Europe’s real problem is dependency on America, not Donald Trump

A day after the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany and Donald Trump said that the US would cut “a lot further than 5,000” troops, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that the greatest threat to the Transatlantic Alliance isn’t external but its “ongoing disintegration”.

Trump’s reckless decision was prompted by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s comment that Iran had “humiliated” America in the war.

Trump’s aggression had the desired effect. Both Merz and his defence minister, Boris Pistorius, who had earlier said that “Europeans must take on more responsibility for our own security”, downplayed Trump’s latest move as “expected”, not sudden.

Merz, in an interview with public broadcaster ARD, said that Trump’s decision wasn’t related to his Iran comment and that “Americans are important partners for us”. Merz added that the US had also temporarily cancelled the Joe Biden administration’s promise to deploy SM-6, Tomahawk, Dark Eagle (hypersonic) and PrSM ballistic missiles, and the Operational Fires ground-launched hypersonic missile system, in Germany.

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As expected, Germany capitulated before Trump—and so have several other European nations. After Trump vowed to increase tariffs on European cars and trucks to 25 per cent, Merz blamed the EU and added that Germany shared Trump’s “common goal” of stopping Iran from developing nukes.

Europe Important to US Operations

Europe’s strategic location at the intersection of Africa, West Asia and Central Asia makes it America’s largest overseas fortress, from where it projects power and force in every direction.

The US has around 68,000 troops stationed across 31 permanent bases and 19 military sites in Europe, according to the US Defense Manpower Data Center. The US European Command, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, oversees military operations across both Europe and West Asia by providing troops, fighter jets, bombers, intelligence, reconnaissance and logistics.

The US has nine Army garrisons in Europe: five in Germany, and one each in Belgium, Italy, Poland and the Black Sea region (Romania and Bulgaria). The garrisons in Germany house 36,436 active US troops. Bavaria Garrison, in Grafenwöhr, is the largest overseas American Army base in the world. America’s largest overseas air base is in Ramstein, from where attack drones take off.

The US has 12,662 active-duty service members in Italy, 10,156 in the UK and 3,814 in Spain. Several other European nations also house US troops. The US Air Force has two bases each in the UK and Germany, and one each in Italy, the Azores and Turkey. Europe also played a major role in the Iran war, with American bombers taking off from UK bases, and Germany, Portugal, Italy, France and Romania refuelling US planes.

Despite Europe’s contribution, Trump has slammed it for not helping the US in ending Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump also hasn’t ruled out pulling out troops from Italy and Spain. “Why shouldn’t I? Italy has not been of any help to us, and Spain has been horrible. Absolutely horrible,” he told the media.

However, Trump is only one aspect of the challenge Europe faces. There are other factors which have contributed to Europe’s weakness.

Europe’s Lack of Unity on Iran War

Tusk was wrong in suggesting that the greatest threat to the European-American alliance is the “ongoing disintegration”.

The greatest threat is a divided Europe. The Iran war has exposed deep divisions in the region. The war is hugely unpopular in Europe, but most leaders have been hesitant in criticising Trump’s unprovoked aggression against Iran. Except for Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who denied US access to its airspace and the deployment of strategic bombers, other leaders only called for respecting international law, diplomacy and restraint.

France’s President Emmanuel Macron, who initially said the war was “outside international law”, allowed US fuel tankers in French airspace. In fact, France, Germany and the UK helped the US logistically without direct military intervention. The UK even allowed B-1B and B-52H bombers to take off from RAF Fairford and B-2As from Diego Garcia.

Europe’s lack of unity and will to be independent of the US was summed up by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who said that European leaders had got Trump’s message. “They heard the message loud and clear,” Rutte said before a European Political Community meeting in Armenia.

Europe’s Lack of United Defence

The reason Trump gets away with insulting and coercing Europe is the continent’s dependence on the US to lead the bloc with its superior firepower and global reach.

The EU does have an Article 5-like mutual defence clause. Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty calls upon member states to assist a member attacked in its territory by all means in their power in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Article 42.7 has been invoked only once—during the Islamic State (IS)-led attacks in Paris in 2015. But again, the anti-IS coalition was led by the US. The EU also has the Common Security and Defence Policy, which, however, allows military missions only to preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security in accordance with the UN Charter.

Even if an EU member is attacked, the bloc doesn’t have a common army with a joint command structure. The idea of a European Army, as old as the Cold War, was revived several times but failed. The idea gained momentum after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Trump’s recurring threats to quit NATO.

“It is time to create a European army,” Sánchez said last year, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy backing him.

However, the idea of a European Army faces several obstacles. First is NATO—23 of the 27 EU members are part of the military bloc. Article 42.7 specifies that assisting member states “shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”. NATO’s former Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, had said that money invested in an EU Army would be a loss for the alliance.

Second, the EU is divided over a common army. Central and eastern countries prefer NATO, not a European Army, to deter Russia.

“We are not in favour of a single European Army,” Portugal’s Defence Minister Nuno Melo said last month. Besides, neutral nations like Austria, Ireland and Malta don’t support the idea either. Third is interoperability.

Europe has 172 different types of major weapons systems, aircraft, vehicles and combat vessels, compared to just 32 in the US, according to Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. For example, the EU has 17 different main battle tanks and 30 fighter planes.

On the other hand, NATO’s strength is interoperability, the defining feature of its joint operations. Interoperability ensures that allies can share common facilities, interact, connect and communicate, and exchange data and services with other equipment.

Removing these major obstacles will be a Herculean and time-consuming task. As Rutte recently said, “If anyone thinks here again that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming.”

Europe’s Reliance on US Arms

The Ukraine war has exposed Europe’s inability to rapidly manufacture weapons useful to Kyiv—HIMARS, Patriot batteries and 155mm artillery rounds.

Last year, the US produced 86 per cent of rocket artillery, 82 per cent of howitzer rounds and 70 per cent of long-range anti-aircraft systems supplied to Ukraine, as per Kiel Institute estimates.

At the beginning of the war, the US was the leading arms supplier to Ukraine. Now, it’s Europe. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Germany has provided the most military assistance to Ukraine, at $23.52 billion, followed by the UK ($16.78 billion) and Denmark ($11.69 billion) since 2022.

However, Ukraine’s annual demand for 155mm rounds and interceptor missiles (4,800 units annually) is far beyond European production capacity, according to CSIS.

According to a March 9 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Europe more than tripled its arms imports between 2016-20 and 2021-25, with a 217 per cent increase in US arms exports to the region. Ukraine received 9.7 per cent of all arms transfers in 2021-25.

European states received 33 per cent of global arms imports, with the region’s imports increasing by 210 per cent between 2016-20 and 2021-25—48 per cent of weapons transferred to European states came from the US.

Europe has also purchased US weapons worth $4 billion under NATO’s $10-billion Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List between August and November last year. If the US exits NATO and Europe decides to form a unified army, it would need massive amounts of arms and ammunition beyond the region’s production capacity.

According to an analysis by European think tank Bruegel, a credible European deterrence would require a minimum of 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 700 artillery pieces (155mm howitzers and multiple rocket launchers). This requirement is more than the combat power of German, French, British and Italian land forces.

“Providing these forces with sufficient munitions will be essential—beyond the bare-bones stockpiles currently available.” For example, a million 155mm rounds would be the minimum for a stockpile to last 90 days in a war.

Europe would also need 300,000 troops for a unified army. Moreover, defence spending would have to increase by €250 billion annually, or around 3.5 per cent of GDP in the short term.

Europe Dependent on US Nuclear Umbrella

Since the Cold War, the US nuclear umbrella has been covering its European allies under NATO. The US has stationed tactical nukes at six bases in five European NATO allies under nuclear-sharing agreements.

There are 100 US nukes—B61-12, B61-3 and -4 gravity bombs—stored in Kleine Brogel, Belgium; Büchel, Germany; Aviano and Ghedi, Italy; Volkel, the Netherlands; and Incirlik, Turkey. F-16s, Tornados, Typhoons and F-35As can deliver these weapons, which aren’t armed or deployed on aircraft but stored in underground vaults.

However, the launch codes are in American hands, meaning the US retains absolute control and custody over them. Decisions on their use require the NATO Nuclear Planning Group’s approval and specific US authorisation.

Therefore, the risk of Trump exiting NATO or not assisting a member under attack looms over the nuclear umbrella.

France, the UK and Germany have realised that they could be left without the American nuclear umbrella. France and the UK are the only nuclear powers in the region. While France’s nuclear deterrent is independent and separate from NATO’s integrated military command structure, the UK’s nuclear deterrent is assigned to NATO.

After Trump blamed Ukraine for the war in February 2025, Emmanuel Macron proposed extending France’s nuclear umbrella to European partners. In July 2025, France and the UK decided, under the Northwood Declaration, to increase coordination of nuclear policies, capabilities and operations, and established a nuclear steering group.

In January, Merz said that European nations were “discussing the development of a joint nuclear umbrella with European allies”. In March, Macron made the most substantial changes in France’s nuclear doctrine in decades. Under “forward deterrence”, France will build more nukes, not disclose their numbers, deploy nuclear-capable jets in other European nations and increase bilateral collaboration on deterrence with key European allies.

The problem is that France doesn’t even have a nuclear triad—air-, sea- and land-based nukes—after deactivating its land-based ballistic missiles in 1996.

France has only two kinds of nuclear weapons. The M51 long-range, MIRV-capable SLBM can be launched from its four SSBNs. The Air-Sol Moyenne Portée ALCM can be delivered by the Mirage 2000N or the Rafale F3. Moreover, France’s 290 nuclear warheads pale in comparison to the massive Russian stockpile. Though one nuke can cause enough devastation, Russia can destroy the world several times over with its vast arsenal. The UK doesn’t have a nuclear triad either. It has 225 warheads, of which 120 can be deployed on 48 SLBMs. It has only Trident 5 SLBMs, which can be deployed on its four Vanguard-class SSBNs.

Moreover, Macron has offered to extend France’s nuclear deterrence, not an umbrella, with the button in his control. Unlike NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements or a Nuclear Planning Group, in which non-nuclear bloc members have a say in shaping the alliance’s nuclear policy and planning, Paris wants to be in complete control. This is similar to the US controlling its nukes in Europe.

(The writer is a freelance journalist with more than two decades of experience and comments primarily on foreign affairs. He tweets as @FightTheBigots. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)