more contested, while Washington may seek to frame the outcome domestically as a managed success rather than a strategic retreat.

Conclusion

The war is therefore likely to conclude not with a decisive treaty or battlefield resolution, but through incremental exhaustion of escalation options on both sides.

The result is not peace in the traditional sense, but a reconfiguration of coercive equilibrium — one where Iran consolidates strategic leverage, the United States absorbs a controlled setback, and regional instability persists in managed form.

This is not the end of conflict, but the stabilisation of its permanent condition.

(The author is a former diplomat, political advisor and geopolitical strategist. The views expressed are personal and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)