India and China are ‘friends’, but at what cost?

China’s repeated assertion that it seeks stable and friendly relations with India stands in sharp contrast to its continuing efforts to rename places in Arunachal Pradesh, consolidate administrative control in territories claimed by India, and sustain the long existing ambiguity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India is, therefore, right to reject such actions not simply as symbolic irritants but as part of a larger pattern of strategic behaviour.

The issue at stake is not merely one of maps or temporary diplomatic friction and is most definitely not an isolated territorial disagreement awaiting technical settlement – it is a historically layered and politically charged conflict, rooted in incompatible understandings of what ‘sovereignty’ truly means. In that sense, the real question is not whether India and China can be "friends" but whether the relationship can ever move beyond managed distrust.

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This is important because the language of friendship often obscures more than it reveals. It suggests that the central challenge in India-China relations is a deficit of goodwill, when in fact the difficulty lies elsewhere. The boundary dispute is the product of two states approaching the same frontier from fundamentally different historical and political premises. The persistence of the problem, thus, arises from the fact that India and China do not merely disagree over where the boundary lies but also on the very basis upon which the boundary ought to be understood. They differ on the legitimacy of inherited treaties, on the significance of colonial-era arrangements, on the relevance of administrative practice, and even on what constitutes the status quo to be restored or defended. Under such conditions, every cartographic act becomes political, and every diplomatic reassurance is shadowed by deeper conceptual incompatibility.

The roots of this incompatibility can be seen clearly in the early exchanges between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai. These letters are important not just as historical documents but as evidence that the dispute was foundational from the very beginning. In his December 1958 letter, Nehru wrote that when the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement relating to Tibet was concluded, "No border questions were raised at that time, and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries.” He added that India’s boundaries were “quite clear and were not a matter of argument". These statements reflected India’s postcolonial legal position: that the territorial boundaries inherited at independence, however shaped by imperial history, formed the legitimate basis of the modern Indian state.

Zhou Enlai’s reply of January 1959 proceeded from a visibly different logic. He stated that “the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimitated” and that “differences do exist” between the two sides. On the McMahon Line, he was explicit: it was “a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China” and could not, in strict legal terms, be treated as valid. At most, China might take a “more or less realistic attitude” toward it.

What India had long regarded as a settled inheritance, China, through these statements, made clear that it regarded as the residue of imperial imposition. Legal continuity for one and historical rectification for another.

This is why the problem is so difficult to resolve. It is not simply that the frontier is undemarcated or that the LAC remains unverified. The more serious challenge is that the dispute is entangled with questions of sovereignty and post-imperial identity. Neither India nor China presents itself as bargaining over uncertain or newly acquired claims. Each claims to be defending rights that are historically grounded and morally justified.

Yet it would be a mistake to treat the dispute as ‘purely historical’. Its persistence is also sustained by the contemporary geopolitical environment. The boundary question does not exist in isolation from the wider Asian balance of power. At the same time, the dispute is sharpened by contrasting national narratives and media culture. In India, the border question has increasingly come to symbolise territorial integrity, strategic autonomy, and resistance to coercion. This generates a political expectation that the state must insist on reciprocity, parity, and restoration of the status quo ante wherever possible. Under such circumstances, even limited accommodation can be risky, as it can be interpreted domestically as ‘weakness’. On the other hand, in China, the official approach often appears more comfortable with deliberate ambiguity.

India must therefore resist two temptations. The first is romanticism: the belief that rhetorical civility or economic interdependence can dissolve hard geopolitical contradictions. The second is performative reaction: treating every Chinese provocation as an occasion for immediate emotional counter-signalling. A reactive posture may satisfy domestic sentiment, but it also reveals strategic insecurity. This is because it will allow Beijing to set the rhythm of the relationship. India’s approach should be to remain firm, factual, and historically grounded. Rather than chasing symbolic parity in every exchange, New Delhi should place sustained emphasis on documentary evidence and the demand that peace on the frontier is the precondition for normalcy elsewhere. In this sense, India’s strategic task is not to “befriend” China in any conventional sense.

Yes, the two countries may cooperate where interests converge, communicate to prevent escalation, and maintain selective engagement in trade and diplomacy. But this is not friendship; it is ‘cautious engagement'.

If the Nehru-Zhou correspondence has taught us anything, it is that the dispute was never superficial or one-dimensional. China may seek stable ties with India, but stability on Chinese terms often demands that India accommodate ambiguity and absorb pressure. India’s task is to engage firmly, without compromising strategic clarity or self-respect.

(The author is a researcher at the East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)