How Trump’s contradictions on Iran may open a Pandora’s box in West Asia

President Donald Trump told the news portal Axios on March 5 that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, who is himself an Islamic theologian, is not acceptable to him as the next Supreme Leader of Iran. Mojtaba is widely considered to be a contender for the highest office of the Islamic Republic, but, as I write these lines, Ayatollah Khamenei's successor has not been decided.

Trump also told Axios that he must have a say in who will be the former Supreme Leader’s successor. He went on to say that he wants the Venezuela example to be followed, where he had agreed to Delcy Rodriguez leading the country after President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores, were extricated by the US to New York. Rodriguez was Maduro’s vice-president.

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Iran’s revolutionary Shia theology and the entire apparatus which supports the present governance structure will make it very difficult for Trump to impose his will on Iran and decide who will be the next leader of Iran. The US and Britain had engineered the deposition of the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and had put back Shah Reza Pahlavi in power, but it is impossible to believe that the Mossadegh example can be followed now. However, does Trump’s desire to name the leader of Iran mean that he is willing to accept Iran's current governance system, which is the Vilayat-e-Faqih, established in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni, the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution?

If Trump means what he has said about choosing the next Iranian leader, it would constitute a departure from the past when it was not regime change that the US and Israel had sought in Iran but system change. (Regime change is when a government changes but the governance structure continues. A system change takes place when the governance structure changes along with a regime change.)

The decapitation of the Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the airstrike on his combined residence and office compound on February 28, constituted a regime change but not that of the governing system of Iran. Has the Trump administration realised that they have to live with the clerical order in Iran? Is it that they want a ‘reformed’ clerical system which accepts the four conditions that they have now declared for Iran?

These conditions are: abandon any desire to have nuclear weapons and to demonstrate this, do not enrich uranium at all; give up all ballistic missile capability; accept degraded and limited conventional armed forces, including in the marine domain; and abandon all connections with Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and other similar groups hitherto supported by Iran. Iran has always declared that it does not wish to make nuclear weapons. It had demonstrated its commitment not to make nuclear weapons – at least for a length of time – in the Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015, which went into operation in 2016.

In addition to the US, China, Russia, France, Britain, Germany and the European Union became parties to the deal. Under it Iran agreed to the severe curtailment of its nuclear enrichment. However, Trump abandoned the deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. He indicated that he wanted ‘regime change’ in Iran. Last year the US and Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities. Indeed, Trump implied after that Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme had been obliterated.

Trump is making contradictory noises on Iran. While his desire to appoint the new leader of the country goes in the direction of wanting the country’s territorial integrity to remain and also live with its current governance structure, his telephone calls with the Kurdish leaders go in another direction. This suspicion is bolstered by reports that the Trump administration wants the Kurds to open a front against Tehran in order to pressure the regime. This is highly dangerous for not only the Iranian system but also has the potential to affect the country’s stability and possibly its territorial integrity.

The core of Iran consists of the Persian Shia people, who constitute about fifty per cent of the population. Persian language and culture as well as the Shia mazhab have deeply influenced the rest of the population who are in greater or lesser measure integrated with the core. Of these ethnic minorities, the Azeri Shias, who are around 17 million in the country’s population of 91 million, are almost fully integrated; Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was an Azeri, as is current President Masoud Pezeshkian. However, the Kurds, Arabs and the Baloch minorities have distinct identities. These groups are Iranian but also part of larger transnational conglomerations which shape their identities and aspirations.

Thus, the Kurds are an ethnic group that is found in Turkey, Syria and Iraq, apart from Iran. Over the centuries the Kurds have naturally been influenced by their circumstances in different countries of which they are a part. However, they have retained a sense of Kurdishness. This has led to their assertion of seeking an autonomous space in all these countries.

In this quest the Turkish Kurds have resorted to a long, drawn-out insurgency against the central authority of the country. In Iraq the Kurds enjoy significant political autonomy, which has been constitutionally mandated since 2005. In Syria the current government is not willing to grant autonomy to Kurdish areas. Now, in this context, if the Iranian Kurds, who number around 9 million, which is around 10 per cent of the total population of Iran, are encouraged to rebel against Tehran, then fissiparous forces may be set in motion with dangerous consequences.

If such forces are released in one part of the country, then the Iranian Baloch who live in areas bordering Pakistan and who have been suppressed by both countries will be emboldened to take action against Tehran too. In addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Baloch are also found in Afghanistan. None of these countries want a Baloch state to come into being, but the Baloch in one country are allowed, when one country has inimical relations with another, space to carry out militant activities as part of the larger relationship. Thus, the Iranian Baloch may find support if not from the authorities, then from fellow ethnic groups.

The Arabs have a degree of contradictions with the centre in Tehran. They too may seek to assert themselves if Tehran weakens.

The prospect of strife in Iran in which groups are pitted against one another and forces emerge which weaken central authority will have grave consequences for the region. This may not immediately trouble either the US or Israel but can disrupt the flow of events in the Arabian Peninsula. That in turn will have major consequences for countries which are dependent on the Arab Gulf States for energy flows, trade, investments and remittances. These negativities will be greatly exacerbated if strife in Iran reaches a level where people begin to move as refugees.

This scenario has to be avoided, and it would be timely for India to call for the preservation of Iran’s stability and territorial integrity.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)