Is Quad becoming irrelevant in a G2-shaped world?

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, was conceived with a clear strategic purpose: to act as a balancing coalition against the growing assertion of China in the Indo-Pacific. It brought together four democracies — India, the United States, Japan and Australia — all of whom, in varying degrees, were concerned by Beijing’s expanding military footprint, economic penetration and geopolitical ambitions. The idea carried symbolic appeal. Here were four major maritime powers, geographically straddling the Indo-Pacific, ostensibly united by shared democratic values and common strategic anxieties.

But in international politics, symbolism alone is never enough. The central question today is whether Quad retains strategic relevance, or whether it has become an increasingly ornamental forum in a world driven by blunt realpolitik and direct bilateral bargains among major powers.

This question becomes especially pertinent at a time when the United States itself appears to be recalibrating its approach towards China. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly spoken of dealing directly with Beijing, often in transactional terms, and has at times hinted at the possibility of a “G2” arrangement between America and China — a condominium of the world’s two largest economies managing global affairs through direct engagement. Even under other administrations, Washington’s behaviour has often reflected this instinct. Despite rhetoric about alliances and collective security, America’s strategic priorities remain fundamentally American. If tomorrow a direct accommodation with China better serves US interests, Washington will not hesitate to pursue it.

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Where does that leave Quad?

The uncomfortable truth is that the grouping risks becoming a secondary appendage to the larger and more decisive US-China equation. In any direct strategic engagement between Washington and Beijing, neither Japan nor Australia possesses the autonomous geopolitical weight to substantially alter outcomes. Both remain deeply tied to the American security architecture. Their room for independent manoeuvre is limited. India alone among the four has sought to preserve strategic autonomy, but even India’s ability to shape Quad’s direction remains constrained by the larger asymmetry between the US and China.

This raises an important concern for India. For New Delhi, the China challenge is neither theoretical nor distant. It is immediate, physical and dangerous. India fought a war with China in 1962. It has unresolved border disputes. It has witnessed repeated Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control, including the deadly Galwan clash of 2020. China’s rapid military modernisation, infrastructural expansion in Tibet, naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and close strategic nexus with Pakistan all pose direct security concerns for India.

Can Quad genuinely help India counter this threat? The answer, at present, is only partially. Quad has certainly evolved from a loose consultative forum into a more structured mechanism. It has expanded cooperation in maritime domain awareness, cyber security, critical technologies, supply chains and disaster relief. Most importantly, it has facilitated greater military coordination. The Malabar naval exercises, originally bilateral between India and the US, now regularly include Japan and Australia. These exercises have grown significantly in sophistication, involving aircraft carriers, submarines, anti-submarine warfare drills and complex maritime manoeuvres across the Indo-Pacific.

The 2020 Malabar exercise in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea was particularly significant because it marked Australia’s return after several years, thereby completing the full Quad configuration. Subsequent exercises have demonstrated improved interoperability among the four navies. Joint patrols, coordinated communication systems and intelligence sharing have all contributed to enhancing strategic familiarity.

Yet one must ask: have these exercises materially altered the balance of power vis-à-vis China? The evidence suggests not substantially. China continues to surge ahead militarily. Its naval expansion is proceeding at a breathtaking pace. Moreover, China’s strategic partnership with Russia has added another layer of complexity. Despite Western expectations after the Ukraine conflict, Moscow and Beijing have moved closer together, bound by a shared desire to resist American dominance.

Indeed, Quad risks becoming another example of the growing ineffectiveness of multilateral forums in an era dominated by hard national interests. Consider BRICS. It includes powerful countries such as China, Russia and India. Yet during the recent Iran conflict, BRICS remained largely peripheral, unable to shape outcomes in any decisive manner. This reflects a broader truth about the emerging world order. Multilateral institutions increasingly struggle when confronted by raw geopolitical competition, and even the United Nations has often been paralysed, and NATO, despite its military coherence, has experienced internal strains.

Ultimately, India’s most reliable defence lies in its own capabilities. This means sustained investment in military modernisation, border infrastructure, cyber warfare, indigenous defence production and naval expansion. It means reducing bureaucratic delays in procurement. It means building economic strength because, in the final analysis, military power rests upon economic foundations. No coalition can compensate for internal weakness.

Equally important, India must avoid strategic overextension. A stable neighbourhood is indispensable for India’s rise. Yet relations with Pakistan remain frozen, ties with Bangladesh have shown signs of strain, and Nepal periodically drifts into suspicion and resentment. SAARC, once envisioned as a meaningful regional forum, lies practically defunct.

There is wisdom in reconsidering the neighbourhood-first approach. A self-confident India should not fear dialogue with Pakistan, however difficult. Nor should it neglect the importance of rebuilding trust with smaller neighbours who are increasingly susceptible to Chinese influence. Regional stability in South Asia may, in the long run, contribute more to India’s security than rhetorical posturing in distant strategic forums. Serious thought should, I think, be given, however challenging the task may seem, to reviving SAARC.

In the unforgiving arena of global politics, nations survive not because of declarations or summit photographs, but because of hard power, economic resilience, diplomatic agility, and preserving and managing more efficiently their legitimate and immediate spheres of influence.

(The writer is a former diplomat, an author, and a politician. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)