Asim Munir reinforces Pakistan’s legacy as a vassal state

The political history of Pakistan is often narrated as the story of military coups, weak civilian governments and endless political instability. But beneath this familiar narrative lies a deeper geopolitical reality that has shaped the country since its earliest decades. Pakistan’s military establishment has historically evolved not merely as the dominant institution inside the country but as the principal intermediary through which the United States and Saudi Arabia have exercised their influence over Pakistan’s strategic direction.

For decades, Washington and Riyadh have viewed Pakistan not as a fully sovereign strategic actor but as a highly useful geopolitical instrument. The US used Pakistan as a Cold War frontline state against the Soviet Union, serving as a covert operational hub during the Afghan jihad, then as a logistics corridor during the ‘War on Terror’ and as a security manager to manage regional balance against Iran, Afghanistan and at times even China. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, viewed Pakistan as a military shield for Gulf monarchies, a source of expanding ideological alignment and a dependent Sunni nuclear power whose army could be called upon whenever Riyadh needed strategic depth.

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At the centre of this triangular relationship stood the Pakistan military. Successive army chiefs understood that the military’s supremacy within Pakistan depended not merely on domestic coercion but also on foreign patronage. American military aid, Saudi financial bailouts, Gulf remittances and Western diplomatic backing became the oxygen sustaining Pakistan’s power structure. In return, Pakistan’s generals repeatedly aligned the country’s foreign and security policies with the broader geopolitical objectives of Washington and Riyadh.

This arrangement reached its peak under General Zia-ul-Haq during the 1980s. Zia transformed Pakistan into the central launching pad for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Billions of dollars poured into Pakistan from the CIA and Saudi intelligence networks. The military establishment expanded enormously in power, Islamist terrorism was institutionalised as state policy and Pakistan’s strategic apparatus became deeply integrated into American and Saudi regional objectives.

Yet even Zia, despite his deep dependence on Washington and Riyadh, believed he was strengthening Pakistan’s long-term strategic position. His worldview was dangerous and deeply destabilising, but he saw alignment with the US and Saudi Arabia as a means to enhance Pakistan’s military capabilities, regional leverage and ideological influence.

Under Asim Munir, however, the equation has fundamentally changed. Munir’s Pakistan no longer appears as a strategically autonomous military state leveraging great powers for its own interests. Instead, it increasingly resembles a security client state functioning primarily to satisfy the geopolitical expectations of Washington and Riyadh while sacrificing domestic political stability, democratic legitimacy and even strategic independence.

The removal of Imran Khan in 2022 became the clearest demonstration of how tightly Saudi Arabia and the US still control Pakistan through the military establishment.

Khan’s problems with both capitals had been building for years. Unlike previous Pakistani leaders who carefully calibrated their foreign policy within the boundaries acceptable to Washington and Riyadh, Khan increasingly projected himself as an independent political figure willing to challenge traditional alignments. His rhetoric on Islamophobia, Kashmir and future Muslim leadership often irritated Gulf monarchies. His attempts to cultivate closer ties with Turkey and Malaysia were viewed in Saudi Arabia as an indirect challenge to Riyadh’s dominance of the Islamic world.

The tensions escalated dramatically in 2020 when Pakistan publicly criticised the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for its silence on Kashmir. Saudi Arabia reacted furiously. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly interpreted Khan’s posture as defiance from a country that remained economically dependent on Gulf financial support.

Soon afterward Riyadh suddenly demanded the immediate return of $2 billion from a larger Saudi financial assistance package extended to Pakistan. The demand shocked Islamabad because Pakistan’s economy was already in severe distress. China had to step in temporarily to help Pakistan repay the amount. Within Pakistan’s military circles the message was understood clearly that Saudi Arabia had lost patience with Imran Khan.

For Pakistan’s military establishment, which has historically maintained intimate institutional ties with Saudi Arabia, the Saudi signal carried enormous weight. Generations of Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces, served in Gulf security structures and relied on Saudi financial patronage during economic crises. Riyadh’s displeasure with Khan therefore rapidly became Rawalpindi’s problem as well.

At the same time, Khan’s relationship with Washington was deteriorating rapidly. The breaking point came after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. On the very day Russian forces entered Ukraine, Khan was photographed in Moscow alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin. The symbolism deeply angered the Biden administration. According to the Drop Site report, US officials had already warned Pakistan against proceeding with the trip.

Pakistan’s refusal to clearly align against Russia further aggravated tensions. Then came the reported March 2022 diplomatic conversation between Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington and US official Donald Lu, in which American displeasure with Khan was allegedly conveyed bluntly. According to the leaked diplomatic cypher, relations with Washington could improve if Khan were removed through a no-confidence vote.

What followed thoroughly exposed the enduring structure of power inside Pakistan. The no-confidence motion against Khan was formally parliamentary, but politically it moved forward only because the military establishment under Qamar Javed Bajwa withdrew support from him. Once the army decided Khan was expendable, his government collapsed rapidly. The opposition united, judicial pressure intensified and sections of the bureaucracy shifted loyalties almost overnight.

In effect, Saudi displeasure and American strategic anger converged through Pakistan’s military establishment to remove an elected Prime Minister who had become inconvenient to both powers.

After Khan’s removal, Pakistan’s policy direction changed almost immediately. Islamabad quietly facilitated military supplies linked to the Ukraine war effort, and relations with Washington improved. IMF negotiations progressed, and the Saudi financial engagement stabilised again. The military establishment signalled repeatedly that Pakistan would remain fully aligned with the strategic expectations of its traditional patrons.

Then came the rise of Asim Munir. Munir’s ascent represented far more than a routine military transition. It symbolised the emergence of a military chief who appeared completely comfortable functioning as the preferred security manager for both Washington and Riyadh.

Unlike earlier Pakistani generals who at least attempted to balance external powers while preserving room for manoeuvre, Munir increasingly appears willing to subordinate Pakistan’s internal political system and strategic autonomy directly to foreign geopolitical calculations.

The Drop Site report describes how under Munir, Pakistan’s democratic structure has been systematically hollowed out. Imran Khan was imprisoned, and PTI was politically dismantled. Elections were widely accused of manipulation as the courts faced immense pressure. Media censorship intensified since then, and so did the suppression of the opposition voices.

But the deeper issue was geopolitical. Under Munir, Pakistan’s military leadership reportedly reassured Washington on missile programmes, nuclear oversight and regional alignments. The same military establishment that once projected anti-American nationalism domestically now appeared eager to demonstrate reliability before the US security establishment.

At the same time, Pakistan’s long-standing strategic partnership with China visibly slowed down. CPEC stagnated, major projects stalled, and Beijing increasingly expressed frustration with Pakistan’s instability and security failures. Critics within Pakistan argue that under Munir, Pakistan’s strategic orientation has tilted decisively back toward dependence on Washington and Gulf monarchies.

This is where the comparison with Zia-ul-Haq becomes important. Munir increasingly mirrors Zia in ideological style, centralised military dominance and reliance on Saudi-American patronage networks. Like Zia, he has overseen a political order where civilian authority is subordinate to the military and dissent is aggressively crushed. Like Zia, he views the army as the ultimate guardian of the state.

But there is one crucial difference. Zia believed his alliance with the US and Saudi Arabia would ultimately strengthen Pakistan’s strategic position and military power. Munir, on the other hand, has reduced Pakistan from a manipulative regional player into a fully dependent client state. Instead of using foreign alliances to enhance Pakistan’s leverage, he appears to have effectively placed Pakistan’s military and political system at the service of American and Saudi geopolitical interests.

That distinction matters enormously. Under Zia, Pakistan certainly became radicalised, militarised and deeply dependent on foreign aid. But the military still imagined itself as pursuing an ambitious strategic doctrine centred around regional influence. Under Munir, the military increasingly appears focused primarily on preserving its own domestic dominance through foreign backing regardless of the long-term consequences for Pakistan itself.

The result is the shaping up of a Pakistan where elected governments can be removed when foreign patrons lose confidence in them, where economic survival depends on IMF negotiations shaped by geopolitical obedience, where Gulf financial leverage can destabilise domestic politics overnight and where the military establishment increasingly functions as the permanent intermediary between external powers and the Pakistani state.

Imran Khan’s removal in 2022 therefore was not merely another episode of domestic political engineering. It was the latest demonstration of a much older structure in which Pakistan’s military establishment acts as the enforcement mechanism through which Saudi Arabia and the US maintain influence over the country’s strategic direction. And under Asim Munir that structure no longer even attempts to conceal itself.

(Raja Muneeb is an independent journalist and columnist. He tweets @rajamuneeb. The views expressed in this article are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.)