Iran holds the leverage as Trump desperately searches for an exit

Deposing before a Congressional Committee on June 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that US-Iranian negotiations on the war were in a “dynamic situation”. He went on to assert that Iran wants the US naval blockade of its ports and shoreline to be lifted so that Iranian oil could again flow to the world. However, the US had ruled that out till Iran lifted its choke on the Strait of Hormuz.

Rubio also said that in the present discussions the Iranians agreed to “negotiate aspects of their nuclear programme” which they were earlier not willing to do. These ‘aspects’ relate to their nuclear enrichment programme and their stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Significantly, Rubio did not give an indication of the timeline for the negotiations, nor that they will end in an acceptable deal. Thus, he struck a more cautious note than President Donald Trump, who has wildly swung between optimism and pessimism on the prospects of a deal.

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The war has gone on for over three months though a ceasefire has been in place since April 8. A step back to consider these three months may provide useful perspectives on the war.

It is abundantly clear, by now, that all the assumptions which formed the premise of what has really been President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war on Iran have turned out to be wrong. They had thought that a decapitation strike would bring Iran’s Vilayet-e-Faqih system to its knees and enable its domestic opponents to rise to finish it off. Instead, the system proved to be resilient and its opponents’ nationalism came to the fore.

Trump considered that the destruction of Iran’s conventional defence capabilities — navy, missiles, anti-aircraft batteries and drones — would leave it vulnerable and compel it to accept US terms. This did not happen, leaving him bewildered and frustrated. Iran did not fight a conventional war. It took it across to US bases in the Arab Gulf states and also targeted their hydrocarbon facilities. Above all, it choked the Strait of Hormuz, thereby drying up 20 per cent of global oil and gas. This has had a disastrous effect on the availability of oil and gas and products dependent on hydrocarbons, such as some vital fertilisers. Once Iran expanded the theatre of war, the very basis of the US and Israeli war plan suffered a severe and irreversible setback.

The only option thereafter was a negotiated settlement and Trump took the first step in this direction almost two months ago when the warring parties agreed to a ceasefire on April 8. That continues, but the problem is that the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked. Trump wants the Strait to be opened, but on his terms, and Iran is not willing to give him that.

Two questions arise: one, will Trump be able to get terms from Iran that will satisfy him? Two, if Iran does not oblige, will he have to drink from a poisoned cup and accept what will, from his viewpoint, be unsatisfactory terms so that the Strait of Hormuz opens? That will naturally leave him open to enormous domestic and foreign criticism. Is he willing to accept that? This requires a measure of consideration. That is being attempted in the succeeding paragraphs.

The great German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum, “war is a continuation of politics by other means”, is applicable to all wars; Trump’s Iran war is no exception. One of the central factors in politics — and therefore in war as well — is the pressure imposed by time. Both Iran and the US are subject to its pressures. The question is which country can bear them more.

Iran needs the war to end to begin the process of reconstruction, but it has lived with deprivation for years because of sanctions. Now the pressures, though, are far greater because of the US blockade stopping the flow of its oil, the principal source of its revenue. For Trump, the impact of the war on the US economy, specifically on oil prices, is a considerable pressure. This has been exacerbated by the upcoming mid-term elections. The global economy has been very adversely affected by the war. On balance, Trump’s need for an early end to the war is greater.

A principal consideration for Trump is to show that he has secured far stronger commitments from Iran that it will not make nuclear weapons than President Barack Obama was able to achieve through his deal with it. This would include curbs on, if not the elimination of, its enrichment programme. There is also the issue of its HEU stocks.

There have been reports that the ‘hard boys’ in the Revolutionary Guards are unwilling to give up what are believed to be around 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. These matters, though, are to be discussed in the second stage, after an understanding has been reached on the first, which will mean the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of the US blockade. Complicating these discussions is the Iranian desire to impose a toll on the movement of vessels through the Strait. Neither the US nor any other country will be willing to accept that.

What the Iranians would, in all likelihood, demand for not imposing tolls is the unfreezing of some of their financial assets held by Western governments. There is also the question of sanctions — US and UN — but that cannot be done in a memorandum of understanding (MOU). That can only be part of a later comprehensive deal involving Iran’s nuclear programme.

As the past few weeks have rolled by, Israel has stepped up its actions against Hizbollah in Lebanon. This has been in breach of the ceasefire. Reports indicate that Trump has expressed his ire in colourful language against Netanyahu, who knows that when push comes to shove he will have to fall in line with what Trump wants him to do. Certainly, the Hizbollah complication is one that he does not need when US-Iran negotiations are underway, albeit indirectly.

Trump will eventually have to arrive at a compromise where he gives more to Iran in the MoU than he gets. He may twist and turn, but his manoeuvring space is limited, for restarting hostilities can have the most dangerous consequences for the region and the world at large. The negotiations for a regular deal will be very difficult and will drag on, but with hydrocarbons flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, some pressures on the global economy will ease.

Finally, whenever it has seemed that the MoU would be reached soon, the prospect has become distant. But how long can Trump delay the inevitable? The answer is: sooner rather than later.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)