The Tehran trap: Intelligence ops look spectacular but are not enough to win wars

“They weren’t supposed to go after all these other countries in the Middle East. They hit Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Nobody expected that. We were shocked.” This statement from the US President on March 16 pretty much sums up what has happened so far in the war in Iran. When we add the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to the equation, it becomes aptly clear how grossly the war has been misread by Israel and the US.

When Israel and the US launched pre-emptive strikes into Iran, it was based on two important factors. One, that there was a small but very crucial window of opportunity to take out the Supreme Leader of Iran along with many of his top generals because the intelligence inputs confirmed the time and location of the meeting that the Supreme Leader was going to chair. Second, the presumption that, once the Supreme Leader is dead and Iran is pounded by the overwhelming military superiority of Israel and the US, Iran will capitulate and surrender in no time, four to five days at the most.

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The war has now entered the third week, and there is no sign of Iran capitulating or its people coming out on the streets seeking a regime change. On the contrary, Iran has a new Supreme Leader in Mojtaba Khamenei, who, by most calculations, would not have become the Supreme Leader in the normal course. His first proclamation on taking the fight to Israel and the US and to any country which supports or facilitates the war is more threatening than reconciliatory. His close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may not only have been instrumental in him becoming the Supreme Leader but may now result in a bloody and protracted military campaign, the worst that the region has ever experienced.

And Iran, despite being overwhelmed militarily, continues to fight back. Its missiles are still penetrating Israeli and American air defences in sufficient numbers to cause the required damage. Its arsenal of missiles, drones and launchers, despite claims of being degraded to more than 75 per cent, continues to emerge from nowhere and fire back. Their numbers too are not dwindling, although the strike rate per day has definitely sobered down.

Why has it happened? Why did the estimation by the world’s top intelligence agencies go so wrong? Has this miscalculation trapped America once again into another ‘forever war’? The answer to some of the questions lies in how the operational plans were conceived and based on what kind of intelligence assessments.

Intelligence Operations: Spectacular but Less Decisive

The current military operation, and many more before this, conducted by the US and Israel, were based on the success of intelligence operations providing the initial but decapitating success which would be followed by a short, precise and overwhelming military campaign to ensure victory.

The targeted assassination of the Supreme Leader along with more than 40 top generals before the first aerial strikes went in on 28th February was meant to deliver a shock from which it would have been very difficult for the Iranian regime to regroup and survive. Whatever semblance of resistance would have been left, it was eliminated by the sheer weight of aerial and missile strikes, targeting the heart of Iran’s military, political and energy infrastructure.

It is not the first time that such an intelligence operation has been launched. Taking out key leadership at the top has been a key mantra to success in American thinking for a long time. Gaddafi in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq or even the recent capture of Venezuelan President Maduro had given them enough empirical logic that this theory will prevail in Iran too. Sadly, the lessons from recent incidents in the region were ignored. Israel took out Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasarullah in September 2024 in a targeted intelligence-based operation. It was preceded by a series of strikes, including the ‘pager attacks’ on top leadership of Hezbollah too. Did it result in the collapse of Hezbollah? The answer is sad. 'No.'

The ceasefire with Hezbollah in November 2024 happened not entirely because Hezbollah begged for mercy but because Israel’s operational priorities had shifted to Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah got a new leader and has steadily consolidated. The proof is being witnessed in the missile and rocket barrages which have recommenced from Southern Lebanon onto Israel and the tough fight that Hezbollah is giving to Israeli ground forces in Southern Lebanon currently.

Even in the case of Iran, the previous instance of intelligence operations was spectacular, but was it decisive? Did they expose structural fragilities in the Iranian regime? The answer is again, ‘No’.

Among those killed on 13th June 2025 when Israel launched ‘Operation Rising Lion’ into Iran were the IRGC chief, Maj Gen Hossein Salami; Armed Forces Chief Maj Gen Mohammad Bagheri; Emergency Command head Maj Gen Gholam Ali Rashid; Brig Gen Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force; Ali Shamkhani, who was the top adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and many more. Also killed were six nuclear scientists who were key figures in Iran’s nuclear programme. But the Iranian regime prevailed, not because the Supreme Leader was alive but because the multilayered structures within the military and politics did not rely on singular authority and had enough well-trained replacements.

Where are the US and Israel failing in this war? It is definitely not due to a lack of military capability but perhaps due to either ignoring or grossly underestimating the very basic military maxim ‘Know your enemy’.

Operational Intelligence

Operational intelligence is all about 'knowing your enemy', and it relies on not only the numbers in the adversary’s armed forces and its arsenal but also many more facets like operational deployments, military doctrine, likely war strategies, and contingencies that may arise during the conflict. It also includes important inputs on how the regime is likely to react to given war situations and what measures, other than military, the adversary can undertake to swing the momentum back in its favour. Another important factor to be considered at the apex level is how the population in the adversary country is likely to react, as also the kind of support or resistance the neighbouring countries and other major external powers are likely to extend during the conflict.

In the current conflict, all these vital aspects have been grossly underestimated with regard to Iran. It was estimated that Iran would have a few thousand (3,000 to 5,000) missiles which require a few hundred mobile launchers, and with sustained pressure of almost unopposed military strikes, the capability would be eliminated in a few days. After 17 days of war, Iran continues to fire missiles and drones, and the numbers are not going down. Plus, the lethality and technology of missiles are increasing by the day.

As has been admitted by President Trump himself, they did not expect Iran to fire at American bases and assets in the Gulf nations. As a result, the focus of air defence was on incoming missiles into Israel, leaving a vital flank exposed. Not only has the US resultantly suffered huge losses in the region but also has been left embarrassed at not being able to protect the Gulf countries despite decades of investment, military deployments and security guarantees.

The possibility of forced closure of the most vital choke point in the region, the Strait of Hormuz, either was not considered or was underplayed as an unlikely event. Also, the fact that despite decimating the Iranian navy, the US navy led by two aircraft carriers has been unable to secure a safe passage for oil tankers is a gross underestimation of not only the ability of Iran to instil fear in the region militarily but also the dynamics that play out in the shipping industry, especially insurance.

It is not known whether the US and Israel had taken into consideration how the Gulf countries and other allies would react to contingencies, especially where the US-Israel required help. Despite many Gulf countries allowing strikes into Iran originating from their territory, none have joined the war actively in their support. Also, the fact that none of the Nato members is willing to deploy naval assets to secure the narrow passage in the Strait of Hormuz despite threats from President Trump is also an indication of another underestimation by the US-Israel combo.

At the apex level is obviously the failure in the assessment that taking out the top leadership would lead to the collapse of the regime. Not only has the regime survived, but it is rallying together in a collective resolve to fight and survive.

Conclusion

The war in Iran is a classic lesson on how operational military intelligence is absolutely vital for a military victory, especially against an adversary like Iran, which does not rely on a single powerful autocratic leader but has a complex and interwoven system of leadership. While intelligence-based targeted operations may look spectacular, they cannot deliver military victory unless they are backed by a realistic assessment of the enemy, based on operational intelligence. It also is a lesson in warfighting, where a country which is pitched against the mightiest and technologically most superior military is giving an equal fight by adopting a strategy of survival rather than outright military victory.

(Col Rajeev Agarwal is a West Asia expert and a Senior Research Consultant at Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi. His X handle is @rajeev1421. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)