Beyond ceasefire and naval blockade: Prospects of an unending war loom large in Iran

It has happened again, for the second time this month. Hours before the 15-day ceasefire between the US and Iran was supposed to expire on 21 April 2026, President Donald Trump announced an indefinite extension to the ceasefire. Justifying it, he stated that the ceasefire was being extended based on a request by the Pakistani leadership, to permit more time for Iran to present a ‘unified proposal’ as the ‘government of Iran is seriously fractured’. This came after a day-long drama where the US delegation led by Vice President JD Vance was ‘boarded and ready’ to fly into Pakistan while Iran stood firm in its stance that no talks could happen in an environment of distrust.

The script had an uncanny familiarity to the announcement of the ceasefire earlier this month. On 7 April, much against the run of play, President Trump unilaterally declared a 15-day ceasefire mere 90 minutes before the deadline was to expire, claiming, like this time too, that it was based on conversations and requests from Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan, and subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the complete, immediate and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

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What Happens Now

It is clear that the extension of the ceasefire was forced upon the US as Iran stood defiant and refused to travel to Pakistan ‘under pressure and threat’. It also went contrary to President Trump’s statement just a few hours before the extension that there would be no extension and that if Iran did not agree to a deal, the US would recommence military operations. Plus, the ceasefire extension has been rejected by Iran, stating that the US is in no position to dictate terms. It is, however, unlikely that Iran will initiate any combat operations on its own.

The extension of the ceasefire, however, comes with the stipulation that the naval blockade imposed by the US Navy across the Oman Sea will continue and that any ship coming from or going to Iranian ports will be interdicted. In fact, two days before the earlier phase of the ceasefire was to end, the US Navy intercepted an Iranian-flagged ship, ‘Touska’, on 19 April, alleging that the ship, which was a part of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), was carrying dual-use items which could be used for military purposes.

The naval blockade aims to maximise economic pressure on Iran by restricting any source of revenue from oil or goods trade. Also, the sanction waiver on the purchase of Iranian oil has been revoked on 19 April, which, along with the naval blockade, could have serious repercussions on the Iranian economy, already feeling serious pressure and high inflation.

With the ceasefire being extended, two issues that were critical at the start of the war, Iran’s nuclear programme and its ballistic missile programme, also need to be reviewed. As regards the nuclear programme, the US has been insisting that Iran hand over 450 kg of enriched (60 per cent) uranium to the US and also make a commitment of complete stoppage of enrichment for at least ten years. On both counts, Iran has made it clear that it is not going to comply. In fact, most analysts are of the view that the US cannot get a better deal on the nuclear programme than what was agreed to by Iran on 27 February, a day before the US and Israel launched the pre-emptive strikes on Iran.

Under that proposal, Iran had agreed to down-blending of the complete stockpile of enriched uranium, have no stockpiling of enriched uranium at all in the future, enrich only what is required for making medical isotopes, and most importantly, submit to strict monitoring and supervision by the IAEA at all its nuclear sites. All these measures combined would have ensured achievement of the goal of the US and Israel — no nuclear weapon capability ever for Iran. Plus, it would have been better than the revoked nuclear deal of 2015, called the JCPOA. Sadly, it was ignored by the US and now, to go back to the same proposal may be too embarrassing and difficult.

Coming to the ballistic missile programme, the intense military campaign by the US and Israel was aimed at crippling Iran’s capability to neutralise the threat completely. Despite claims that 70-80 per cent of Iran’s missile inventory and almost 80 per cent of its mobile missile launchers were destroyed, Iran still retains a large inventory of missiles and its launchers. Plus, its defence industry is rapidly replenishing the missile stock.

Satellite imagery is revealing regular progress on Iran clearing its underground missile silos and launcher sites, which indicates that the threat is far from over. In fact, contrary to initial assessments by the US and Israel that Iran has an inventory of 3,000 to 5,000 missiles along with 550 mobile launchers, many estimates indicate that even the remaining inventory of Iran may exceed 5,000 missiles along with over 200 missile launchers.

The Naval Blockade and Global Economy

The continuing double naval blockade (by Iran and the US, on either side of the Strait of Hormuz) is beginning to become critical. Against an average flow of around 12 million barrels of oil through the Strait of Hormuz before the war, the average outflow has drastically reduced to a trickle. Against an average of 120-130 ships that used to transit the Strait, the numbers have been reduced to single digits and could reach almost zero if Iran and the US ensure a strict blockade. Although the pipelines of Saudi Arabia and the UAE carrying oil directly into the Red Sea can carry around 5 million barrels per day, that too could be blocked if the Iran-backed Houthis block the Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint in the Red Sea.

The International Energy Agency has warned that the current crisis resulting from the blockade is turning out to be the largest disruption in the history of the global oil market. Continued closure is severely threatening global energy security and is likely to create a jet fuel shortage in Europe within six weeks, which could cause significant price surges. Despite the release of 400 million barrels from global strategic reserves, the severe shortfall in crude oil supplies is likely to only multiply in the coming weeks.

It is not, however, only energy supplies which are threatening the global economy. Ships carrying perishable food items and pharmaceuticals are also stuck, leading to shortages at the destinations and rapid reduction in revenue at the production centres. The side effects of crude oil and LPG shortages have already started affecting the fertiliser industry, semiconductor facilities, chemical and plastic factories, and many more. Also, with every week of blockade, the timelines to restore normalcy once the blockade opens are getting stretched.

Gulf States Caught in the Crossfire

The Gulf states have been caught in the crossfire like never before. Their energy infrastructure has been bombed, their food supplies have been blocked, and their fragile security umbrella has been exposed. The prospect of a stronger and more belligerent Iran looms over their future horizon if the war ends in the current state of stalemate, with Iran clearly ascendant. Plus, the vulnerability of their energy supplies through a singular choke point, the Strait of Hormuz, has been brutally exposed. The war has also exposed the fault lines within the Gulf nations, and it will require a serious and time-consuming review of their collective security apparatus to come up with workable solutions after the war. One thing is, however, clear: the days of sole dependence on American security guarantees are long over.

India’s Predicament

After a rather shaky start in the early phases of the war, India has been able to restore its fine balance in the region. As a result, almost 10 ships destined for Indian shores have been able to pass the blockade. Its strategic oil reserves are holding, and its strategy of diversifying sources for purchase is working, but it is a time-consuming process. With the waiver on the purchase of oil from Iran being revoked, India is relying primarily on Russian oil supplies. However, with Qatar and UAE LPG not available and not many alternate sources available, LPG may soon turn into a criticality.

To give a rough estimate, India imports almost 2 billion barrels of crude oil per year, of which 80 per cent comes from the Gulf region, i.e. 1.6 billion barrels. Broken down to an average daily import, it works out to be 44 lakh barrels per day from the Gulf region. A Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) can carry about 2 million barrels, which would suffice for about 5 days of supply. In the past 54 days of the war, only 10-odd tankers have reached India, carrying 10,000 to 20,000 barrels each, none of them a VLCC. Most estimates suggest that India can manage comfortably till about the first week of May, after which, in the absence of regular imports of oil, there can be criticalities.

Conclusion

The indefinite extension of the ceasefire is not a solution to the problem created in the region by the pre-emptive strikes in Iran on 28 February. The US clearly has no stamina for a continuation of the war, but it has no clear exit strategy either. Rejection of this extension by Iran is an added embarrassment for the US. The naval blockade by the US may have been aimed at targeting Iran, but it is likely to end up hurting the global economy, and soon.

Less than a day into the extended ceasefire, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has claimed that it has seized two ships in the Strait of Hormuz and transferred them to Iranian waters. A third vessel, which was fired upon, has been “disabled off Iran’s coast.” These reports are definitely going to force shipping and insurance companies to once again shut down any passage through the Strait.

Going by the statements emanating from Tehran, it is quite evident that Iran thinks it holds the edge. In such a scenario, getting Iran to accept US-Israel terms on issues like the nuclear programme or the Strait of Hormuz looks very unlikely. In fact, Iran may make more belligerent demands than ever before, even insisting that Israel open up its nuclear programme to the IAEA. For the US, this war has turned out to be an embarrassment. A number of generals and admirals in the US who have dissented on the decisions made during the war have either resigned or have been forced to retire. What Americans need to now remember is that leaders will come and go, but a nation’s credibility, once lost, is very tough to regain. Meanwhile, the war looks headed for a prolonged period of uncertainty.

(Col Rajeev Agarwal is a West Asia expert and a Senior Research Consultant at Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi. His X handle is @rajeev1421. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)