Pakistan’s double deterrence: Nukes and militants come full circle in the Munir era

Two noticeable events happened in Pakistan recently. First, the establishment celebrated ‘Youm-e-Takbeer’, translated as “the day of greatness”, which essentially refers to the anniversary of the nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, about ten days after India conducted its own tests in Pokhran, without any grandiose names.

Like a certain famous sports shoe advertisement, Delhi just ‘did it’ and then went on its way. Pakistan has a national holiday, and celebrations are conducted by embassies everywhere. That’s one level of deterrence which Islamabad likes to use whenever in trouble.

The other level was seen when Lashkar-e-Taiba's deputy chief, Saifullah Kasuri, threatened to kill not only Field Marshal Munir but also Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. That is another type of deterrence, only of a different kind but, oddly, almost for the same audience.

Deterrence by Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan has one of the fastest-growing nuclear arsenals, and at present its inventory is estimated at about 170 warheads, which is about 14–27 warheads a year. It operates enriched uranium facilities in Kahuta and Gadwal, a heavy-water plutonium production reactor complex at Khushab, and a plutonium reprocessing plant at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH). Rather a lot for such a small country, especially since it has now been reported that it is developing an ICBM capable of reaching the US. China is helping develop the Hangor-class submarines, potentially capable of firing nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

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All this is well researched. What is less known is the evolution of its nuclear ‘doctrine’. Based on ‘first use’, it has moved from ‘minimum credible deterrence’ to ‘full-spectrum deterrence’, just after it tested a tactical nuclear weapon, the ‘Nasr’, to what it calls the use of ‘zero-range’ missiles. No one is clear what that means, but it presumably refers to battlefield nuclear weapons and landmines, which means miniaturisation of a very high order.

It also underscores its basic ‘madman’ nuclear position, which seems to build uncertainty around exactly what it will do in a crisis. All that went for a six after ‘Operation Sindoor’ and India’s own very well-stated doctrine that any nuclear use will be met with a full nuclear response.

But Pakistan’s ‘deterrence’ is also part of its diplomatic arsenal. Actual ‘use’ of nuclear weapons during multiple crises has always been in the form of sometimes unstated threats – such as moving missiles into the open during Kargil – or convening a meeting of its National Command Authority, aimed at drawing in external actors, primarily the US.

In other words, its nuclear deterrent can be said to be ‘aimed’ at the US, usually for an intervention on Kashmir. Recently, however, Pakistan has used it to get itself onto the international stage as a ‘mediator’ in the Iran war, as a ‘most favoured nation’ in the Oval Office, and projected its virtual military ruler to an extent even he may not have expected in his wildest dreams. In other words, a deterrence policy that involves signalling an impending and severe threat.

Deterrence by Terror

Now consider the Lashkar-e-Taiba threat against Munir, warning of assassination if Pakistan dared to recognise Israel. First, protests against Israel, all extremely violent, have been part of urban lore in Pakistan at least since 2005, as the country not only got into the hands of radicals but also as the Barelvi groups ‘caught up’ with the extreme Deobandis in creating violence over diverse issues, including Palestine.

The Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, for instance, was publicly paid off by the Director General of the Punjab Rangers, Maj Gen Azhar Navid Hayat, after it had launched protests at Faizabad Exchange against the then Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). Shortly thereafter, the Army’s ‘favourite’, Imran Khan, was sworn in on the back of further protests. The same group, however, was sharply pulled up by Lt Gen Asim Munir when it got too big for its boots. In other words, the push and the leash operate together.

Now here’s the clincher. Multiple groups launched massive protests in October 2025 after the Gaza peace plan had been signed, having mysteriously kept silent when Israel was pounding Lebanon and Palestine to bits. This set of protests coincided with Trump asking Pakistan to send troops to police the ceasefire. That was classic Pakistan Army tactics.

The Lashkar ICBM

Now it seems Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, which had been sitting quietly for a while due to international attention on it during the Biden administration years, has come back into the limelight. A series of statements by Saifullah Kasuri, Deputy Chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba, threatening India while addressing large gatherings has now become par for the course after Operation Sindoor targeted jihadi nodes. In fact, in May 2025 Kasuri was attending a rally in Lahore to celebrate that very same ‘Youm-e-Takbeer’, declaring that he had become “more famous” since being named in the Pahalgam case.

With him on the stage were Punjab Assembly Speaker Malik Muhammad Ahmad Khan and Food Minister Malik Rasheed Ahmad Khan—both senior politicians from the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and close associates of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Also present was Talha Saeed, son of LeT founder Hafiz Saeed, and Amir Hamza, a US-designated terrorist and senior LeT figure. At various times he has been seen hobnobbing with army officers and saying openly that he leads Friday prayers for the army.

Kasuri is no ordinary figure. He has been head of LeT’s Peshawar headquarters, served on Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s (JuD) Coordination Committee for Central Punjab Province, and been president of the Lashkar’s political arm, the MML (Milli Muslim League). And the money for all this may come from the faithful, but it is certainly not enough for the lifestyle that leaders like Hafiz Saeed are accustomed to, travelling in bulletproof heavy SUVs. Pakistan may be down to its last penny, but the army and its extensions have it good.

And it is this puppet who is supposed to have threatened the Field Marshal with assassination. This is ‘deterrence’ of a different sort, but like the nukes, it is aimed at the US and its allies. No, Pakistan has no intention of recognising Israel. It simply can’t. It would mean the end of the army and the ‘establishment’.

That is the key problem with fame. When Munir was strutting around as a ‘friend’ of the President of the United States, it was clear that sooner rather than later he would come up against a brick wall. He is now expected not only to deliver Iranian peace but also to join, or at the very least pay lip service to, the Abraham Accords, together with other Arab nations.

This may be delayed for a while, but sooner rather than later, either Pakistan will have to deploy troops in Israel to police a ceasefire or back plans to bring Israel into the Middle East again. Continued violence, however, allows Munir to keep sashaying with Trump on the one hand, while tipping off the Chinese on the other, all the while importing oil from Iran via a smuggling route.

The ‘mediator’, therefore, has no stake, in fact no interest at all, in the war ending. Kasuri just gave everyone firm evidence of that. And the key capability that allows Pakistan to do all of this—the mediation, the betrayals, and most of all a revived and powerful terrorist capability—is the fact that it has nuclear weapons.

In fact, full circle.

(The writer is Director [Research and Analysis] at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)