Iran at a crossroads: Why US, Israel must take correct lessons from history

The confrontation between the US, Israel, and Iran has now entered a dramatically altered phase. What began as calibrated missile exchanges has crossed into strategic decapitation. The confirmed killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—alongside reports of the elimination of senior military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders (as many as 40 of them)—marks not merely escalation, but an attempt to fracture the leadership core of the Iranian state.

Yet even at this moment of extraordinary military success, one central question persists: does leadership decapitation equal regime collapse? That is an interesting subject for debate, and the reality will be known a few days later. Till then analysis is necessary. To answer the question, one must revisit the foundations of this conflict.

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Iran’s hostility toward Israel has never been merely tactical. It is ideological and civilisational. For decades, Tehran has positioned itself as the uncompromising defender of the Palestinian cause, accusing the largely Sunni Arab world of deserting it. In doing so, it sought not just to confront Israel but to claim moral and political primacy within the Islamic world. This posture locked Iran and Israel into structural confrontation long before the present exchange of missiles.

Layered onto that ideological rivalry is the nuclear question. Over 25 years, Iran developed enrichment capabilities that kept the world uncertain about its ultimate intent. The US strike on selected nuclear facilities in June 2025 produced ambiguous damage assessments. Iran may not have weaponised a device, but it retained sufficient technical depth to sustain strategic ambiguity—and leverage.

Militarily, Iran compensated for the absence of a modern air force by investing heavily in surface-to-surface missiles and drone systems. Israel, in turn, built layered missile defences and operated under the security umbrella of American regional infrastructure. Over the past two months, Washington assembled 19 warships in theatre while Israel intensified operational readiness. Diplomacy proceeded in parallel, but few believed it would succeed without coercive pressure.

That pressure has now culminated in the elimination of Iran’s ideological head and portions of its senior command structure, with none of the replacements, if any, safe any longer as long as they remain overground. The Israeli Air Force has gained total air superiority too.

From an intelligence and operational perspective, this represents a stunning achievement. It implies deep penetration of Iranian command networks, persistent surveillance, and precision strike calibration. The message to Tehran’s elite is unmistakable; no sanctuary is guaranteed. Yet, the killing of a supreme leader does not automatically dissolve a state.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains intact, albeit with suspect leadership capability. Iran’s clerical establishment remains. The Assembly of Experts still exists to determine succession. The government machinery continues to function. A segment of Iranian society remains loyal to the regime even amid widespread dissent. The system is wounded but not yet dismantled.

This is where the danger lies—not in weakness, but in temptation. From the US–Israel perspective, momentum is unmistakable. Leadership decapitation, command disruption, and psychological shock are powerful indicators of dominance. The temptation now is to push further—to convert operational success into systemic collapse. Intelligence penetration may extend beyond kinetic strikes. Information operations, inducements for elite defection, and calibrated efforts to catalyse internal dissent are conceivable instruments of hybrid strategy.

Yet history warns that moments of apparent dominance can be strategically deceptive. Leadership elimination often creates the impression of inevitability, but states rarely disintegrate in straight lines; we need to remember Iran has a population of 90 million. External shock frequently produces internal consolidation rather than fragmentation.

A wounded regime may harden before it fractures. The psychological effect of decapitation can unify security elites who might otherwise compete for influence. If Washington and Tel Aviv misinterpret temporary dislocation as irreversible collapse, escalation could outrun political design. The distinction between calibrated coercion and strategic overreach lies less in military capability than in judgement exercised at the moment of success.

It could unfold either way. A sustained push may produce the political outcome sought by the US-Israel combine. Equally, it could trigger a cohesive backlash, generating wider instability and prolonged conflict.

Regime change from the air has historically proven elusive. There is little structural reason to assume that this case is categorically different. Air power and precision strikes can degrade infrastructure, paralyse command networks, and eliminate individuals. They do not easily dismantle ideological cohesion or deeply embedded security institutions. Iraq and Libya remain sobering precedents.

The caution here is not theoretical. The death of Ali Khamenei may already have triggered emotive, nationalist and religious consolidation that transcends pre-existing domestic dissent. In moments of external assault, divisions can temporarily dissolve. If that occurs, the calculus shifts from regime fragility to regime survival instinct.

At this juncture, Washington and Tel Aviv face a historic decision. Having demonstrated overwhelming intelligence and precision superiority, they could declare limited objectives achieved and seek to bring Iran back to the negotiating table from a position of strength. That path preserves escalation control and avoids martyrdom narratives, consolidating Iranian cohesion.

Alternatively, they may interpret this moment as a narrow window to “finish the job". Continued strikes aimed at systemic collapse could follow. That path risks large-scale infrastructure destruction, civilian casualties, proxy reactivation, and prolonged instability.

Iran, for its part, cannot afford inaction. Leadership decapitation demands a response to preserve deterrence credibility. Retaliation may be symbolic or calibrated—but it must be sufficient to signal continuity of authority. A measured response would sustain limited war. An overreaction—such as a successful strike on a major American or Israeli asset—could trigger uncontrollable escalation.

The most unpredictable variable is internal Iranian cohesion. Succession struggles within the clerical hierarchy and the IRGC could either stabilise or destabilise the situation. If the security establishment remains unified, regime survival becomes probable. If fractures emerge, internal turbulence may rival external confrontation. Much will depend on the speed and cohesion of succession. If the Assembly of Experts moves swiftly to appoint a successor and the IRGC publicly demonstrates unity, the regime’s continuity narrative strengthens. Conversely, visible hesitation, elite defections, or competing power centres could generate temporary paralysis. Yet even paralysis does not guarantee collapse; security establishments often prioritise survival instinctively. The coming days will reveal whether Iran’s power structure is elastic under stress—or brittle.

Meanwhile, the information war intensifies. Allegations of civilian casualties—schools struck, infrastructure burning—must be treated cautiously. In modern conflict, perception travels faster than verification. Narrative dominance can shape escalation as decisively as missiles.

International appetite for prolonged war remains limited. Energy markets are volatile but not yet panicked. Yet escalation risk now sits higher than at any previous stage of this crisis.

For India, the stakes are tangible. Nearly 9.5 million Indian citizens work across West Asia, remitting approximately $50 billion annually. Sixty per cent of India’s energy imports originate in the region. Sustained disruption would impact growth trajectories and economic ambition. A widening war in West Asia, alongside the continuing Ukraine conflict, would amplify global instability at a time when few economies can absorb further shock.

The central illusion to guard against is that precision equates to permanence. Momentum can breed overconfidence. Strategic decapitation is a tool, not a conclusion. The temptation to press advantage now exists on both sides—one to complete the dismantling of a hostile order, the other to avenge and reassert survival.

History suggests that moments of maximum leverage are also moments of maximum danger. If this episode has demonstrated anything, it is the depth of intelligence penetration and the vulnerability of hardened power structures. The more pragmatic course would be to convert that demonstration into diplomatic leverage rather than extended destruction.

A pause at the point of dominance often yields greater strategic dividends than escalation beyond it. Peace, in such circumstances, is not concession—it is consolidation of advantage. Could sound utopian in an environment where passions may rule the head.

(The writer is the former Commander of India’s Srinagar-based Chinar Corps. Currently he is the Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir and a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)