Nairobi terror attack: Lessons India should learn

“History,” wrote Osama bin Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam, “does not write its lines except with blood”. “Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls; honour and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses. Empires, distinguished peoples, states and societies cannot be established except with examples. Indeed those who think that they can change reality, or change societies, without blood, sacrifices and invalids, without pure, innocent souls, then they do not understand the essence of this Din.”In Nairobi this grim weekend, the world has again seen men dance to Azzam’s song of blood: 39 people are dead, and more than 150 injured, at the time of writing; more will die as the day winds by.The big story isn't—or shouldn't—be about the victims mown down as the attackers, in the words of one witness, threw grenades “like maize to chickens”.  It shouldn't be about the Indian man shot dead at point-blank range because he did not know the name Amina, the prophet Muhammad’s mother.It should be about this one stark truth: a decade after 9/11, global the jihadist movement is more powerful than at any time in the past—and the world has no clue just how to stamp it out.[caption id="attachment_1125891" align="alignleft" width="380"] A victim of the Nairobi terror attack. Reuters.[/caption]The Nairobi attacks should be bringing home one lesson to New Delhi policy makers: in a globalised word, Indian nationals and interests are at threat far from the country’s frontiers. In Kenya alone, there are more than 11,000 Indian citizens. With the United States no longer willing to lead the war on terror single-handed, it’s imperative for India to play a greater role in global counter-terrorism efforts, committing wealth—and yes, lives—to defend its citizens.FROM a sprawling maze of buildings at Camp Lemmonier, next to the airport in the former French colonial outpost of Djibouti, the United States has been fighting a grim battle against Somalia’s al-Shabab.  Eight Predator drones, eight F-18E bombers, transport jets and some 300 special forces personnel have been operating against jihadist targets. The base in reported to be in the midst of an $1.4billion expansion, which could let it house another 800 commandos.The United States’ secret war in Somali is less well-known than its campaigns in Afghanistan or Yemen—but it’s outcome isn’t too different, posing hard questions about global counter-terrorism efforts.Ever since 2007, a multinational force called AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia, has been conducting peacekeeping operations with the backing of the United Nations. Led by Uganda’s army, AMISOM succeeded in forcing al-Shabab to retreat from Mogadishu, Somali’s capital, in 2011.  Last year, more than 2,000 Kenyan troops joined hands with a Somali clan to evict al-Shabab from its last urban stronghold, the port town of Kisimayo.Following the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the country’s first proper head of state in 21 years, many experts saw signs of hope. “Many angry and disaffected Somalis passively supported al-Shabab”, the preeminent scholar of Somalia, Ken Menkhaus wrote, in part because the alternative was so uninspiring. Now that support could evaporate as Somalis rally behind the new government”.The evidence that al-Shabab was in retreat seemed persuasive.  The organisation became riven through by internal fissures.  Following a split last June between key leaders Sheikh Hassan DahirAweysand Ahmed AbdiGodane, frontal fighting broke out.  Fighters linked to Godane, who is thought to be resisting al-Qaeda’s growing influence, killed their hardline rivals Ibrahim Haji Jama Meadand Abdi Hamid HashiOlhayi. United States-born Omar Hammami, and Osama al-Britani, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, died in similar factional fighting outside Mogadishu.“Somalia is a good news story for the region, for the international community, but most especially for the people of Somalia itself”, United States assistant secretary of state Johnny Carson told journalists late last year.Not just yet, this weekend’s carnage makes clear.WHY isn’t al-Shabab in retreat, as some had expected? For one, the organisation’s tactics evolved.  Instead of force-on-force fighting with AMISOM, it switched to terrorism.  In June, 2009, it staged a suicide bombing targeting the Medina hotel in Beledweyne, following up in December with another strike on a university graduation ceremony in Mogadishu.  Then, in July, 2010, it staged its first known transnational strike, killing 74 people watching the football World Cup in Uganda’s capital, Kampala. Last summer, 15 people were killed when terrorists hit a church in Kenya.“The military strength of al-Shabaab, with an approximately 5,000-strong force, remains arguably intact in terms of operational readiness, chain of command, discipline and communications ability”, the United Nations’ Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea reported last year.“By avoiding direct military confrontation”, the UN succinctly concluded,“it has preserved the core of its fighting force and resources”.Even though al-Shabab is riven through by internal fissures, it’s still succeeded in thriving in a landscape characterised by state collapse, a polity fractured on clan lines, and endemic corruption and warlord-ism.  The country has had no functioning government for decades, the consequence of multiple coups, endemic criminality and the disintegration of government.For the global jihadist movement, these failed states are an ideal area in which to expand their influence—to develop pro-states and safe havens, of the kind al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri recently highlighted the need for.The problem is that while the United States is willing to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Somalia—targeting jihadi leaders, and retaliating against plots, for example—no-one has the resources for long wars of the kind that is winding down in Afghanistan. It certainly no longer had the stomach to attempt nation-building of the kinds it failed to do after 9/11.In recent true, the United States has repeatedly proclaimed al-Qaeda is dying. “Al-Qaeda is sort of on the ropes and taking a lot of shots to the body and the head”, White House counter-terrorism chief John Brennan said.Former defence secretary Leon Panetta concurred, arguing that the United States is “within reach” of “strategically defeating" the jihadi group.That’s true:but then, narrowly defined, al-Qaeda was never a huge military threat. At it’s peak, the organisation had a core of just under 200 cadre—120-odd grouped together in a crack unit, and a small number of foot-soldiers handling logistical work and training. Perhaps a thousand men had graduated from the training camps it ran in Afghanistan. Their remnants are under constant pressure.Yet, there’s also this: a decade after 9/11, the wider jihadist movement is more powerful than at any time in the past, exercising influence from Mali to Libya and on to Syria and Iraq. Inside Pakistan, the Tehreek-e-Taliban has all but defeated the state; in Afghanistan, the outcome of the contestation unleashed after 9/11 is far from clear.. Bin Laden himself, the scholar C. Christine Fair has noted, has emerged as a “kind of Che Guevara of the jihadist movement”: an icon important not for the operational role he played, but an inspirational figure.In the decade since 9/11, the dates have multiplied: 13/12, 7/7, 26/11. There will be more—and India hasn't done enough to prepare for the next strike on its own soil, let along in distant countries.  Yet, this problem cannot be fought by individual nations in their own territories. India need to start thinking about a strategic, global response—just as its enemies are doing right now.