Beyond the Lines | West Asian crisis: Why Iran may hold the strategic advantage

As missiles hissed into buildings in Tehran, decimating the Iranian leadership in one fell swoop, one could not help but notice the global wave of shock and awe, in equal measure, at the visual clips of collapsing buildings and dismantled meeting rooms. While it revealed the audacity and capacity of American and Israeli intelligence to execute precision operations, the immediate message of the strike carried a deathly impact and a deadly aftershock. 

Months of Israeli intelligence gathering had transformed actionable information into combustible energy, massed clinical preparation into a surgical operation, and a military strike into a Hollywoodian spectacle — much like how the Maduro operation in Venezuela gave us a glimpse of distant decapitation. This provided proof of the deep penetration America was capable of. But then reality was expected to unravel more questions than answers. A strike is not a guarantee of success. Iran is not Venezuela. Optics do not unpack options. Complex geopolitics cannot warrant easy solutions. 

More from Opinion

Why This Happened Now 

Before we begin to unpack potential outcomes, let us examine the timing. Why now? In the 12-day war in June 2025, the Iranians surprised Israel by penetrating its defences using ballistic missiles. The war ended because Israel did not want to fight on before it had prepared for it. Besides, Israel realised that it needed America to actively participate in the war for it to succeed. 

By February 2026, the situation had changed, and the Americans were now convinced about entering the war. Israel and America were ready, and so was Iran. After the 12-day war, China supplied Iran with CM-302 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles that could target US ships with a range of 290–460 km and threaten US carriers in the Persian Gulf. 

The February gamble was going to be a risky one, yet Israel persisted. However, noted political theorist John Mearsheimer believes Israel sees Iran as an existential threat and has a single objective — to wreck Iran. Iran is not a direct threat to the US. However, with Chinese help, Iran’s ballistic missiles now threaten Israel alongside the proxy threat ecosystem against Israeli interests, such as Hezbollah, which it could revive. Thus, the threat posed by Iran has dissimilar meanings for Israel and America. Co-opting the US increases the chances Israel has of attaining its objective. On the other hand, America has more to lose in this war. 

Though the chances of success of this campaign are unclear, it is believed that this tiny window for destroying Iran would shut for Israel if it were not to act now with a willing American president riding a horse of hubris. There are two possibilities from this war: either it ends quickly or it goes on forever. America wants regime change for it to end. 

What happens now? 

Unlike Venezuela, Iran is a country that has experienced five decades of radicalised Shia Islamic infrastructure built into an ironclad system wherein decapitating the leader only hardens radical belief and the will to fight. They also have full control of the country. Thus, regime change cannot happen by remote means and needs the physical presence of the US. That lessens the possibility of a short war and, as it drags on, reduces American options. 

Air warfare theorist Robert Pape says that in the last 100 years of bombing, not a single regime change has been achieved by a bigger power over a weaker one without putting boots on the ground. Will the US invade Iran and deploy American troops? Since 1947, the US has been involved in around 100 regime change operations in other countries, and most have resulted in destabilising those countries. 

It was in Iran that the US first dismantled the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 to install their puppet, the Shah of Iran, to secure oil interests. The current regime in Iran has been preparing for this day forever — against an American attack. The US will have to fight a longer campaign to defeat Iran. 

Does America have the stomach for a longer fight should it come to that? The American success on the first day is archetypal Trump — wherein the bomb bore his bluster. But will he, unused to the politics of sustained conflict, survive the pains of its consequences? Donald Trump is used to quick results and has not indicated any appetite for a grinding war of attrition. 

Trump promised to restore peace in the Russia–Ukraine war but walked away when the going got tough. He could not find any solution to the Gaza conflict — again oversimplifying the approach. His claim of brokering peace in eight recent wars reveals a lack of prudence and a desperation to stay relevant. 

There is an area of concern that could prove decisive. Recently, General Dan Caine, Chief of Defence Staff of the US, flagged the possibility of a depleted capability to fight a longer war. The US could run out of air interceptors to stop Iranian missiles within weeks of constant fighting. The US is racing to eliminate Iran’s ballistic missile capability before interceptors run out in three to four weeks, while Iran plans to extend the conflict.  

On the other hand, if the US depletes its air defence munitions, it could move its reserves from Japan, which in turn diminishes its defences against China. That, of course, is a strategic objective that Iran — and by extension China — will fulfil if the war goes on longer. 

How is Iran likely to extend the war? 

The Iranians are aware of Trump’s presidential limitations and are engaging American interests in the GCC region, complicating matters for Trump. It is likely that, faced with the grim possibility of a longer, dirtier war, Trump may announce a quick victory and retreat from the fight, as he has done in the past. 

Putting boots on the ground will open him up to closer scrutiny as a leader, and he may not have the appetite beyond a point. 

Iran has decided to shut the Strait of Hormuz — a 33-kilometre-wide channel that supplies a fifth of the world’s oil. Five tankers are known to have been damaged and over a hundred ships are stranded around the Strait, which separates Iran and Oman. There is already a surge in oil prices. 

The war has narrowed the immediate risk to a single point of failure — the Strait of dependence. As a mark of gratitude for its help, Iran has opened the Strait only for Chinese carriers to pass. Iran has cleverly brought China onto the periphery of the war while keeping America out. 

While closing choices on the narrow strait, it expands the repercussions to the region around it and beyond. 

What are the implications? 

The immediate anxiety lies in the area around the zone of conflict. Traditionally, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar had stayed away from engaging in conflicts, instead focusing on making the region one of the world’s most business-friendly economic zones. 

The war will affect Saudi Arabia’s economy, which is completely dependent on oil. Bombing water infrastructure could leave Saudis without water in a few weeks, believes Professor Jiang Xueqin, known for his work on predictive history. 

Places such as Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai had become places of residence for global citizens from Europe, Australia, South East Asia and India. The hospitality infrastructure and data centre towers were hit in the UAE, which makes the hitherto peaceful region vulnerable to global investors. Besides attacking American bases, Iran has expanded the conflict into these areas, hoping to extract support from these countries against the American attack. 

In June 2025, Iran’s response was proportionate, but this time the response has been overwhelming and may have caught everyone by surprise. It appears that the initial bombing of Tehran may have hoodwinked the US into believing that it had it easy. The death of its top leadership lulled Donald Trump into believing half the war was won. 

In fact, Khamenei’s death has made the Iranian government more obdurate and hardened the people’s will to rally stronger against an external enemy. Here is the basic difference in perception: while loss of life is seen as a setback by the US and Western forces, it is seen as martyrdom to the cause by Iran. 

Iran had been preparing for this day for years and has been banking on a vast landscape of mountains and valleys — terrain that allows assets to be relocated, camouflaged and secured. The US was supposed to dismantle old, ageing and underwhelming Iranian weapon systems. Instead, it has a fight on its hands. 

Not for nothing is asymmetric warfare a subject known to favour the underdog. 

America has locked horns with Iran before. In 1979, a hostage crisis in Iran ended Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Five decades later, Donald Trump sits at the edge of history in the same country — without an exit plan. 

(The writer is the author of ‘General Brasstacks: The Sundarji Story’, ‘Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory over China’ and ‘Camouflaged: Forgotten Stories From Battlefields’. His column for Firstpost — ‘Beyond the Lines’ — covers military history, strategic issues, international affairs and policy-business challenges. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Tweets @iProbal)